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C O NC LUSIO N ..................................................................
APPLYING THE ANTISUBORDINATION PRINCIPLE ..........................................

INTRODUCTION

Through an examination of the tax law's treatment of child-care expenditures,
I intend to show both how the current tax law facilitates class, gender, and race
subordination and how it could be designed to disrupt it.' By looking at the tax
law's treatment of employment-related child-care expenditures, I will make the
argument that a comprehensive tax analysis requires not only an examination of2
the well-recognized issues of equity, administrability, and economic rationality,
but also consideration of other issues of social justice-specifically,
consideration of the implications of economic exploitation, racism, and sexism
on economic arrangements. I appreciate that there is currently little consensus
among policymakers for the need to include what I will call the
antisubordinationprinciple in tax reform deliberations.3 A review of child-care
expenditures offers the opportunity to demonstrate how the antisubordination
principle can further social justice while enhancing our general understanding of
the tax law and producing reforms that advance the traditional goals of equity,
administrability, and economic rationality.
Currently, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) includes two alternative
provisions, sections 21 and 129, designed to reduce the tax liability for taxpayers
incurring employment-related child-care costs. 4 These provisions promise to
1. I have intentionally chosen the term subordination rather than discrimination for two reasons. First, I
want to avoid confusing the marketplace arrangements that I will be critiquing with the discriminatory acts that
the law already prohibits. Some of the arrangements that I will describe may be illegal, but many of the others
are not, despite their discriminatory and subordinating effect. The second reason I am using the term
subordination is to encourage the reader to consider the multiple ways in which domination of a group occurs.
In this regard, my thinking is informed by the work of Iris Marion Young, who organizes the concepts and
conditions that produce oppression into five categories: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and violence. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 39-65 (1990).
Subordination in the marketplace and the tax law based on disability or sexual orientation must also be
investigated. The analysis of both these forms of discrimination requires a substantial amount of background
analysis to show how both are related integrally to class, gender, and race and to show how the omission of
specific provisions recognizing the specific needs of persons with disabilities and of those in the bisexual,
lesbian, gay, and transgender communities is one of the ways discrimination occurs. For that reason, I have
decided to limit my introduction of an antisubordination principle to tax policy discussions to consideration of
issues of class, gender, and race and to defer questions involving disability and sexual orientation. I
acknowledge that the different systems of subordination are related integrally and inseparably and appreciate
that I am presenting only a fragment of an antisubordination tax framework by looking exclusively at class,
gender, and race issues.

2. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG. , GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, 6-11 (Comm. Print 1987); STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 88TH CONG., THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 30-42 (Comm. Print 1964).
3. In referring to persons who engage in discussions of tax policy, I will use the term policymakers. I
include within that term academics, researchers from privately funded organizations, elected officials, and
others working in either the executive or legislative branches of government.
4. I.R.C. §§ 21, 129 (1994) [hereinafter all citations to the Code will omit the year]. Sections 21 and 129
also reduce the tax liability for taxpayers incurring employment-related care expenditures for dependents other
than their minor children. A complete analysis of dependent-care expenditures for persons other than minor
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show the useful application of the antisubordination principle for two reasons.
One reason is that the provisions are frequently the subject of a debate in which
both proponents and opponents of the provisions rely on one of the tax law's
most basic tax tools-the business/personal distinction-to reach different
conclusionsi Opponents urge Congress not to make any provision in the Code
for child-care expenditures because the expenditures are a form of consumption.6
In contrast, proponents argue that current law should be expanded to provide tax
relief for child-care costs incurred to permit a parent or parents to engage in
business either as an employee or entrepreneur. 7 If, with regard to a particular tax
issue like childcare, the business/personal distinction does not produce
predictable and widely accepted results, that suggests that the antisubordination
principle may prove useful.
The inadequacy of the tax analysis of child-care expenditures suggests a
second reason why the antisubordination principle may be applied profitably to
this area of tax law. The conventional tax analysis of child-care provisions
focuses exclusively on the effects of the provisions on the parents, usually
mothers, to engage in waged work. Little or no consideration is given in
traditional tax analysis on the effects of the provisions on the waged child-care
worker.8 For example, Anne Alstott, who considers the tax treatment of childcare expenditures in a recent article devoted to considering what tax policy might
contribute to a feminist legal agenda, analyzes the tax provisions exclusively
from the viewpoint of the consumer of child-care services. 9 Even though
Professor Alstott throughout her article is dedicated to evaluating the tax law by
considering the different family and economic circumstances of women, 10 childcare workers are invisible in her analysis. This omission is particularly
confounding because the economic arrangement that is the very subject of
taxation is the purchase of child-care services. Nevertheless, the focus of
attention in tax discussions is the parent's decision to engage in unwaged labor
in the home or waged labor in the marketplace. The antisubordination principle,
children would require an investigation of demographic changes within the American family, medicare and
medicaid policies, and a range of disability-rights issues. I have therefore decided to limit the inquiry of this
article to employment-related child-care expenditures.
5. See infra notes 227-36, 250-56 and accompanying text discussing, within the context of employmentrelated child-care expenditures, the business/personal distinction and its relationship to the tax concept of
imputed income.
6. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1445-47
(1975); Lawrence Zelenak, Children andthe Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349, 359-61 (1994).

7. See, e.g., ABA Section on Taxation, Report of the Child Care Credit Task Force, 46 TAX NOTEs 331,
334-35 (1990).
8. See infra notes 271-374 and accompanying text (describing the analysis of employment-related childcare expenditures found in influential tax law texts and showing that the waged child-care worker played no
role in that analysis).
9. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2056-59 (1996). Further evidence of the invisibility of child-care workers in Professor
Alstott's analysis is the definition she adopts for the term "caregivers." She defines them as "women or men
who perform family labor" using the term "family labor" to mean "the unpaid work of caring for children and
other family members." Id at 2004 nn. 11 & 13.
10.

See, e.g., id. at 2025-26.
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which is based on the proposition that economic exploitation, sexism, and
racism operate together, holds out the promise of uncovering this type of
analytical shortcoming and thereby enhancing our understanding of the
economic implications of a tax rule."
Part I briefly describes the tax treatment of employment-related child-care
expenditures for the benefit of those readers who are unfamiliar with the current
law. Parts II through IV adopt the critical methodology developed by critical race
theorists and legal feminists that stresses historical contextual ization in the
reading of legal texts. The purpose of Part H is to establish the historical context
for evaluating the development of the tax provisions as well as the tax policy
discussions surrounding those provisions. The analysis found in this Part is
designed to reveal the class, gender, and race subordination in the social and
economic arrangements involving childcare found in different parts of the
country at different times during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Section A
studies the role domestic work in general and childcare in particular played in
the United States from the nineteenth century until World War H. Section B
builds on the historical analysis found in Section A and discusses post-war
trends in the labor market, some post-war legislative efforts dealing with
childcare, and the current demand for and the nature of child-care services. The
conclusion drawn from the historical study of childcare is that child-care services
shape contemporary understandings of class, gender, and race and that class,
gender, and race shape contemporary understandings of child-care services.
11. An equally important reason for studying the tax treatment of child-care expenditures is that sections
21 and 129 historically have represented the largest source of federal financial support for child care. See
Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Children,
Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1991) (statement of Nancy Duff Campbell, Managing
Attorney, National Women's Law Center, Washington D.C.) [hereinafter Campbell Statement]. See also ABA
Section on Taxation, supra note 7, at 333 ("Of the more than 20 separate federal programs providing child care
assistance, the child and dependent care credit is the largest, providing some 60 percent of all Federal spending
for child care."). The significance of the tax credit resulted from a decrease in government spending for direct
subsidies and a liberalization of the tax credit and an increased use of it by eligible families. See Philip K.
Robins, Economic Implications of Dependent Care Alternatives, 46 TAX NOTES 343, 349-50 (1990).
Estimates are that from 1976 to 1988, the amount of governmental support for child care provided through the
tax credit increased by 412% in constant dollars. See id. at 351. This increase is attributable most to the
increased use of it by eligible families. "It is estimated that the percentage of families with working mothers
using the credit increased from 18.2 percent in 1976 to 44.3 percent in 1985. In contrast, the average constant
dollar credit per family increased by only about 11 percent from 1976 to 1986." Id Budget estimates for 1997
were that the cost of section 21 to the federal government will be $2.8 billion. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
103D CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998 PREPARED FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS AND COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, table 1 (Comm. Print 1995). The figure used
is a combination of the cost of the credit for child care as well as adult dependent care. Most analysts agree that
the credit is used overwhelmingly for child-care expenditures. See Campbell Statement, supra, at 89 n.3. The
cost of section 129 was estimated to be $.8 billion. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at tbl. 1. Regardless
of recent government efforts to fund child care directly, see infra notes 386-89 (describing the 1996 welfare
reform legislation that includes federal money for child care), with $3.6 billion at stake having to do with the
well being of our children and the persons charged with their care, the tax treatment of child-care expenditures
is worthy of serious consideration. A complete picture of government supported child care requires
consideration of state policies. See Sharon C. Nantell, The Tax Paradigm of Child Care: Shifting Attitudes
Alliance, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 883, 919-37 (1997) (describing a wide range of
Toward a Private/ParentalPublic
state tax provisions relating to child care).
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The historical analysis in Part H showing that child-care services are not
distinct from, but are part of, a social and economic system of class, gender, and
race subordination becomes the foundation for incorporating the
antisubordination principle into a comprehensive tax analysis of child-care
expenditures. Part III relies on a traditional tax policy framework to analyze
child-care expenditures, describing and applying the widely accepted ideal
income tax base developed by Robert Haig and refined by Henry Simons. 12 The
business/personal distinction and imputed income, which are key analytical
components of the ideal tax base, are the central focus of the discussion. This
Part shows that conventional tax approaches provide little guidance about the
appropriate tax treatment of child-care expenditures. This Part further
demonstrates how the history of child-care services reveals that the seemingly
objective analytical tools of the business/personal distinction and imputed
income are limited in their usefulness because they are rooted in the very ideas
and practices that have produced systematic subordination based on class,
gender, and race.
Part IV continues to interpose the antisubordination principle into traditional
tax analysis by examining the three most influential tax law texts dealing with
child-care expenditures. The first text analyzed is Henry Simons's pathbreaking
book PersonalIncome Taxation;'3 the second is the opinion of Judge Opper in
the case of Smith v. Commissioner;14 and the last is Stanley Surrey's book
Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures.'5 The textual
analysis demonstrates that the three authors are unpersuasive when they rely on
tax principles to support their conclusions that child-care expenditures should
not be excluded from the tax base. Through a close reading of the texts and
reference to the historical material presented in Part II, Part IV shows how each
author relies on accepted roles based on class, gender, and, in a less obvious way,
race to create the appearance of applying tax rules objectively. Subjecting these
texts to an antisubordination analysis and uncovering their logical missteps has
the important effect of disrupting their influential power. Once the traditional
deference to these texts and the tax principles upon which they rely is shown to
be unjustified, room is made for deciding the question of the appropriate tax
treatment of child-care expenditures by adopting a broader analytical framework.
Part V is an attempt to build an alternative framework that integrates
traditional tax and antisubordination principles. Based on the historical
examination of child-care services, it demonstrates the class, gender, and race
implications of the current tax law regarding child-care expenditures and
proceeds to consider alternative approaches. What is most important about the
12. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the ideal income tax
base).
13. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATON: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF
FISCAL POLICY (1938).
14. 40 B.TA. 1038 (1939), aff'dper curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1939).
15. STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDrrURES (1973).
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analysis found in Part V is that it shows how the antisubordination principle
enhances understanding of the social and economic implications of a tax rule,
and how it is essential to the tax law in achieving its goals of equity,
administrability, and economic rationality. The Conclusion suggests further
avenues of inquiry arising out of the introduction of the antisubordination
principle into the tax law.
I. CURRENT TAX TREATMENT

OF EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CHILD-CARE

EXPENDITURES

This section briefly explains the current tax treatment of child-care
expenditures and its limited usefulness, especially to low-income taxpayers. As
the description of the tax provisions below make clear, Congress has limited the
availability of tax relief to those taxpayers who incur child-care expenditures for
employment-related purposes. Some of the legislative history of section 21 from
in Part liB. 16 A further critique of both sections
its inception in 1954 is discussed
17
21 and 129 is found in Part V
Section 21 provides a nonrefundable credit equal to between twenty and thirty
percent of the expenditures incurred for childcare during the taxable year that
enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed. 18 The percentage of expenditures
allowed varies depending on the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 19 The amount
of the employment-related child-care expenditures that may be taken into
account to determine the amount of the credit is limited. If a taxpayer has one
child in childcare, no more than $2,400 can be used to determine the credit, and
if the taxpayer has two or more children, no more than $4,800 can be used to
compute the amount of the credit.2 ° Section 129 authorizes an employer
provided assistance program for childcare. An employee is allowed to exclude
from gross income up to $5,000 ($2,500 in case of a married person filing a
separate return) of child-care expenditures that are either paid, reimbursed, or
provided in kind by the employer.2 1 Section 125 permits an employer-provided
16. See infra notes 157-69, 257-60 and accompanying text (describing section 21 's legislative history).
17. See infra Part V and accompanying text (critiquing sections 21 and 129 as part of an analysis of
alternative tax approaches to employment-related child-care expenditures).
18. See I.R.C. § 21(a)(1). The income exclusion allowed under section 129 would seem to undermine
the structure of the child-care credit under section 21, which is designed to limit the tax benefits of high-income
taxpayers. Section 129, however, might be more advantageous to low-income taxpayers than the credit. See
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40
UCLA L. REv. 983, 1018 n.135 (1993) (showing how the operation of the earned income credit could lead to
an effective marginal rate for a married couple of 27.4% ,thereby making the exclusion under section 129 more
advantageous in some instances than the credit under section 21). The problem is apparently that the
mechanisms for lower-income taxpayers to take advantage of this benefit have proven so cumbersome that
section 129 continues to benefit higher-income taxpayers the most. See id.
19. See I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (the 30% maximum percentage is reduced by I percentage point for each
$2,000 (or fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000, but the
percentage is never less than 20%).
20. See I.R.C. § 21(c).
21. See I.R.C. § 129. To qualify for the income exclusion a number of different requirements must be
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child-assistance program to be part of a cafeteria plan. 22 An employee can
exclude from income reimbursements for child-care expenditures up to $5,000,
as authorized by section 129.23
One significant practical limitation of both sections 21 and 129 is that the
child-care expenditures taken into account are less than the costs incurred by the
taxpayers.24 Section 129 is further problematic because it is available only if an
employer establishes the program.2 5 A significant decrease in the use of the
credit occurred in 1989 after the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988,
which required that taxpayers claiming the credit include the provider's name,
address, and taxpayer identification number.26 One explanation might be that
some taxpayers were claiming expenditures that they were in fact not paying. A
more likely explanation is that child-care workers who do not report their income
did not give their employers their taxpayer identification numbers. 27 Apparently,
at least for some taxpayers in need of childcare, the value of the child-care credit
and the potential penalties for failure to comply with the law are less than the
savings obtainable by using the underground economy. Those savings include
avoiding payment of at least the employer's share, if not also the employee's
share, of social security taxes as well as avoiding payment of a high enough
salary to permit the child-care worker to net a living wage. 28 Not everyone made
met. The requirements under sections 21 and 129 are quite similar. For example, both require that the taxpayer
provide the "name, address, and taxpayer identification number" of the provider on the return. §§ 21(e)(9),
129(e)(9). Section 129 contains some other qualifications related to the fact that it concerns an employerprovided assistance program. For example, to qualify, the plan must meet a number of different
nondiscrimination requirements to assure that it is available generally to the employer's work force. See §
129(d). In addition, the two provisions are coordinated. For example, the dollar limit on expenses under section
21 must be reduced by the amount excluded from gross income under section 129. See § 2 1(c).
22. See I.RC. § 125(a), (e)(1).
23. Not only is the amount excluded under sections 125 and 129 from gross income for federal income
tax purposes, it is also excluded from state income taxes and social security taxes. See I.R.C. § 3121(a)(18).
The exclusion from social security taxes means, however, that some employees may, depending on their
income level, receive lower social security benefits than they otherwise would have. In addition to the
exclusions under sections 125 and 129 having implications for the employee under the social security system,
they also may lead to a reduction in pension coverage. See I.R.C. § 414(s); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(s)-l(a)(2) (as
amended in 1993) (a plan must exclude amounts provided under section 129 as compensation for purposes of
complying with nondiscrimination provisions applicable to pensions and may exclude amounts provided under
section 125 for this purpose, but it is not required to use this same definition of compensation for purposes of
calculating the amount of contributions or benefits actually provided under the plan).
24. The amount that is excludable is even more inadequate for those employees with more than one
child. The amount is the same regardless of the number of children a taxpayer may have. See I.R.C. § 129(a).
For a taxpayer with one child, however, the exclusion under section 129 may be significantly more
advantageous than the credit under section 21, which limits the expenditures subject to the credit for one child
to $2,400. See I.R.C. § 21(c)(1).
25. See Dependent Care Assistance ProgramsProvided by 68 Percent ofEmployers Surveyed, 66 TAX
NoTEs 324, 324 (1995) (reporting that 68% of the employers surveyed provided dependent care assistance
programs and nearly all of them (97%) offered it through a dependent care flexible spending account; also
reporting that 34% of the employers indicated that the savings on Social Security and unemployment taxes
frequently or always outweighed the administrative costs of the programs). For further discussion of the
relationship of social security to the income tax exclusion for child-care expenditures, see supra note 23.
26. See I.R.C. § 21(e)(9).
27. See Campbell Statement, supra note 11, at 93.
28. The cost of Social Security taxes are significant and cannot be ignored in discussing the child-care
labor market. Cf McCaffery, supra note 18, at 997-98 (demonstrating how "social security contributions pose
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this decision. The number of returns reporting income from child-care services
increased sixty-five percent from 1988 to 1989, which is the year the
requirement of providing a taxpayer identification number was added to section
21 29
A second aspect of the child-care credit that reduces its usefulness to lowincome taxpayers involves structural changes made by the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA) and the recently enacted child credit provided under section 24.'°
The child-care credit neither provides for an inflation adjustment of the income
limitations determining the applicable percentage of expenses, nor for the
expense limitations. Moreover the child-care credit is not refundable. After the
TRA, which indexes the standard deduction, the dependency exemptions, and
the tax brackets, the maximum child-care credit of thirty percent available to
taxpayers with incomes of $10,000 is illusory because persons with income at
this level do not owe taxes.3' IRS data demonstrate that the number of taxpayers
with adjusted gross incomes under $15,000 claiming the child-care credit has
decreased every year since 1986.32 Fewer public complaints have been registered
with regard to the child-care assistance program's limitation of $5,000 even
though it is also not indexed. The attention paid to the child-care credit, but not
to the child-care assistance program, is probably attributable to the fact that most
of those taxpayers benefiting from a child-care assistance program are at higher
income levels and are still enjoying some benefit from the income exclusion. The
recently enacted child credit further reduces the usefulness of the child-care
credit for low-income taxpayers. The limitations placed on the child-care credit
and the child credit result in tax reductions or in refunds for low-income working
families with employment-related child-care expenditures that are not
substantially more than they would have been had the child-care expenditures
not been incurred. 3
The nature of the limitations imposed by sections 21 and 129 should be kept
in mind in considering the history of waged childcare found in Part H1and the
critique of traditional tax analysis found in Parts Imand IV. As we will see, our
understanding of the current tax treatment of child-care expenditures changes
dramatically upon the introduction of the antisubordination principle into the tax
a higher burden for all but the wealthiest Americans"); see also David Cay Johnston, Taxes on Nannies Are
Going Unpaid Despite New Law, N.Y. TtMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at I (reporting a reduction in the number of
taxpayers paying the employer's share of social security, medicare and federal unemployment taxes for child-

care providers and housecleaners whom they hire).
29. See Campbell Statement, supra note 11, at 93.
30. See id. at90-93; Zelenak, supra note 6, at 413 n.321; Mary L. Heen, Child Care, Welfare Reform,
and Taxes, 2 COMMUNTrY TAX L. REP., Oct. 1997, at 1, 15-17; see also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING
WOMEN 115-18 (1997) (showing that in all income ranges, the child-care credit is relatively rarely used and

among lower-income households it is virtually not claimed); Martin J McMahon Jr., The New Child Credits:
ExplainableMechanics and Unfathomable Policy, 76 TAX NOTES 1625 (1997) (discussing the computation of
the child credit and its relation to the earned income tax credit).
31. See I.R.C. §§ l(f),
63(c)(4),151(d)(3).
32. See Campbell Statement, supranote 11, at 91.
33. See Heen, supra note 30, at 15-17.
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analysis. One of the key reasons our understanding changes is that the
antisubordination principle encourages us to focus on the relationship between
the consumer and the waged provider of childcare.
H. THE HISTORY OF WAGED

CHILDCARE

Childcare is part of a whole range of activities, such as housecleaning, food
preparation and service, and laundering and repairing of clothing, frequently
referred to as reproductive labor.3 4 A history of waged childcare must therefore
be placed within the broader history of waged domestic work. A review of
waged childcare in the United States shows that the wages and working
conditions for child-care workers have not been, and are not currently, the
product of a free competitive market establishing an equilibrium between supply
and demand. The labor history instead shows how social prejudices and
government intervention have produced those wages and working conditions.
With an understanding of that market, a tax analysis that looks at the purchasing
of child-care services as an objective fact unrelated to the political and economic
strongholds of power that influence the nature of that transaction becomes
inadequate. A comprehensive tax analysis that applies the antisubordination
principle would necessarily take into account the economic exploitation, racism,
and sexism that occurs in the child-care labor market.
A substantial amount of the historical data that follows relates to domestic
work in general, rather than child-care work specifically. I rely on it because it is
often difficult to segregate one aspect of reproductive labor from another. I also
rely on it because it provides an important context for evaluating practices found
in the child-care labor market, discreetly considered. Although considering
childcare within the broader context of domestic work is useful, it cannot be
34. See, e.g, Shellee Colen, "Like a Mother to Them ": Stratified Reproduction and West Indian
Childcare Workers and Employers in New York, in CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 78, 78 (Faye D. Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp eds., 1995); Evelyn Nakano Glenn,
From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor,
18 SIGNS 1, 1 (1992).
35. The conclusion that child-care arrangements are the product of class, gender, and race subordination
is well supported in the literature from other disciplines, such as social history, economics, and sociology. This
literature demonstrates that reproductive labor is a system that establishes and is itself established by
hierarchical relationships. As Shellee Colen writes, "physical and social reproductive tasks are accomplished
differentially according to inequalities that are based on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, place in a
global economy, and migration status and that are structured by social, economic, and political forces." Colen,
supra note 34, at 78. Colen and Roger Sanjek underscore the important role domestic work plays in
constructing (reproducing) hierarchies when they write:
In a broad sense, household work does more than provide reproductive labor for employer
households and wages for workers ....
[Ilt also reproduces the relations of inequality in its local
society, the very relations that structure recruitment of workers. These relations of inequality include
gender, age, ethnicity, race, class, and migration status, and most often compound two or more of
these axes of differentiation.
Shellee Colen & Roger Sanjek, At Work in Homes I: Orientations, in AT WORK INHOMES: HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE 1, 5 (Roger Sanjek & Shellee Colen eds., 1990) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
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done without paying attention to the historical data which indicates that, within
domestic work, employers frequently favored white native-born or immigrant
women to do child-care work. 36 As child-care workers, the women frequently
enjoyed higher status, and concomitantly better working conditions, than many
women who were performing other forms of reproductive labor, such as laundry,
cooking, or housecleaning. 37 As the discussion that follows shows, the higher
status of the work depended on it being performed by white women, and it was
performed by white women because the work did have higher status.
A. Domestic Workfrom the Nineteenth Century Until World War II
1. The Respectability/DegeneracyDistinction
Domestic work has existed, in the form of slavery, indentured labor, and free
labor throughout the history of the United States.38 In the late 1700s and early
1800s, the patterns of domestic work diverged between the North and the South.
Black African enslaved labor became prevalent in the South while nonimmigrant free laborers predominantly performed domestic work in the North.39
The "intertwined" systems of slavery and service, albeit to differing degrees,

36.

See MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. 80-81 (1992).

37. See Colen & Sanjek, supra note 35, at 5, 13 n. 11(observing that child-care work as contrasted with
housecleaning "seems to carry less stigma in contemporary North America than other tasks"); infra note 64
(discussing the contradictions surrounding the role of the Victorian governess).
38. See ROMERO, supra note 36, at 51; Glenn, supra note 34, at 4. Transported convicts and indentured
white domestic workers were found in all the colonies, but especially in the middle and southern ones. See
JuDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS 49 (1985). Indians performed

domestic work mostly in New England and Black Africans performed domestic work mostly in the South. See
id.
Judith Rollins reports that "[t]hough servants of European descent had slightly more legal protection. . . all
categories of servants were treated poorly; work conditions .. .were often wretched and physical brutality
commonplace." Id. She goes on to observe that the colonialists reconciled their democratic ideals of
egalitarianism with their treatment of domestic workers by constructing them to be "of classes and/or races
considered biologically inferior; liberal democratic principles simply did not apply to them." Id.
39. See Rollins, supra note 38, at 50. Rollins suggests that democratic ideas influenced greatly the
relationship between the employer and the domestic worker in the Northeast. She reports that the term help
supplanted the term servant and liveries became rare as the relationship was no longer marked by servility or
subservience on the part of the domestic laborer. See id.
Other familiar terms included hired man, hired hand,
and hired girl. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHrrENEss: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 50 (1991). Notably, this form of servitude emerges in the Northeast when the
employee performing domestic work is of the same community, ethnicity, and religion of the employer. See
ROLLINS, supra, at 50. Although David Roediger agrees that this developing language of labor was evidence of
republicanism and egalitarianism, he persuasively argues that the new words were inseparable from the
workers', as well as the employers', interests in distinguishing the relationship from that of slave and master.
[I]n
a society in which Blackness and servility were so thoroughly intertwined-North and Southassertions of white freedom could not be raceless. To criticize Europe as 'slavish' or full of
'dastardly slaves' inevitably called to mind chattel slavery ....
The existence of slavery (and increasingly of open Northern campaigns to degrade free Blacks)
gave working Americans both a wretched touchstone against which to measure their fears of
unfreedom and a friendly reminder that they were by comparison not so badly off. It encouraged an
early language of labor that was at once suffused with concern for 'republican liberty' and at the
same time willing to settle for. . . 'evasions.'
ROEDIGER, supra, at 49-50.
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touched most towns and homes in the United States.4 °
In the middle of the nineteenth century, it seems fair to say that domestic work
was a site where class and racial prejudices were established as well as reflected.
The most notable change that occurred during the second half of the nineteenth
century was that the nation attained the highest proportion of female wage
earners in domestic service than at any other time in its history.41 This
burgeoning of the ranks of domestic workers is traditionally attributed to the
expansion of the middle class who, through manufacturing, clerical, and sales
positions, acquired the means to hire domestic workers.42 Although there is
significant evidence to support a marketplace-demand explanation, it fails to
capture the interrelationship of events by overemphasizing only one aspect of the
industrial revolution. In a world of economic growth and expansion, we need to
explain why so many in the middle class chose to consume their discretionary
income by hiring domestic workers rather than taking advantage of an array of
investment opportunities that held the potential of providing them with more
economic security and wealth. It is only with an elaboration of the effects of
other economic, political, and social changes, such as the liberation of enslaved
women and men in the South, the conquering of Mexican lands in the
Southwest, inter- and intranational migration, European colonization efforts, and
women's suffrage and reform movements, that the complex forces affecting the
middle-class home and domestic work are revealed.
Social historians have shown that early in the nineteenth century, within the
context of an emerging urban capitalism and the growing influence of
Evangelical Christian religion in both England and the United States,
respectability became closely associated with the work ethic, good character,
independence from patronage, sobriety, chastity, and dedication to family.43 The
achievement of these attributes is what set apart the middle class from the
aristocracy, the working class, and others who without these attributes could be
categorized as degenerate. 44 Acquiring respectability became a justification for
40. The consequence of that intertwining is that claims by nineteenth-century workers performing
domestic work to free labor and dignity were racial claims to whiteness.
41. See EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR BRIDE: THREE GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE
AMERIcAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 100 (1986); see also THOMAS DUBLIN, TRANSFORMNG WOMEN'S
WORK: NEW ENGLAND LIVES IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 157-58 (1994) ("In 1870... Boston had one

servant for every three and one-half families in the city; for New York City and Philadelphia, the comparable
proportions were one servant for every four and five families, respectively." (footnote omitted)).
42. See ROMERO, supra note 36, at 50.
43. See LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES: MEN AND WOMEN OF THE

ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS, 1780-1850, 108-13, 180-92 (1987); E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA 20 (1993); Gail Bederman,
"Civilization, " the Decline ofMiddle-Class Manliness, and Ida B. Wells sAntilynching Campaign(1892-94),
52 RADICAL HIST. REV. 5, 6 (1992).

44. George Mosse elaborates on how the intellectual construct of middle-class respectability, the term
that described the ordered, self-regulating state of bourgeois homes and bodies, came to distinguish bourgeois
life:

Through respectability, they [the middle class] sought to maintain their status and self-respect
against both the lower classes and the aristocracy. They perceived their way of life, based as it was
upon frugality, devotion to duty, and restraint of the passions, as superior to that of the "lazy" lower
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the power that the middle class wielded in economic, social, and political
matters. In other words, respectability and its converse, degeneracy, were part of
the nineteenth-century ideological language expressing relations of domination
and subordination along class, gender, and racial lines. Respectability became an
assertion of membership in the middle class and the basis on which one had the
right to dominate those classified as degenerate. A primary site where
respectability could be produced, as well as displayed, was in the home, and
domestic workers had a role to play in that production and display. It is for that
reason that respectability becomes a useful lens to use in an inquiry into the
history of childcare in the United States.
As we will see, the historical data challenge the myth that marketplace
arrangements reflect objective value. Instead, the data link respectability with
class, gender, and racial hierarchies and reveal the marketplace as encompassing
the ideological constructs and practices that produce, as well as sustain, those
hierarchies. Losing the illusion of objective value through historical
contextualization of economic arrangements is a necessary first step to
appreciating the value of an antisubordination principle in tax policy
discussions.
2. The Cult of Respectability in the Last Halfof the Nineteenth Century
The rise in the percentage of all women laborers hired as domestic workers
coincides with the development in the second half of the nineteenth century of an
intensification of distinctions, within intellectual thought and through material
practices, between women and men, private and public, and home and
workplace. The marketplace became characterized as harsh, crude, and brutish
while the home became characterized as clean, orderly, and a haven for social
and moral graces.45 The separate spheres made it possible for a man to earn
classes and the profligate aristocracy.
GEORGE L. MOSSE, NATIONALISM AND SEXUALITY: RESPECTABILITY AND ABNORMAL SEXUALITY IN MODERN

EUROPE 5 (1985). Mosse continues that once national survival begins to be defined in terms of physical and
moral health, and manliness comes to describe those who can possess these qualities, the concept of
degeneration emerges as its antithesis. Degeneracy, for Benedict Augustin Morel, who first formulated the
concept in medical terms in 1857, is a process of destruction that is brought on by moral and physical poison.
See id. at 34-35. Mosse writes:
This deviance from the norm, as Morel called it, could be brought about by such poisons as
alcoholism and the use of opium, by debilitating diseases like malaria, but also by the social
environment, a nervous temperament, diseased moral faculties, or inherited bodily and mental
weakness. Several of these poisons usually combined in order to begin the relentless process of
degeneration.
Id. at 35 (note omitted). For further discussion of the different views of degeneracy within sexology in the late
nineteenth century, see LAWRENCE BIRKEN, CONSUMING DESIRE: SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A

CULTURE OF ABUNDANCE, 1871-1914, 65-67 (1988). As Birken situates sexology within "the larger history of
Western thought," id. at 15, he shows how the concept of degeneration reflected class, gender, and race
differentiations at the tum of the century, see id at 72-91, as part of his larger argument that sexology
"simultaneously furthered and resisted the extension of the concept of citizenship." Id. at 76.
45. See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND
SEX IN AMERICA 47-49 (1984); ROTUNDo, supra note 43, at 254.
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respect through self-control and good character by looking to his home, wife,
and children, leaving him free to lust for power and wealth in the marketplace.
Not coincidentally, the barbaric marketplace became a justification for virtuous
women to remain in the home and not to compete with men by entering into the
public arenas of the workplace, education, or politics. 46 This era is frequently
referred to as either the cult of the lady or the cult of domesticity.4 7
The boundary between the home and the market has been understood as
separating the less-valued reproductive labor from the highly-valued industrial
progress, but on closer examination, through the lens of respectability, it can be
understood as sustaining class and race, as well as the more obvious gender,
hierarchies.48 It is in the liminal space occupied by domestic work-waged
workers doing reproductive labor in the homes of the middle class-that many
of these concealed interconnections are unmasked. 49 To underscore this point
and to avoid confusion with earlier writings conceming the cult of the lady or the
cult of domesticity, I will refer to the era as the cult of respectability.
Homemaking in the era of the cult of respectability became highly labor
intensive as standards increased for cleanliness, orderliness, and ornateness of
children, material possessions, and rooms. 50 Concerns for cleanliness surely were
46. See ROTUNDO, supra note 43, at 254; see also ROMERO, supra note 36, at 52-53 (emphasizing how
the separate spheres ideology accentuated the dependence of a wife's social position on her husband's and how
that social position in turn determined differences in the structure of women's homemaking activity).
47. See, e.g., GIDDINGS, supra note 45, at 47-49; Gerda Lemer, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in
the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson, 1800-1840, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN: TOWARD ANEW SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 182 (Nancy Cott & Elizabeth Pleck eds., 1979); ROMERO, supra note 36, at
53-58; Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1960, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966). As Diane Roberts
forcefully demonstrates regarding the distinctions between the meaning of cult of the lady in the North and in
the South, it is a mistake to use the concept of the cult of the lady as if it were monolithic in either its practices
or effect. See DIANE ROBERTS, THE MYTH OF AUNT JEMIMA: REPRESENTATIONS OF RACE AND REGION 107-09
(1994).
48. Anne McClintock intriguingly connects the inferiorization of domestic workers to colonialism and
the idea of "anachronistic space."
Women who transgressed the Victorian boundary between private and public, labor and leisure, paid
work and unpaid work became increasingly stigmatized as specimens of racial regression. Such
women, it was contended, did not inhabit history proper but were the prototypes of anachronist
humans: childlike, irrational, regressive and atavistic, existing in permanently anterior time within
modernity. Female domestic servants were frequently depicted in the iconography of degeneration as
"plagues." "black races," "slaves" and "primitives."
ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE COLONIAL CONTEST 42

(1995).
49. See ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT'S HISTORY OF SEwALITY

AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS 146-47 (1995) ("[T]echnologies... designed to affirm the bourgeois
self' entailed "discourses [that] were constructed around a spectrum of stereotypic Others, epitomized in the
servant class against which the boundaries of the bourgeois self were drawn."); see generally Dorothy E.
Roberts, SpiritualandMenial Housework, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997) (explaining how class, gender,
and race hierarchies are reinforced by the distinction between menial and spiritual housework-a distinction
that depended on who was performing the tasks).
50. See SUELLEN HOY, CHASING DIRT: THE AMERICAN PURSUIT OF CLEANLINESS (1995).

Mistresses concentrated on housework for comfort and appearance's sake; and before long
"cleanliness, tidiness and the care and arrangement of possessions replaced domestic production as
housewives' preoccupations." The upper-middle-class home of the 1840s and 1850s required
downstairs a kitchen and a "wash house" behind it, and upstairs a bath as well as bedrooms and a
nursery.
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justified both in the private and public spheres in public health terms, but within
the respectability/degeneracy distinction it took on moral and exclusionary
overtones.5' Suellen Hoy argues that cleanliness "became a route to citizenship,
to becoming American" and during the last half of the nineteenth century grew
to be "'one of the characteristics of high civilization,"' which in turn linked
cleanliness to whiteness.5 2 As Hoy notes, "[alt least a century earlier they
[Americans], like their English relatives, had often associated the color black
with dirt."' 53 Any group perceived as having darker skins than northern
Europeans, especially African Americans, Jews, southern Italians, and Irish were
characterized as "filth" who threatened the character and strength of the nation.54
The concept of cleanliness, therefore, became one of the technologies used in the
nineteenth century to establish the superiority of the middle classes and the
inferiority of the lower classes on the basis of race.
The high standards for cleanliness created considerable stress for the middleclass woman, because to be a respectable woman meant she had to be above the
dirty work of scrubbing floors and changing babies. The cleanliness/dirt
dilemma was resolved for the lady of the house when she transformed
homemaking and child-rearing into a profession in which she supervised the
reproductive labor of others. 55 In fact, it was only if she had a domestic worker in
the household that she and her husband could know that they had attained
56
respectability.
Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted).
51. See id. at 87.
52. Id. at 87-88 (quoting from a number of turn-of-the-century publications).
53. Id. at 92.
54. See id
55. See ROMERO, supra note 36, at 53 ("A house kept to the end of display is impossible to all but a few
women, and their success is dearly bought.") (quoting RALPH WALDO EMERSON, 7 DOMESTIC LIFE:
EMERSON'S COMPLETE WORKS 108f (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1893)). Phyllis Palmer elaborates further on
the relationship of the lady of the house to the domestic worker.
[H]ousewives felt so put upon by endless unpaid work that they wanted desperately to extricate
themselves. Thus it was in their interest to pay low wages for such labor; they had an incentive to
perpetuate the low social esteem and presumed low economic value ofhousework.... Caught in the
conflict between society's denigration of housework and evaluation of women on its competent
conduct, housewives did not challenge the middle-class norm of housework; rather, they projected
their dilemma onto the women less powerful than themselves whom they employed.
Phyllis Palmer, Housewife and Household Worker: Employer-Employee Relationships in the Home, 19281941, in "To ToIL THE LIVELONG DAY": AMERICA'S WOMEN ATWORK, 1780-1980, 179, 191 (Carol
Groneman & Mary Beth Norton eds., 1987) [hereinafter TO TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY]; see also HOY, supra
note 50, at 19 (arguing that the practice of hiring domestic workers "kept the sexual division of labor intact");
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 97-98 (detailing how the "emblems of upper-class prestige depended on the
deadly labor of the female working class" by describing the labor of the seamstresses who produced the
"sumptuous dresses of London's idle upper-class women," but not further acknowledging the deadly labor
performed in the colonies to produce the cotton cloth that became the "sumptuous dresses"); Glenn, supranote
34, at 7 (observing that white middle- and upper-class women hired other women to do the hard and distasteful
tasks required in the household rather than challenging the gender-based division of reproductive labor).
56. See Glenn, supranote 34, at 6-7; see also DEBORAH VALENZE, THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL WOMAN 157-

58 (1995) (analyzing domestic work in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England by describing a
trend of wealthier wives of tradesmen and farmers expressing a "distaste for the hard labor of housewifery,"
made more burdensome by rising standards of housekeeping, and finding the solution in the hiring of domestic
workers and concluding that "[t]hough not every middle-class family employed a servant, many did; added to
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More was at stake in the employer/employee relationship for the lady of the
household than a clean and orderly child and home. The supervision specifically
was designed to "imprint[] the work with signs of inferiority, deference, and
servility, ' 57 raising the question: How was respectability maintained (how was
the middle class served) by degrading the reproductive labor performed by the
domestic worker and the worker herself?
The practices of inferiorization not only were designed to convey to the
domestic worker her subordinate status relative to the middle-class family and
especially to the lady of the household, but they were also designed to provide
assurances to the family of their superiority. Those assurances were particularly
crucial because the domestic worker embodied, both materially and figuratively,
the contradictions of middle-class life. 58 Not only was the home supposed to be
free of commerce, but women were not supposed to be participating in
commerce. Yet, here was a woman receiving payment for work performed in the
home. The contradiction was even further complicated by the fact that she was
getting paid for doing reproductive labor that was supposed to be produced
without pay.59 The domestic worker entering the home as a waged laborer
created an incursion on the security of middle-class life. The domestic worker
knew the very truth that middle-class life was designed to eradicate-she knew
its dirtiness. 60 In order to render her intimate knowledge of middle-class dirt
insignificant, she had to be stripped of the ability to know. She had to be stripped
these numbers were lower-class households needing 'another pair of hands in the workshop or at the counter,'
making domestic service a widely extended form of employment" that resulted in a hierarchy with "the woman
of greater means acting as supervisor over one or more lower-class servants" that allowed her the leisure that
was becoming of her "gentility" and domestic workers that were "a measure of her wealth").
The management model found in the public factories frequently was incorporated into the households,
which meant that domestic work became unskilled supervised work that was highly regulated, such as washing
had to be done on Mondays and silver polishing on Thursdays. See ROMERO, supra note 36, at 57-58, 62
(reporting that "domestics themselves pushed for working conditions resembling the businesslike relationship
between worker and boss in the factory or office"); Sedef Arat-Koc, In the Privacy of Our Own Home:
ForeignDomestic Workers as the Solution to the Crisis in the Domestic Sphere in Canada, 28 STUD. POL.
ECON. 33, 54 (1989) (arguing that feminists like Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Melusina Fay Pierce, and Mary
Livermore "prioritize[d] extension of the principles of industrialization over concems for equality" by
disregarding the interests of household workers and seeing their work, deemed wasteful, annoying, and
unreliable, as a problem to be solved "through rigid supervision and factory-like discipline").
This level of intense supervision, regulation, and orderliness can be seen both as mimicking
industrialization and creating, nurturing, and embodying the very values that commercial expansion needed.
Anne McClintock, challenging the separate spheres of home and workplace, describes the common regulatory
attributes as the "concealed alliance" between the "cult of industrial rationality and the cult of domesticity"
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 168.
57. ROMERO, supra note 36, at 58.
58. Cf.id.
at 50 (reasoning that, in the context of nineteenth-century England, "the middle classes found
it necessary to draw rigid class lines between master and servant" because they "themselves may have been
only one generation away from servanthood"); STOLER, supra note 49, at 109-10 (discussing the "micromanagement of domestic life" as a response to domestic workers "who were viewed as subversive contagions
in those carefully managed colonial homes" in reference to the Dutch and the Dutch colonies in the nineteenth
century).
59. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 164-65.
60. This story was further complicated by the fact that the appearance of leisure was achieved in many
homes that could not afford more than one domestic worker by the labors of the "lady," which were all the
more laborious because the lady's labors had to be concealed. See id. at 161-62.
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of her subjectivity. By degrading her and her work, the middle-class family
transformed her from a knowing subject into an invisible object and in the
process made the reality of their dirt a nonreality. 61 Tax policymakers' failure to
consider the child-care worker in their discussions of child-care expenditures
takes on a different cast when held up to the light of the late nineteenth-century
middle-class home.62
The strategy of objectification and invisibility, of course, contained its own
contradictions. By constructing the domestic worker as a degraded object, the
lady of the household was faced with yet another dilemma. She could only
distance herself from degrading dirt by having it removed from her home by a
domestic worker, but by letting the domestic worker into her home, she
understood herself to be admitting a contamination.63 The domestic worker was
the degradation that the home was not supposed to contain, but only if the
domestic worker was in the home could the home rid itself of degradation.
The contradictions would seem to be most confounding when the domestic
work being provided was childcare. 64 Mothers and fathers seemingly were
required to engage in a wide range of strategies to deny the implications of
having their children, during their formative years, being nursed, bathed,
comforted, and disciplined by the contaminated Other.65 To reconcile the caretaking role of the domestic worker with the responsibility of reproducing
themselves through their children, the middle-class parents not only had to
denigrate the child-care work and the worker, but they had to socialize their
children to do the same. Within the context of waged childcare, therefore, we see
how middle-class respectability is inextricably linked to working-class women's
61. See VALENZE, supra note 56, at 158 (showing that the hierarchical dimensions associated with the
cult of the lady "absolutely depended on the denigration of household tasks"). McClintock further explores the
relationship of dirt to class when she writes, "dirt was the memory trace of working class and female labor,
unseemly evidence that the fundamental production of industrial and imperial wealth lay in the hands and
bodies of the working class, women and the colonized." MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 153-54.
62. See supra notes 9-11 (critiquing Professor Alstot's article for not considering the waged child-care
worker in her analysis of the role of feminist legal theory in tax policy); infra notes 271-374 and accompanying
text (describing the analysis of employment-related child-care expenditures found in influential law texts and
showing that the waged child-care worker played no role in that analysis).
63. See STOLER, supra note 49, at 112 (identifying similar types of tensions and transgressions in the
colonial as well as the Dutch home, in the context of the Netherlands and its colonies).
64. The position of governess, most typically a white, educated, single woman, established, for those
who could afford one, yet another level within the stratified system of reproductive labor. This "solution"
served to reinforce racial hierarchy while at the same time exacerbating the very contradictions it was supposed
to solve. As McClintock observes within the context of a colonial economy, the Victorian governess was
[rlacially a member of the white elite, [but] she was in reality a member of the serving class .... She
was paid for work, which the housewife did for free. All in all, the white governess embodied some
of the most abiding contradictions of the colonial economy of female labor.
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 277.
65. Cf id at 270-71 (considering this question regarding British middle-class identity and the effect of
children being cared for by "black maids and nurses" in the colonies); id at 82, 94-95 (elaborating on why
psychoanalysis needs to reconsider the "body of the working-class woman" and address middle-class men's
"unsettling memory of female power and agency, embodied in the memory of the nurse"); Colen, supra note
34, at 90-91 (discussing West Indian workers' frustration, in the context of the 1980s in New York City, as
well as affective ties forged, when they are given "the responsibility for socializing children without ... the
authority to discipline them").
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degradation. An inevitable byproduct of naturalizing the denigration of domestic
work and the creation of the lady of leisure was the disavowal of the economic
value of women's reproductive labor.66 Within the middle-class formation,
reproductive labor became invisible-an invisibility
that naturallyfound its way,
67
as we will see, into traditional tax analysis.

3. Geographic Variationsfrom the Last Halfof the Nineteenth Century Until
World War II." Class, Gender,andRacial Stratification
Although variations of geography and time periods led to different specific
household arrangements, pervasive and tenacious gender and racial stratification
characterized domestic labor in the United States in the second half of the
nineteenth century.68 To be a member of the white middle-class required the
hiring of domestic workers and to be a domestic worker was to be a non-white
woman of the lower classes. 69 Domestic work became constructed as degrading
work because it was performed predominantly by non-white women, and nonwhite women became constructed as inferior because they predominantly did
domestic work. 70
Given the particularized instability created by the domestic worker crossing
over, both literally and figuratively, the threshold of the home, it is not surprising
that the middle classes, as well as whites from the working classes, easily called
upon the racial caste system embodied in the technology of cleanliness to enforce
66. Cf Arat-Koc, supra note 56, at 37-38 (discussing the domestic sphere and the "physical, economic,
and ideological invisibility of domestic labour").
67. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 164.
68. Cf Arat-Koc, supra note 56, at 44-45 (describing active Canadian state involvement in the
recruitment and control of domestic workers in the late nineteenth century, which included making the
immigration of household workers easier, as well as sending immigration employees to England and Scotland
to recruit and enforcing indenturing arrangements; also explaining how recruitment through the 1920s was
closely linked to Canada's nation-building efforts and aided by middle-class women and social reformers,
assured that the household workers were of the "'right' national and racial stock and character").
69. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 9-10. When describing domestic work in England, McClintock says
that the "widest definition of the middle class., was that of keeping domestic servants," MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 48, at 85 (quoting ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL 286 (1977)), and that "[t]he essence of middleclassness was the experience of relating to other classes or orders of society. With one group, domestic
servants, the middle class stood in a very special and intimate relationship: the one fact played an essential part
in defining the identity of the other." Id. at 405 n.30 (quoting JOHN FLETCHER CLEWS HARRISON, THE EARLY
VICTORIANS, 1832-51, at 110 (1971)).
70. See ROLLINS, supra note 38, at 52; see also GLENN, supra note 41, at 5 ("For racial-ethnic women
•.. concentration in domestic service in turn reinforced their degraded status in society. They came to be seen
as particularly suited for, and only suited for, degraded work. Racial-ethnic status and occupational position
became more or less synonymous badges of inferiority"). Colen & Sanjek provide a further explanation of how
the nature of waged domestic work permits employers to rationalize the inferiority of the worker:
[T]he time demands of household work frequently constrain workers from maintaining their own
households and participating fully in their own intimate family relationships. These circumstances
reinforce employer rationalizations of exploitive behavior, and augment the social stigma of
household work. When household work comes to characterize a social group, it stigmatizes in a way
that other working-class occupations that involve productive work and permit fuller family and
personal life-such as mining, agricultural labor, factory work, or clerical employment--do not.
Colen & Sanjek, supra note 35, at 6 (citation omitted).
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the respectability/degeneracy distinction that the domestic worker perilously
challenged.71 The racialized nature of the servant and master class involved not
only relegating persons constructed as non-white to domestic work, but also
using the ideology of race to determine the interaction between master and
servant. The race ideology became particularly useful for employers to achieve
emotional distance from those persons who were physically and intimately
involved in the operations of their homes.72 Stigmatization of impurity and
uncleanliness intersected class, gender, and racial hierarchies all for the purpose
of assisting middle-class families in maintaining a distance from the domestic
workers situated within the intimate confines of their homes. 73 It is in the
specific details of particular labor markets and the changes that occur within
them that the full effect of stratified reproduction can be appreciated. 74
In the Northeast, the story of domestic work is told through the lives of
71. Cf MCCLINTOCK, supra note 48, at 165 ("Small wonder that female servants in Victorian
households came to be figured by images of disorder, contagion, disease, conflict, rage and guilt. For this
reason .. domestic space became racialized as the rhetoric of degeneration was drawn upon to discipline and
contain the unseemly spectacle of paid women's work.").
72. The British historian, Deborah Valenze, detected the interaction of class and race ideologies in her
study of domestic workers in the Victorian era.
[I]f servants could be seen as less than human, employers need not feel self-conscious or
embarrassed to carry on their intimate lives in front of them. Reports of interaction between servants
and their mistresses, admittedly scarce and not always reliable, nevertheless deserve close analysis.
The language and tone of such evidence suggests deeper meaning rooted in an ideology of class and
race. For in the eyes of many masters and mistresses, class did operate in ways parallel to racial
categories; lower-class people were closer to nature and less pure and clean than the more civilized
middle-classes. Female servants suffered from the double stigma of gender and class, and the effect
was a foreignness approaching racial difference. The framework of Victorian sexuality subjected
lower-class women to inferior status from every point of view.
VALENZE, supra note 56, at 174; see Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Editors Introduction: Writing "Race" and the
Difference it Makes, in "RACE," WRrriNG AND DIFFERENCE 5 (Henry Louis Gates ed., 1986) ("Race has

become a trope of ultimate, irreducible difference between cultures, linguistic groups, or adherents of specific
belief systems which- more often than not-also have fundamentally opposed economic interests. Race is the
ultimate trope of difference because it is so very arbitrary in its application.").
73. The racial dimension to the stigmatization explains why the middle classes demonstrated their
preference for whites by paying them higher salaries, by providing them better working conditions, and by
using less demeaning job classifications. If the labor supply permitted the distinctions, white women
performing domestic work were classified by their employers as housekeepers while African Americans or
Mexicans were classified as laundresses, cooks, or servants. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 10-11. The story of
the racial and gender division of reproductive labor is part of a larger story of the racial and gender division of
labor in the newly industrialized economy See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical
Perspectiveon RacialInequality in "Women's Work," 43 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1336 (1991).
74. The racial/ethnic hierarchies among women found in reproductive labor in the home were embedded
for many of the same reasons outside the home when women of the middle and upper classes ventured into the
public sphere. Hoy presents such an example when she describes the making of the nursing profession in
support of the Union army during the Civil War:
Afraid that the nursing experiment might fail if too many women of poorjudgment secured hospital
positions, [Dorthea] Dix set about looking for women of character, good health, and some
experience....
One result of such scrutiny was that the title "nurse" carried cachet. Some 20,000 women served
the Union army in all capacities.., but only 2000 to 3000 were called nurses and were under Dix's
supervision; these were "white women of the middle and upper classes." The other nine-tenths
served as "matrons," "cooks," and "laundresses" and were African-American women (free or slave)
and white working-class women.
Hoy, supra note 50, at 47 (footnote omitted) (italics added).
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migrating women-white women who migrated from rural to urban areas,
women who migrated from other countries to the United States, and African
American women who migrated to the North from the South. Thomas Dublin's
study, Transforming Women s Work, New England Lives in the Industrial
Revolution, offers data useful to understanding and analyzing the cult of
respectability with evidence that "immigrants predominated in Boston's female
75
work force, accounting for almost 64 percent of all workingwomen [sic]."
When native-born white women did work, they had a relatively broad range of
occupations available to them; they found employment as "professionals,
proprietors, and clerical and sales workers. 76 In contrast, African American
women and immigrant women were highly concentrated in domestic work. 7
Dublin reports that in 1860 in Boston, eighty-seven percent of working African
American women were employed in some area of domestic work 78 and that
"[j]ust over eighty percent of all female servants were foreign-born." 79 According
to Dublin, "[t]he proportion of servants among native-born whites was less than
half those among immigrants or blacks, whereas the proportion in white-collar
occupations ... was more than four times as great., 80 His evidence shows that
native-born white women performed domestic work, but that they were not
defined by, or confined to, domestic work. Moreover, when white native-born
women did work in domestic work, they typically worked in professional- or
merchant-class families that were wealthier than the families who employed
African American domestic workers.8 ' Dublin supplements the statistics with
telling contemporary testimony of the racial stratification in the women's labor
market in general and the domestic labor market in particular. White native-born
women could command higher salaries as domestic workers and even then
82
would avoid it precisely because it felt like being a "slave" and was degrading.
The statistical evidence is overwhelming that in the last half of the nineteenth
century, the opportunities in the Northeast for working-class women to choose
employment other than domestic work depended largely on the women's race
and ethnic background. Dublin reports that among native-born working women,
75. DUBLIN, supra note 41, at 158.
76. Id at 236.
77. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 8.
78. See DUBLIN, supra note 41, at 159. He also provides evidence that they were concentrated in

specific occupations of laundresses, cooks, and chambermaids. See id.
As is indicated at infra notes 85-86, 90,
in 1860, significant migration of African American women from the South to the Northeast had not yet
occurred. African American women made up only about one percent of the female labor force in Boston in
1860. See DUBLIN,supra, at 161.
79. Id at 161; see id at 198-99 (providing further statistical evidence of how the race and ethnicity of

domestic workers changed between 1860 and 1870).
80. Id at 158.
81. See id.
at 202; see id.
at 199 (showing that for the less wealthy families, it became more difficult "to
find" native-born white women to be domestic workers and referring to a Boston lady of the time who is
quoted as saying, "[wihen no more American servants could be found, like everyone else we had Irish, in fact,
they were the only ones available").
82. See id.at 162; see ROMERO, supra note 36, at 62 (reporting that women avoided domestic work or
left it at the first opportunity notwithstanding the relatively higher pay).
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less than a sixth were employed as domestic workers in 1900.83 This was true
whether they were of native-born or immigrant parentage. 4 He also indicates by
contrast that "[a] majority of immigrants . . .worked as servants, and among
African Americans the proportion exceeded three-fourths."8 5 Similar racial
stratification occurred in other northern cities (in New York City in 1900, eightyfour percent of African American women were in domestic work; in
Pennsylvania in 1890 the figure was ninety-one percent).86
World War I marked a shift in the demographics of domestic work in the
Northeast and Midwest.8 7 It became more difficult to hire European immigrants
83, See DUBLIN, supra note 41, at 243; id.
at 245 (showing that, in 1900, "[almong the foreign-bom
[working women], a scant 7 percent found employment in white-collar clerical or sales occupations. For the
native-born, whether of native-born or immigrant parentage, about 29 percent enjoyed the better wages and
working conditions of clerical and sales jobs."); id at 253 (showing that, in 1900, "[nlative-bom daughters of
immigrants most often found work in factories, whereas immigrant women divided their employment almost
evenly between domestic service and factory work.").
84. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 103.
For European women, domestic work functioned as a starting point for both the individual and the
group. Most European immigrant domestics were young, single, live-in workers. The typical servant
entered service upon leaving school in early adolescence and worked until her early or mid-twenties.
After marriage she left service and usually did not return. In addition, although an immigrant woman
might not move up the occupational ladder, her daughter usually did. American-born daughters of
immigrants for the most part shunned domestic service and entered the expanding white-collar fields
of clerical and sales employment. Thus, the group's involvement in domestic service continued only
as long as new immigration from the mother-country continued.
Id.
85. DUBLIN, supra note 41, at 243; see also JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW:
BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 161 (1985) ("[Flor the most part,

black female wage earners remained outside the expanding industrial economy, and the few who gained a
foothold in factory work remained in the lowest-paying jobs."); ROLLINS, supra note 38, at 52 (describing the
particular stereotyping of Irish immigrant women and how the anti-high and antiservitude prejudices reinforced
each other). The following unattributed quote captures the constitutive nature of ethnocentrism and domestic
work: "The Irish seemed more lower-class because they were in domestic labor, and the work itself seemed
more menial because the Irish dominated it." Id.
86. See DUBLIN, supra note 41, at 238; see also JONES, supra note 85, at 156 (reporting that in 1905 in
New York, ninety percent of the African American working women were domestic workers). From the Civil
War through the first half of the twentieth century, thousands of African American women migrated to northern
cities. See id.
at 155. The women tended to be young and unmarried, moving from Virginia and the Carolinas
to Philadelphia, New York, or Boston. See id.
at 156.
The manner in which African American women in New York City were strictly confined to domestic
work in the early part of this century is usefully compared to the experiences and opportunities, as described by
Miriam Cohen, of Italian immigrant women during that same period:
In the United States by the turn of the century, servantry was not considered an acceptable option by
many white working-class females. Manufacturing jobs meant shorter hours and at least some
freedom from supervision, and such work allowed women to live at home with their parents. As
more factory work became available, females of all ethnic groups chose the workshops. Unlike many
Irish women in the nineteenth century and Polish women in the early decades of the twentieth,
Jewish and especially Italian women emigrated almost exclusively in family groups or to join family
groups already in America. These family connections meant that Jewish and Italian women did not
need domestic service to supply room and board as well as wages.
MIRIAM COHEN, WORKSHOP TO OFFICE: Two GENERATIONS OF ITALIAN WOMEN IN NEW YORK CITY, 19001950, at 53 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
87. See ROLLINS, supra note 38, at 54; see also JONES, supra note 85, at 156-57 (describing the Great
Migration during World War 1 (1916-1921) in which about five percent of the total southern African American
population migrated north, which was more than the number of African Americans who had migrated north
during the preceding forty years; they came from the deep South and a greater proportion of them chose
midwestem cities; reporting further that by 1920 the black communities in New York, Chicago, and
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and their families as domestic workers for two reasons. First, the women had the
opportunity to leave these jobs when they married, and changes in the labor
market allowed their daughters to find manufacturing, clerical, or sales jobs. 8
Second, limitations on immigration instituted in World War I dramatically
reduced the supply of women immigrants available. 89 The closing of U.S.
borders to immigrants combined with the migration of African Americans to the
North resulted in African American women comprising a significant percentage
of domestic workers outside the South. 90 This combination of factors reinforced
the racial division of reproductive labor.91 Racial stratification in domestic work,
of course, was concomitant with discriminatory employment practices by
northern factory, sales, and clerical employers against African American
women.

92

Racial stratification also occurred in the Southwest, the West, and the South,
but marked differences in the domestic labor markets existed. In the Northeast,
Philadelphia "were larger than any in the South," but "no more than 9 percent of the total population of any
urban area in the North ... [was] black").
88. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 11.
89. See id
90. See ROLLINS, supra note 38, at 54. Jacqueline Jones provides strong statistical data showing the
predominance of African American women as domestic workers in the North and Midwest.
The exploitation of black domestics was thus a national, rather than a southern, phenomenon. In the
three largest northern cities-New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia-the total number of servants
declined by about 25 percent (from 181,000 to 138,000) between 1910 and 1920, but the proportion
of black women in that occupational category increased by 10 to 15 percent. After World War I,
black women constituted more than a fifth of all domestics in New York and Chicago, and over onehalf in Philadelphia .... [I]n 1920 fully 90 percent of black women in that city made their living as
day workers, washerwomen, or live-in servants. The 108,342 servants and 46,914 laundresses not in
commercial laundries totaled almost two-thirds of all gainfully employed black women in the North.
JONES, supra note 85, at 164 (footnote omitted); see also Elizabeth Clark-Lewis, "This Work Had a End":
African-American Domestic Workers in Washington, D.C, 1910-1940, in To TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY, supra
note 55, at 196, 197-98 (providing further supporting data that "African-American women were forced into a
'servant caste. "(citation omitted)).
91. See Clark-Lewis, supra note 90, at 202-03 (demonstrating that migrant African American women
perceived the white mistresses as engaging in more degrading practices against them as compared to African
American women not born in the South because they knew how important the job was to them and that it
would not be easy for them to leave); see also id at 203-12 (outlining benefits for migrant women of
household day work as compared to live-in work, changes that occurred in their lives by the move to day work,
and the strategies they used that allowed them to attain day work).
92. See JONES, supra note 85, at 154. Jones provides data that serves as telling evidence of
discriminatory employment practices:
[Lless than 3 percent of all black working women were engaged in manufacturing in 1900 compared
with 21 percent of foreign-born and 38 percent of native-born white working women. By 1930 the
comparable figures were 5.5 percent of gainfully employed black women (100,500 out of
1,776,922), 27.1 percent of foreign-born, and 19 percent of native-born white women. (These
figures reveal the impact of the last group's opportunities in sales and clerical work.) Black women,
about 10 percent of the total American female population, constituted only 5.4 percent of the
country's female manufacturing workers and only 0.5 percent of all female employees in clerical
occupations, though they were gainfully employed in disproportionately large numbers overall.
Id. at 166; see also id at 178-80 (describing further discriminatory hiring policies); id. at 200 (footnote
omitted) (reporting that "[iun 1940 one-third of all white, but only 1.3 percent of all black, working women had
clerical jobs. On the other hand, 60 percent of all black female workers were domestic servants; the figure for
white women was only 10 percent"); Clark-Lewis, supra note 90, at 198 (explaining that "antimigrant biases in
the established African-American communities" meant that the migrating women could seldom find work in
African American-owned businesses).
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native-born working women of immigrant parentage found opportunities outside
of domestic work.93 In contrast, children and grandchildren of Mexicans who
found themselves in United States' Southwest territories, either because of
having been conquered or of having migrated, remained in domestic work.94 The
same systematic restrictions were experienced by women who migrated from
China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines to Hawaii and California, 95 suggesting
that the stratified labor market persisted because some groups were racially and
ethnically identifiable.9 6
In the Southwest, during the last half of the nineteenth century and the first
half of the twentieth century, Chicanas were disproportionately represented in
domestic work.97 White native-born or immigrant women were preferred,
especially for work as nannies, leading to substantially lower salaries and less
desirable positions for Chicana domestic workers. 98 Private enterprise bringing
industrialization to the West as well as public education programs were designed
to teach domestic skills to the wives and daughters of Chicanos who were hired
as miners or as other similar types of laborers. 99 Chicanas were thought to be
particularly well suited to domestic work once trained to clean in accordance
with "American standards."' 00 The tracking of Chicanas into domestic work
continued throughout the depression years of the 1930s under the auspices of the
WPA. 101
In the West, especially California and Hawaii, the largest immigrant groups of
men were from Asian countries. 102 Immigration laws prevented the immigration
of families leading to a scarcity of women to do domestic work. Unique in this
geographical area, white households hired Chinese men in the late nineteenth
century and Japanese men in the early twentieth century to perform domestic
93. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.

94. See GLENN, supra note 41, at11.
95. See id.at 11,23.

development inthe West and the
96. See id at 4-5, 11;see also id. at23 (describing theindustrial
created thesupply of cheap
relations
of theUnited States
with countries inAsia that
economic and political
immigrant labor).
97. See id at 101 (reporting that "[iun El Paso, Texas ...Spanish-surnamed females accounted for 65.4
percent of all servants and 64.8 percent of all laundresses in 1910."), ROMERO, supra note 36, at 80 (reporting
that in Santa Fe between 1860 and 1880, "the proportion of women with Spanish surnames who were engaged
in domestic service almost doubled, from twenty-five percent to forty-eight percent").
98. See ROMERO, supra note 36, at 80, 81.

99. See id at81, 84.
100. See id Romero elaborates:
[d]uring the post-World War I period, middle-class white Americanizers continued to view Chicanas
and Mexican immigrant women as dependent, inferior females who would be improved by exposure
to "American" standards of housekeeping and parenting .... Self-righteous mistresses actually
justified paying low wages on the basis that domestic service would teach skills for social mobility
and provide moral benefits to Mexican servants.
Id. at83-84.
101. See id at84-85; Glenn, supra note 34, at 12;see also GLENN, supra note 41, at103-04 ("Mexican

segmented labor markets of theSouthwest,
American women . . . [were] ghettoized in theethnically
experienc[ing] virtually no mobility out of domestic and other service occupations.").
102. See GLENN, supra note 41, at22-23 ("[A] large[] international movement of labor from Asia to the
United States... took place between 1850 and the mid-1930s.").

1998]

Rocking the Tax Code

work. 0 3 Early in the twentieth century, a substantial number of Japanese women
immigrated and close to half of all who did became employed either as servants
or laundresses. 104
In the South from the Revolution through the Civil War, enslaved African
Americans predominantly performed domestic work under cruel, harsh, and
unmerciful conditions. 10 5 After Emancipation, African Americans remained in
domestic work in the South, which had an exceptionally high ratio of domestic
workers to households. 10 6 Through the first half of the twentieth century, nearly
every southern middle-class housewife employed an African American woman
to clean and care for her children. 1' 7 In addition, it was not uncommon for
10 8
working-class whites to hire African American women as housecleaners.
Jacqueline Jones reports, however, that in the late nineteenth century in the
Cotton Belt African American women found alternatives to doing domestic work
in the homes of whites:
Husbands preferred that their wives not work directly for whites, and, if
they had to, that they labor in their own homes (as laundresses, for
example) rather than in a white woman's kitchen .... [R]elatively few
Cotton Belt women worked regularly as servants for whites (4.1 percent
in 1880; 9 percent in 1900), some performed day service during the slack
season.I°9
The pervasive and tenacious racial stratification of reproductive labor and how it
contributed to the making of the middle class is demonstrated by the reaction of
the white middle classes to African American women who withdrew from waged
labor to care for their own families. n0 Employers showed "their contempt forl
freedwomen who 'played the lady' and refused to join workers in the field."'
103. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 9.
104. See id.at9;see also GLENN, supra note 41, at 6 (footnote omitted) ("In the years before World
War II, over half of all employed Japanese females in the Bay Area, both foreign- and native-born, were found
in domestic work."). Intergenerational mobility from domestic work into other occupations was not as easily
achieved for Japanese women as it was for European women. Their daughters and granddaughters, however,
had more employment opportunities than did African American women and Chicanas. See GLENN, supra, at
104-05.
105. See ROLLINS, supra note 38, at 51.
106. See id at 51.
107. See JONES, supra note 85, at 128; Glenn, supra note 34, at 10.
108. See JONES, supra note 85, at 128; Glenn, supra note 34, at 10.
109. JONES, supra note 85, at90.
110. See id.
at 58.
111.Id.at59. The contempt by whites for African American women who stayed at home continued into
the next century. Jones tells of an interview with a Chicago stockyard worker who had left Mississippi during
the Great Migration north. He told an interviewer for the Commission on Race Relations that
Men and women had to work in the fields. A woman was not permitted to remain at home if she felt
like it. If she was found at home some of the white people would come to ask why she was not in the
field and tell her she had better get to the field or else abide by the consequences. After the summer
crops were all in, any of the white people could send for any Negro woman to come and do the
family washing at 75 cents to $1.00 a day. If she sent word she could not come she had to send an
excuse why she could not come. They were never allowed to stay at home as long as they were able
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When white employers used the term "lady" in reference to black women it was
used for sarcastic and derisive purposes and meant as a criticism for her being
lazy.1 12 This type of ridicule, of course, served a dual purpose of denigrating
unwaged labor in the home as well as reinforcing the white male's superiority in
the public marketplace through racial subordination.
Also worth noting is the effect of the African American urban migration
during Reconstruction. Fleeing the rural areas to seek food and safety, they were
met with considerable hostility by whites who "believed that the city was
'intended for white people."'1 3 The lack of housing and employment
opportunities resulted in an exodus of African Americans back to farm work in
1866 and 1867, but nevertheless the urban population of African Americans
increased significantly during the 1860s, especially in the larger southern
cities. 114 A high ratio of those who stayed were women who found it difficult to
support themselves and their children in rural areas. 115 In these southern cities
most of the women were employed as servants or laundresses, with a small
minority working as cooks, nurses, seamstresses and unskilled laborers in
factories. 116 Notwithstanding the dramatic changes that occurred in the late
nineteenth century regarding white working women's employment opportunities,
the labor story of African American women, as Jacqueline Jones forcefully
demonstrates, "exhibited striking continuity across space-urban areas in the
North and South-and time-from the nineteenth to the early twentieth
century.,

117

to go. Had to take whatever they paid you for your work.
Id. at 157.
112. Id at 59.
113. Id at 73.
114. Seeid.
115. See id.
116. See id at 74. One survey found that servants represented about half of all African American
working women in the seven cities studied and laundresses another one-fith. Id The heavy toll of this work on
African American women and their families cannot be overstated. As reported by Jones, part of what accounts
for the disproportionately low fertility rates for African American urban women in the South at the turn of the
century was the work they performed in domestic service.
One black physician familiar with the living conditions and work responsibilities of black women in
southern cities made this bitter observation in 1896:
As to still-births: Why should we be surprised at the great number of still-births among
our women, since they do most of the work that is liable to produce this state of things?
They do the cooking, the sweeping, the lifting of heavy pots; they carry the coal, the
wood, the water; they carry heavy burdens on their heads; they do heavy washing, make
beds, turn heavy mattresses, and climb the stairs several times during the day, while their
more favored white sister is seated in her big armchair, and not allowed to move, even if
she wanted to.
Id. at 123. See also id at 128-34 (describing the African American woman's working conditions, the stress of
balancing the need for a cash income by leaving her home with the needs of her children of having her care,
and the slavery legacy inherent in the relationship of employers and employees).
117. Id. at 161; see also GLENN, supra note 41, at 103 (describing how marriage did not mean that an
African American woman could withdraw from waged labor because her earnings remained necessary for the
support of the family and how the exclusion of African American women from factories, offices, and stores
until the 1950s resulted in they and their daughters and granddaughters being confined to domestic work or
related employment).
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The gender and racial stratification of domestic work in the United States did
not, of course, occur solely through private arrangements. State and federal
governments also played a role. As already noted, U.S. labor history of domestic
work was affected by wars, immigration policies, among other factors. The
governmental role in perpetuating the respectability/degeneracy distinction is
revealed most obviously in the implementation of social programs during the
first half of the twentieth century.
4. SocialProgramsDuringthe FirstHalfof the Twentieth Century
The gender and racial stratification of domestic work not only affected the
labor market; it controlled all matters of social and public policy. For example,
African American mothers and mothers who had immigrated from Mexico were
excluded from goverment pension programs that were designed to assist
mothers after World War 1.11 The majority of the recipients of these pensions
were European immigrant mothers." 9 Gwendolyn Mink reports that in Los
Angeles, county officials justified excluding Mexican widows on the ground that
their "feudal background" made it "difficult for them to 'understand not to abuse
the principle of a regular grant of money from the state."' 1 20 Not a single African
in 1920, even though
American family received a pension in Houston, Texas,
121
they comprised twenty-one percent of the population.
The prevailing stereotype that led officials to deny African American women
eligibility status was that they were self-supporting as domestic workers. 122 A
field supervisor overseeing the Aid to Dependent Children program was reported
to have said:
The number of Negro cases are few due to the unanimous feeling on the
part of staff and board that there are more work opportunities for Negro
women and to their intense desire not to interfere with local labor
conditions. . . .There is a hesitancy on the part of the lay boards to
118. See generally Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in HistoricalPerspective, 26 CONN. L. REv. 879,
886 (1994) (critiquing matemalist policymakers' challenge to white men's democracy as "constrained by its
gender, cultural, and racial prescriptivity").
119. See GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917-

1942, at 49-50 (1995) (reporting that only 3% of the recipient population in 1931 were African American
mothers and 50% of them lived in just two states, Pennsylvania and Ohio); see also Lucie E. White, On the
"Consensus" to End Welfare: Where are the Women s Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REv. 843, 845-47, 853-54 (1994)
(describing the work of elite and middle-class women during the Progressive Era and their role in developing
the mothers' pension programs and the racially discriminatory operation of the programs and noting that only
after World War 11did the Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] program begin to address the
needs of African American women through the influence of the civil rights movement and the legal aid/legal
rights movement).
120. MINK, supranote 119, at 49-50.

121. Seeid. at 50.
122. See WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 174-94 (1965); MINK, supra note 119, at 50

(citing the practices of Chicago officials as an example); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 138 (1971).
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advance too rapidly over the thinking of their own communities which
see no reason why the employable Negro mother should not continue her
usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefinite domestic service rather than
23
receive a public assistance grant.1
At the same time that the middle-class homemaker denied the domestic worker's
agency in order to preserve the homemaker's and family's superiority, the federal
government was attributing to her full agency as a worker who was not in need
of public assistance. The two views are not in conflict. Both characterizations
depended on denying the domestic worker her claim to being a woman and a
mother; both depended on making the reality of the domestic worker's life
invisible; and both served the economic and social interests of the white middle
class.
Notwithstanding the New Deal and the accompanying surge in labor
regulation, domestic work remained beyond the reach of federal, state, or local
government regulatory control. Relying on the assumption that domestic work
belonged to the private sphere, lawmakers rationalized that governmental
intervention into citizens' homes was unfeasible and, therefore, made no efforts
to improve the working conditions of waged household work. 124 Phyllis Palmer
revealingly describes the efforts of non-governmental organizations formed in
the late 1920s to address the need to improve the wages and working conditions
of household workers. Their major goal, pursued throughout the 1930s, was "to
achieve formulation and widespread adoption of model contracts for the
voluntary use of housewives and household workers. 125 Their project failed
because the groups representing the workers and those representing the
126
housewives could not agree on the length of the work day and the work week.
"Employers consistently refused to adopt business standards of set hours and
organization for the work of the household, apparently because of the endlessly
expansive demands made on women, primarily by their husbands and
children. . . . [T]he middle-class woman who could afford to hire help was
looking for a clone: a woman who could do things as she herself did them, for
the hours that were expected of her .... 27 Although Palmer suggests that the
interracial work of the organizations, particularly the YWCA, had a long-term
impact on its work for racial justice, she concludes that the exchange of stories
between workers and employers "failed to change ... the middle-class feeling
that the only solution [to the demanding and expansive nature of housework]
128
was to pass on as much of the work as possible to another woman."'
123. MINK, supra note 119, at 143 (quoting Mary S.Larbee, UnmarriedParenthoodUnder the Social
Security Act, NAT'L CONE. Soc. WORK PROC. 434 (1939)).

124. See Palmer, supra note 55, at 180-81; see also id at 191 (reporting that domestic work was
excluded by the unemployment provisions of the Social Security Act along with agricultural labor).
125. Id. at 184.

126. See id at 184-88, 192-95.
127. Id.at 193-94.
128. Id at 195.
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Concern during World War II that domestic labor would no longer be widely
available at a low cost affected labor mobilization efforts. The government,
through training programs and propaganda, supported private employers and
white workers who were comfortable with existing racial hierarchies in the labor
market. 129 For example, Japanese American women found themselves channeled
into domestic work during and after World War H. Accepting these positions
made it possible for them to leave the internment camps. Even after the camps
were closed, government agencies established to assist them directed them to
domestic work jobs. 130 These efforts were frequently rationalized as being in the
women's own best interests. Although different racial stereotypes and
characterizations were used for different groups of women, what was clear was
that their "best interests" coincided with the belief that the proper role for these
women was serving the needs of white families.131
Concomitant with federal government programs directing women of color
into domestic work was the absence, subsequent to World War H, of protections
for domestic workers otherwise available in many other industries. 132 White
employers that expected wages for domestic work would decrease subsequent to
the war. "Reports abounded of housewives who immediately lowered the pay of
servants as soon as the Japanese surrendered .... ,,1 33 Many African American
129. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 11 (referring to programs tracking Chicana students into homemaking
courses). Jones provides yet another dimension of governmental involvement in the racial stratification of the
work force:
From official United States government posters to short stories in popular women's magazines,
recruitment propaganda was aimed exclusively at white women of both middle and working classes.
When black women were mentioned in connection with the national manpower crisis at all, they
were exhorted to enter "war service," by taking jobs that white women most readily abandonedlaundry, cafeteria, and domestic work.
JONES, supra note 85, at 236-37.
130. See Glenn, supra note 34, at 13.
131. See id. at 14. Jones elaborates on this point by describing African American women's work
experience during the war:
By 1944 black women constituted 60 percent of all private household workers (up 13 percent over
the figure for 1940), reflecting white women's hasty flight from service as soon as the Great
Depression ended. Black women also filled a disproportionate number of institutional service jobs as
a result of the "secondary boom" in the restaurant, lodging, and custodial services industries. For the
first two and a half years of the war, especially, when defense plants hired any black women at all,
they used them as scrubwomen or janitors and kept them in these jobs for the duration of the
conflict. Institutional service jobs offered more in the way of higher wages and on-the-job
companionship than private domestic employment; even better, a blue-collar job beat making beds or
"busting suds" for anyone.
JONES, supra note 85, at 237-38.
132. See JONES, supra note 85, at 257-58. Reformers focusing on mother-directed child welfare policy
in the 1930s and 1940s
believed women ought not to work, although sometimes they "needed" to, and therefore [they] ...
did not contest the omission of women from policies developed for workers. The only occupational
exclusion seriously challenged by matemalists was the exclusion of domestic work under the Social
Security Act. This limited defense of women as workers coincided with a long-standing, separate
conception of Black women (a third of all domestic workers) as workers rather than mothers.
Perhaps it also coincided with the reformers' view that for some women to work in other women's
homes promoted legitimate interest in child and family welfare.
MINK, supra note 119, at 172.
133. JONES, supra note 85, at 258.
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women refused to return to domestic work even when the pay remained
relatively favorable as compared to factory and laundry workers. 34 The
government's response through the Women's Bureau was to try to convince
women, especially African American women, that the work was not degrading.
Its dual concerns were to address the anxieties of upper middle-class women who
needed (wanted) inexpensive labor and those of African American women who
would find it difficult to support themselves if they rejected domestic work as an
alternative.135 Jones reports, however, that the government's efforts were
unsuccessful because employers failed to cooperate and to provide fair wages
and reasonable working conditions for those they hired to perform domestic
36
work. 1
The U.S. history of domestic work from the last half of the nineteenth century
until World War 1Itells an unrelenting story of gender and racial stratification
that serves the interest of the middle class. The cumulative data challenges the
myth that respectability is earned through hard work and dedication to family
and is achievable only by those with good character. The data also challenges the
myth that those categorized as degenerate deserve disrespect. What the data
shows is that the claim of respectability by the middle class depended
ideologically and materially on a class of persons that established respectability
for the middle class by being denied it for themselves.
As we will see in the following section, since World War H, domesticity,
motherhood, and respectability took on different meanings and supported
different practices than they did in the earlier part of the century. As we will also
see, however, waged child-care arrangements continue to reflect the class,
gender, and racial hierarchies. Data on the U.S. labor market of domestic work
after World War I1 challenge conventional understandings of work and family
and lead to a reconsideration of the respectability/degeneracy distinction and the
role it may be playing in contemporary tax law.
B. The Marketfor Child-CareServicesfrom World War II Through the
PresentDay
1. The Reconfigurationof the Respectability/DegeneracyDistinction
Dividing the story of women's involvement in market work into pre-World
War H and post-World War H periods replicates the scholarly literature on women
in the United States workforce. 137 The conventional view is that the war period
134. See id
135.

See id

136. See id. at 258-59. African American women's working conditions were improved mostly by groups
in the African American community organizing to provide training and placement services, to maintain living
wages, and to monitor employers who exploited their workers. See id. at 259.
137. See Diane E. Herz & Barbara H. Wootton, Women in the Workforce: An Overvie, in THE
AMERICAN WOMAN, 1996-97 at 44, 46 (Cynthia Costello & Barbara K. Krimgold, Women's Research and
Education Institute eds., 1996).
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was "a watershed in women's involvement in market work.' 138 As we have seen,
however, women who were young, unmarried, foreign-born, or nonwhite
participated in waged labor in large proportions throughout the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. To avoid universalizing the experiences of white, U.S.born, middle-class, married women, it is more accurate to see World War H as an
important milestone in women's labor history because of its effect on the cult of
respectability.
Respectability becomes reconfigured, in part, by the operation of three related
developments during the postwar period. One is the spread of industrialization
into the home by transferring reproductive labor from the home into the
marketplace. 139 From grocery and convenience stores to restaurants and health
clubs, families have been able to purchase many services for the household
outside the home. These services, along with technological labor-saving devices,
including freezers and frozen foods, automatic washers and permanent-press
clothes, microwaves, vacuum cleaners, and dishwashers,
have been the industrial
40
response to the household domestic worker. 1
Cooks are no longer found in the kitchens of those in the middle class.
Instead, they work in large industrial kitchens producing packaged food or in
restaurant kitchens producing ready-to-eat food. 141 The shift of reproductive
labor to the non-household marketplace, generally, has improved the nature of
the work, the working conditions, and its status. 142 Gender and racial
stratification of reproductive labor, however, has remained intact. Although
substantial progress has been made with regard to gender and racial
discrimination in employment, statistics also reveal that gender and racial
43
divisions in the labor market remain prevalent.1
The substitution of non-household market services and commodities for
domestic workers has coincided with a labor shortage for household domestic
workers. That labor shortage is attributable, in part, to an economic expansion
that provides greater employment opportunities for women of color and, in part,
to changes in discrimination laws that provide women of color greater access to
education and jobs. Thus, the second development affecting the cult of
respectability in the postwar years is the representation of women of color in all
occupational categories. 144 Although domestic work and race continue to be
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 46.
See HOY, supra note 50, at 152; Glenn, supra note 34, at 5;ROMERO, supra note 36, at 64-65.
See ROMERO, supra note 36, at 65-66.
See Glenn, supranote 34, at 5-6.

142. Seeid. at 22-23.
143.

See id.at 19-22.

144. See Glenn, supra note 73, at 1346, tbl. 2. In 1994, about six of every ten white women participated
in the labor force. The same proportion of African American women participated. See Herz & Wootton, supra
note 137, at 50. Women of Hispanic origin participated at a slightly lower rate (53%). See id at 50.
Of all African American women workers in 1960, 36.2% were private household workers. That
percentage decreased to 5% by 1980. See Glenn, supra note 73, at 1345. In 1980, of Mexican women workers
in El Paso, 2.1% were household domestic workers. See id These declining percentages are contrasted with
the increasing percentage of women of color in occupations that have traditionally been filled with white
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mutually constitutive, the inferiorization of domestic work is not occurring at the
same level of intensity or pervasiveness.
These two developments-industrialization of reproductive labor and
improvement in the occupational opportunities available to women of colortogether signify that the middle class status is no longer equated with the
presence of domestic workers in the home. Instead, middle-class status can be
acquired through the acquisition of commodities that produce reproductive labor
themselves. The more commodities the family acquires-the dishwasher,
garbage disposal, lawn-sprinkling system-the more it can be assured of its
distinctive status from the working class. With respectability and cleanliness
remaining firmly linked, commercial messages by firms suggesting that their
products, with minimal effort on the consumer's part, can achieve "cleaner than
clean" are particularly attractive. The underlying meaning is that
industrialization has provided the solution to the middle class's conundrum of
being able to achieve cleanliness only by allowing the unclean to cross their
thresholds. Preoccupation with the acquisition of reproductive goods and
services produced and sold in the non-household marketplace contributes, in
part, to the third development affecting the cult of respectability.
The third development is the entrance of white, middle-class, married women,
in greater numbers and at a faster rate than any other demographic group, into
the work force. 145 Given the racial stratification of the labor force for both
women and men, it would be far too simplistic to equate the experiences of many
white married women entering the work force with those of married women of
146
color. White men historically have been the highest earners in the labor force.
They and their wives, therefore, have been in a better financial position to decide
to forgo a second worker's earnings and have the wife remain at home to care for
their children. In a comparison by race of the median weekly earnings of
workers. Of all African American women workers, less than 9% were in clerical positions in 1960 compared to
28% in 1987. See id.Hispanic working women have enjoyed some success in overcoming discrimination
barriers. The proportion of Hispanic working women in managerial or professional positions increased 61.2%
between 1983 and 1987. See id.
145. See Susan M. Hartmann, Women's Employment and the Domestic Ideal in the Early Cold War
Years, in NOT JUNE CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1960, at 84, 86 (Joanne

Meyerowitz ed., 1994). In 1900, approximately 19% of women were in the waged labor market. Most of them
were unmarried and without children. See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Working Wives Widen "Income Gap",
WALL ST. J., June 20, 1995, at A18. In contrast, between 1969 and 1993, the percentage of working-age

married couples with two eamers rose from 49% to 72%. See id In 1994, 75% of women with children over
six performed waged work. See id; see also Robins, supra note 11, at 344 (providing further data
demonstrating the increased labor force participation of women with children); Herz & Wootton, supra note
137, at 52 ("[l]n 1994, 70 percent of women with children under age 18 participated in the workforce,
compared with 85 percent of those without children."). The percentage of mothers with children under age 6 in
the labor force has also increased. The percentage increased from 28.7 in 1970 to 58.2 in 1990. See Jonathan
R. Veum & Philip M. Gleason, Child Care: Arrangements and Costs, MONTHLY LAB. REV., October, 1991, at

10. See also Herz & Wootton, supra, at 52 (reporting that in 1994, 60% of mothers with children under six
were in the workforce compared with 39% in 1975; more than 50% of mothers with children under age one
were in the workforce).
146. See Glenn, supra note 73, at 1348-49; Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism
in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH.& LEE L. REV. 1469, 1489 (1997).
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husbands whose wives did not have waged employment, the data provides
further support that the relatively higher income of a white husband gives his
wife more choices in deciding whether to work and how much to work. White
husbands' median weekly earnings were $511 in 1989 while the median weekly
earnings of African
American and Hispanic husbands were $360 and $332,
47
1
respectively.
Not only have the economics of the decision to enter and stay in the work
force been different for white women as compared with women of color, but the
political and social consequences of white, middle-class women venturing out of
their domestic settings into the public marketplace have also been different.
When they leave their homes, they transgress the customs of ladyhood. 148
Although some may have done so enthusiastically while others may have done
so with some regret, what is detectable in the last half of the twentieth century
are the efforts of the middle class to draw yet another distinction between what I
would term the lady-like worker and the working-class woman. Confounding
contradictions arose when working-class women crossed the threshold into the
middle-class home; they also arose when the lady crossed her own threshold to
go into the marketplace. In both instances, strategies were necessary to mask the
similarities and to display the distinctions in order to justify a claim for
respectability.
Notwithstanding that substantial numbers of middle-class women are entering
the work force in the postwar years, respectability, with an emphasis and
celebration of a gendered domesticity, retains its persuasive power. In the 1950s,
during the height of the Cold War, "[n]ational leaders as well as popular culture
proclaimed that women's role in the international crisis was to strengthen the
family and raise new citizens emotionally and mentally fit to win the Cold
War."' 149 Public opinion constructed the good care, the nurturing, and the
education of children as a matter of national security and that mothers were
meeting their patriotic duty by meeting their family duties. The famous "kitchen

147. See Glenn, supra note 73, at 1349, table 4; see also id.
(reporting that in 1989, the median weekly
earnings of a two-earner couple both of whom are white was $867 as compared to $753 for an African
American couple and $680 for an Hispanic couple). But see Robert Rector, Fourteen Myths about Families
and Child Care, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 521 (1989) (stating that "[m]any traditional families are in fact

among the least affluent of America's families. Among families with preschool children earning less than
$15,000 per year, traditional families outnumber families headed by employed single mothers.").
148. Married women's movement into the labor force has been attributed to the feminist and civil rights
movements, the decline in birthrates, which both reflected and contributed to women's growing participation in
the work force, and women's higher education levels. See Herz & Wootton, supra note 137, at 46. Also
affecting women's participation in the work force has been the changing nature of the American family.
Marriage rates have declined and divorce rates have increased, peaking around 1980. See id. at 48. Although
married-couple families remain prevalent (77% of all American families in 1994), "women who do not
currently maintain households or families are more likely to plan their work lives with that possibility in mind."
See id; see also Robins, supra note 11, at 344-45 (suggesting a number of factors responsible for increasing
female labor force participation; the factors suggested employ traditional micro-economic reasoning and rely on
traditional stereotypes regarding women and work).
149. Hartmann, supra note 145, at 85 (citing ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN
FAMI~mS INTHE COLD WAR ERA (1988)).
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debate" in 1959 between Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev and Vice-President
Richard Nixon linked communism with women in the waged work force and
consumerism, in the form of labor-saving home appliances, with freedom. 150 The
lady as homemaker was, in large measure, a thriving image and practice in the
postwar years.
At the same time, however, the Cold War demanded that serious consideration
be given to maximizing the country's human resources, which to policymakers
meant considering women as participants in the work force. 151 Susan Hartmann
argues that "[in] an era dominated by the celebration of domesticity and
women's traditional roles, experts and opinion leaders not only recognized and
approved of women's increasing employment but also sought to adjust public
opinion and public policy to accommodate women's greater participation in the
public sphere."' 5 2 Whether one views the evidence as demonstrating
ambivalence about the appropriate role of women or as a well-designed, twotrack policy, the practices and the rhetoric served to maintain the boundaries
between the middle and the working classes. Not surprisingly, childcare became
a primary boundary-making tool, which means that childcare,53as a concept and a
practice, necessarily has class, gender, and race implications. 1
2. The FederalGovernment ' Involvement in Childcare
The Women's Bureau, which was established in 1920 as part of the
Department of Labor, recognized that women in the waged labor force needed
childcare.154 During World War H, when middle-class women were encouraged
to enter the work force to assist the war effort, Congress funded day-care
centers.' 55 Presumably, in a war-time economy when issues of domesticity lost
sway and the need to encourage women to enter the work force was viewed as a
matter of national security, government-provided day care was easily justified.
Not surprisingly, the programs were terminated at the end of the war. 56 No
further action occurred at the federal level until 1954, when Congress provided
for a tax deduction for employment-related child-care expenditures.' 5 7
The debate surrounding this tax deduction is revealing as to how the
respectability/degeneracy distinction informed both sides of the arguments and
150. See Hartmann, supra note 145, at 86.
151.

See generally id. (exploring the work of the National Manpower Council and the Commission on

the Education of Women to demonstrate how the early Cold War years was a period of transition).
152. Id. at 86.

153. See supra notes 38-136 and accompanying text providing an historical analysis of domestic work in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that demonstrates the prevalence of a hierarchical construction
of child care in the United States.
154. See JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE 136-37 (1994).

155. See id. at 137. The Children's Bureau, Women's Bureau, and a host of other reform groups,
however, resisted the development of a child-care policy. See MINK, supra note 119, at 164-66.
156. See QUADAGNO, supra note 154, at 137.

157. See Sar A. Levitan & Frank Gallo, Work and Family: The Impact of Legislation (The American
Family Duringthe 20th Century), 113 MONTHLY LAB. REV., March 1990, at 34.
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thereby reinforced the distinctions between the middle-class lady, the lady-like
worker, and the working-class woman. As first proposed, it was a deduction
limited to actual expenditures up to $600 and available only to widows,
widowers, divorced or legally separated individuals, and waged working mothers
whose husbands were incapacitated. 158 The middle-class married woman whose
husband earned a family wage was obviously excluded from benefiting from this
proposal. The notion of creating an economic environment to enable mothers to
have a choice between staying at home with their children and entering the work
force was hotly contested. 159 The legislative history also makes clear that it was
beyond the ken of policymakers to attribute the need for childcare to the fact that
the huband had entered the work force-the gendered division of reproductive
labor remained intact.
Ultimately, Congress passed and the President signed a tax bill that contained
a more generous deduction that covered middle-class working wives. A
deduction of up to $600 of child-care expenditures was allowed for families
whose income was below $4,500, and only families whose income exceeded
$5,100 were not allowed any deduction. 160 A review of the hearings indicates
that the debate concerned especially married mothers entering the work force and
leaving their children under the care of someone else. For example, Congressman
Noah H. Mason from Illinois argued at a House Ways and Means Hearing that:
I know of dozens of instances in my own little town where the mother
learned she could earn money during World War 11 and now insists upon
doing it while the children are running loose and becoming a nuisance in
the town. I would not want to give that kind of mother any exemption for
whomever she hires. But if it is a widow or widower. .. I think he or she
161
is entitled to it.
Addressing a witness at the Hearing about whether married couples, regardless
of their economic status, should qualify for a deduction for child-care
expenditures, Congressman Mason later asked the following question:

158. See H.R 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 214 (1953); Hartmann, supra note 145, at 94-95.
159. See infra notes 161-66, 257-60 and accompanying text describing and quoting extensively from the
legislative history that led to Congress's enactment of a deduction for employment-related child-care
expenditures.
160. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 35-36, 220-21 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 4666-67,
4856-58; Hartmann, supra note 145, at 95 (indicating that nearly half of all families had incomes below $4,500
in 1954); see also Forty Topics Pertainingto the General Revision of the InternalRevenue Code Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong. 27 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings] 62-63 (statement of
Nancy M. Henderson) (arguing that "[b]ecause a woman has been able to acquire an education and has
pursued a career along with her family, she should not be penalized because of her capability and ambition and
the fact that she is earning a salary of $6,000 or more" and responding to a question of whether a woman who
marries should give up her career by saying "[t]hat of course, is up to the individual's personal decision
whether or not she wises to continue to do that. I don't think that the law should discriminate against her if that
is what she wants to do").
161. 1953 Hearings, supra note 160, at 27 (statement of Noah M. Mason, Congressman from Illinois).
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But would you say we should go this far: A married lady insists upon
working so that she can buy a $750 fur coat because her husband cannot
afford it. He is working; he is earning what we would call a good living,
but she cannot afford these luxuries and she wants these luxuries and
therefore she goes to work and earns for herself enough to get these
luxuries, and she neglects her children or hires someone who is not
capable of handling them and is letting them run the streets and thus
bringing about juvenile delinquency? And I know of several cases of
exactly that kind. Would you say this committee
should step in and
162
that?
do
to
continue
to
woman
that
encourage
Abuse of the tax deduction, by women who went to work to obtain luxuries or to
send their children to fancy schools, was of major concern, as was the risk of
child delinquency in the absence of a mother's supervision.163 The more liberal
version of the bill passed through Congress because the participation of middleclass women in the work force was needed. The more liberal version was also
passed because it was thought to be unfair not to view child-care expenditures as
a necessary cost of earning income when other costs related to business activity,
such as travel and country club memberships, were deductible. 164
In contrast to the concerns expressed about middle-class married women and
their children, there were no fears that children from poor and working families
would not have the care and nurturing of their mother. The policymakers
believed that the tax deduction would promote the welfare of the children and
reduce delinquency by allowing their mothers to obtain adequate child
supervision. 165 No concerns were raised about poor and working-class women
162. Id. at 35-36.
163. See id. at 53 (statement of Arthur G. Klein, Congressman from New York) ("Some of these women
might decide they do not like housework and want to get a job.... I don't think all women ought to get this
exemption if they do not have to go out and get a job."); Hartmann, supra note 145, at 96.
164. See, e.g., id. at 30 (statement of Aime J. Forand, Congressman from Rhode Island) (when
proposing a bill that limited the deduction to a parent whose spouse is either dead, divorced, or separated from
the parent, arguing "[i]t is my belief that if as many mothers, for instance, had been working at the time that
regulations were shaping the meaning of 'ordinary and necessary business expenses' as there are now, the
Treasury Department would have permitted deductions for wages paid housekeepers, nursemaids, and
expenses of nursery care"); id. at 31 (letter from Beryl S. Denzer, a mother with two small children) (referring
to the inequity of allowing deductions for membership in country clubs but not deductions for childcare); id. at
38, 41 (statement of Kenneth A. Roberts, Congressman from Alabama) (referring to the deductibility of
entertainment expenses as he argued on behalf of child-care deductions); id. at 50 (statement of Julia
Thompson, Representative of the American Nurses' Association) (criticizing Smith V Commissioner
(discussed infra notes 307-34 and accompanying text) and arguing that "equity demands that the working
mother be put on a par with business and professional people with respect to deductions allowed"); id at 61
(statement of Nancy M. Henderson) (comparing the cost of child care to the cost of a secretary hired by a
business concern and arguing, as a matter of equity, against any income limitation being placed on the
deductibility of child-care expenditures).
165. See 1953 Hearings, supra note 160, at 34 (statement of James C. Davis, Congressman from
Georgia) ("Without proper care, juvenile delinquency would increase by leaps and bounds."); id. at 58
(statement of Louis B. Heller, Congressman from New York) ("Leaving these children to themselves is an
open invitation to the spread of juvenile delinquency."); cf ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 876-78 (scrutinizing
current welfare reform rhetoric and demonstrating that it is based on a historical and systemic stigmatization of
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entering the work force abusing the purpose of the legislation. On the contrary,
the child-care deduction 66was viewed by some as a way to reduce welfare
dependency and idleness.1
The debate, however filled with contradictions, consistently maintained the
boundaries among the three types of post-war women. Tributes went to the lady
who stayed home and cared for her children. Skepticism and charges of selfish
consumption motives went to the lady-like worker. Her willingness to enter the
work force was not viewed as an act of self-sufficiency or initiative. Rather she
was seen as perhaps shirking her responsibilities at home. The lady-like worker
lost some respectability when she crossed the threshold into the marketplace, but
the rhetoric saved her from crossing yet another boundary-being a workingclass woman.
The most degrading arguments were reserved for the working-class woman.
Nothing was lost to her, her children, or the nation when she entered the work
force. For her not to enter the work force was an act of laziness.' 67 The
assumption underlying this view of the working-class woman was that she was
not a good mother. The assumption produced its own incongruity because some
of these working-class mothers found employment by caring for the lady-like
worker's children. 168 That apparent contradiction was easily explained away,
presumably by the fact that the child-care services were being provided under the
supervision of the lady-like worker. In the end we are left with the ironic
conclusion that one of the major pieces of federal legislation recognizing the
child-care issues faced by all mothers in the waged work force was enacted in a
domesticity and reinforced
manner that sustained the celebration of middle-class
69
the inferiority of working-class mothers. 1
Black mothers as well as their children).
166. See 1953 Hearings, supra note 160, at 58 (statement of Welsey A. D'Ewart, Congressman from
Montana) ("I recall very clearly one case ...where the working mother paid so much for foster daytime care of
her children that she would actually have been money ahead had she stayed at home in idleness and relied on
the county welfare board to take care of her."); Hartmann, supra note 145, at 97.
167. See Joel E Handler, Two Years and You're Out, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 857, 857-60 (1994) (looking at
the policies and rhetoric of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and how they produced the "deviant
class" of poor single mothers and compares that rhetoric and those policies to current welfare proposals to
argue that "most Americans always wanted poor single mothers to be working in the paid labor force rather
than being supported by relief").
168. Cf Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CoNN. L.REV. 871, 873-74 (1994)
(explaining how current welfare proposals grow out of the devaluation of Black mothering and the invisibility
of the injury to Black mothers and their children when they are forcibly separated).
169. Cf 1953 Hearings, supra note 160, at 56 (statement of David L. Perlman on behalf of the Office
Employees International Union, A. F. of L.) (speaking on behalf of the child-care expense deduction that would
benefit a substantial portion of the Union's members who were waged working mothers but also urging based
on his "personal belief' that the amount deducted should be limited); id at 62 (statement of Nancy M.
Henderson) (referring to herself as a housewife and working mother in a professional position and arguing
against the $6,000 income limitation but further testifying that "it is perfectly legitimate to keep in the limitation
on the maid salaries of $40 per week as the maximum expenditures which could be deducted."); id. at 71
(statement of American Federation of Labor) (expressing the group's sympathy to the problem, noting that the
"[v]arious bills introduced would serve to benefit women in middle- and upper-income categories, while
providing little benefit to the greater majority of working mothers in the low-income groups" and raising
concerns that the bills "would permit wholesale evasion and abuse and would be very difficult to enforce," and
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Interest in childcare reemerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s based on a
convergence of conflicting concerns. Those concerns included the following: the
lack of quality childcare provided to children with waged working mothers,
articulated most strongly by the Children's Bureau; working women's need for
childcare, articulated most strongly by the Women's Bureau; and a need to
reduce the cost of welfare by making it possible for mothers with children to
enter the waged work force, articulated most strongly by members of Congress
who were feeling pressure about the growing welfare rolls. 170 A bill introduced
by Senator Jacob Javits, which had as its original purpose to fund childcare for
waged working mothers, was modified to place greater emphasis on reducing the
welfare rolls by getting mothers on welfare into the work force. 171 Opposition to
the legislation saw support for childcare as a communist plot to destroy the
traditional family. The apparently irreconcilable strategies of fighting the Cold
War by celebrating domesticity and by utilizing human resources in the waged
work force continued to inform the debate.172 Ultimately the bill, providing funds
for childcare for mothers on welfare and for waged working mothers with low
incomes, was passed in 1962.173 The governmental funding of childcare in the
early 1960s moved the issue out of the shadows of the private sphere, but only
once it was viewed exclusively as a concern of the poor.' 74 For children and their
ultimately endorsing larger personal exemptions and lower tax rates); White, supra note 119, at 854-55
(attributing the consolidation of the white middle class to the racialization of welfare and "the impact of public
programs like Social Security, which insured risks in primary sector jobs, tax subsidies for home mortgages,
and the government-backed loans for college education").
170. See QUADAGNO, supra note 154, at 137-39. Mink provides a useful context for considering the
politics of welfare during this time period:
The welfare politics that succeeded the New Deal ... essentialized the choices and behaviors of
welfare mothers and disputed their entitlement to social support. Mothers' pensions became
discursively transformed into a "way of life" by the late 1960s, and the worth and rights of single
mothers were displaced by the icon of the Black "welfare mother."
At least four policy decisions paved the way for these changes. First, the Social Security Act of
1935 created occupational and work history requirements that excluded many women from
unemployment compensation and other income protection. Second, in 1939, New Dealers adopted a
two-tiered approach to mothers' pensions when they folded into the survivors' insurance system the
widows and children of male workers insured under the Social Security Act. Much like social
security benefits for the elderly, survivors' insurance offered widows of insured men an automatic
and unsupervised income subsidy. With "the best" single mothers tracked separately into the social
security system, Aid to Dependent Children became a program for the widows of uninsured men
and for morally suspect mothers who were single because divorced or never married. Where widows
accounted for 43 percent of the ADC case load in 1937, they accounted for only 7.7 percent by
1961.
A third policy decision came in 1950, when the ADC formula for children's benefits was
amended to include a grant for mothers. A fourth policy change developed over the course of the
1960s, when the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program was expanded and barriers to
eligibility . . . and moral supervision . . . were eased. Commentators have pointed out that the

relaxation of eligibility barriers coincided with an increase in the welfare "take-up" rate for women
of color. It also coincided with a wildfire of popular perception that women on welfare didn't deserve
it.

MINK, supra note 119, at 175 (footnotes omitted).
171.

See QUADAGNO, supra note 154, at 138.

172. See id. at 139.
173. See id at 140.
174. See id. at 141.
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mothers from the middle class, childcare remained a private problem of
reproductive labor to be solved through private arrangements. The domestic
sphere was preserved, despite the fact that those private arrangements were
supported by a federal tax deduction. It was important that the subsidy to ladylike workers was different in kind than that provided to working-class women
because it allowed the lady-like worker and the working-class woman to remain
distinct socially and politically.
The advent of the War on Poverty in the middle and late 1960s also refocused
attention on childcare as a federal issue. 175 The emphasis, under what was called
the Operation Headstart program, was on child development and providing
176
enriching experiences for poor children, especially African American children.
Although a flurry of bills were introduced concerning childcare in the late 1960s,
significant funding languished given the fiscal constraints of the Vietnam War
and the growing lack of interest in initiating or expanding programs for the poor,
especially for poor African Americans. 177 Moreover, the rhetoric of the 1950s in
celebration of domesticity still held sway. Although influenced in part by the
antidiscrimination aspects of the Comprehensive Child Development Act passed
by Congress in 1971,178 Nixon justified his veto by characterizing the child-care
programs as antithetical to family values. In his veto message, he stated that
support for child development programs "would commit the vast moral authority
of the national government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing
against the family-centered approach."' 179
During the late 1960s, several different women's groups were becoming
politically active, but tellingly, their agendas generally did not include childcare.
One exception to that was the Congress to Unite Women that called for
"employment equality for women, free twenty-four-hour child-care centers, and,
until such care was available, the right to deduct child-care expenses from
taxable income.' 180 Whether women's groups ignored child-care issues in the
175. See id.

176. See id; see also White, supra note 119, at 854 ("Although less than half of welfare recipients are
African American, AFDC became identified as a 'black' program .... The counterfactual racist stereotypes of
the lazy unmarried welfare mother with many children... that are statistically and experientially false-began
to take hold among the white middle class public, including women."); Handler, supra note 167, at 861-62
(comparing the image of welfare families to its reality by relying on a range of statistics).
177. See QUADAGNO, supra note 154, at 144-46. The experience with community action agencies in
Operation Headstart that proved to be a social catalyst for antidiscrimination initiatives made the question of
local control highly controversial. This is most obviously seen in the debates in 1971 surrounding the
Comprehensive Child Development Act passed by Congress but vetoed by President Nixon. See id. at 150. In
his veto message, Nixon specifically addressed the concern that the Office of Economic Opportunity would
abandon its new function of research and return to its original function as an agency of social change that he
described led to its losing "much public acceptance." See id. at 153.
178. S. 2007, 92 Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 45,612; see also Lance Liebman, Evaluating Child
Care Legislation: Program Structures and Political Consequences, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 377-79
(1989) (describing the Act).
179. QUADAGNO, supra note 154, at 151-52; see also Liebman, supra note 178, at 368 (arguing that,

notwithstanding the veto, new money to finance childcare was spent "through several programs instead of one
and with no comprehensive strategy or coherent rules of entitlement").
180. QUADAGNO, supra note 154, at 148.
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political sphere or proposed solving them through tax deductions, they did not
consider how these proposals would affect child-care workers.
Lady-like workers did not see that their interests for adequate quality
childcare coincided with the interests of working-class women. The failure to see
the common interests was not an oversight, but was in fact necessary to
maintaining their tenuous claim to respectability. As working women, albeit
white and middle class, they always risked being mistaken for working-class
women. The difficulty nineteenth-century ladies had of drawing boundaries
within the domestic realm between themselves and their domestic workers was
replayed between lady-like workers and their working-class counterparts. The
difficulty was intensified because to be a lady-like worker meant, in many
instances, that working-class women would cross the lady-like worker's
threshold and care for her children in her home. Constructing the child-care
worker as an inferior object within these private arrangements would allow the
lady-like worker to assure her own superiority as a mother/worker. It is no
wonder that within the arrangement it was impossible to see the child-care
worker, as a mother with children of her own, who needed her or someone else's
care. 181
Notably Congress responded to the calls to reconsider the child-care tax
deduction. In 1971, the same year that President Nixon had vetoed an act that
would have provided for child development programs, Congress expanded the
income tax deduction for childcare for the express purpose of creating
employment opportunities in domestic work. 8 2 The Revenue Act of 1971 was
passed in response to a lagging economy marked by high unemployment and
high inflation.18 3 Congress was interested in reducing taxes for individuals and
creating tax incentives for business to encourage growth and increase the number
of jobs in the economy l8 4 The modifications to the child-care deduction were
politically attractive once conceived of as simultaneously reducing individual
taxes while increasing employment. These dual goals were accomplished by
permitting a deduction for expenditures for household cleaning and other
reproductive labor unrelated to the provision of child-care services, even when
the taxpayer already qualified for a child-care deduction, increasing the amount
181.

Given the gendered division of labour in the household, the labour of the housewife and the domestic
worker are interchangeable; the domestic worker is employed to replace an absent full-time
housewife; but when the domestic worker can't work, the housewife must. Given the social
degradation of domestic work and the class inequality between the domestic worker and the
mistress, however, their shared subordination does not often lead to solidarity. . . . Rather than
solidarity, shared subordination can lead to "housewife power strategies" through which "many
housewives seek to maintain class and race privileges vis-.-vis their domestics." What characterizes
servant-mistress relationships is deference from the worker and matemalism from the employer.
Arat-Koc, supra note 56, at 43-44 (quoting Elaine B. Kaplan, I Don t Do No Windows, 10 SOJOURNER 10, 17
(Aug. 1985)).

182. See Revenue Act of 1971, § 210, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 518-20 (current version I.R.C. §
21); S. REP. No. 92-437, at 13-14, 59-62 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1929, 1965-68.
183. See H. R. REP. No. 92-533, at 3-4 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825.

184. See id.
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that could be deducted, and increasing the family-income limitations to $18,000
at a time when the median family income was about $10,000.185 These
modifications, which were introduced in the Senate and agreed upon in
conference, was justified in part because
it can be expected to give a large number of individuals who are now
receiving public assistance the opportunity to perform socially desirable
services in jobs which are vitally needed. At the same time, it will help to
remove these individuals from
the welfare rolls and reduce the cost of
86
providing public assistance. 1
The implications of this tax change, which remains in effect today, are
breathtaking. By government design, lady-like workers are offered incentives to
hire domestic workers who are inextricably linked to the racial hierarchy through
welfare. 187 The predictable effect is to maintain the degradation of domestic
work because Congress presumed it would be performed by women of color and
to maintain the degradation of women of color because Congress presumed they
were appropriate for domestic work. The tax change provides relatively
contemporary evidence of the tenuous nature of the distinction between childcare services and other types of reproductive labor. To the extent that child-care
185. See S.REP. No. 92-437, supra note 182, at 59-62, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1965-68.
The Senate initially had proposed raising the family income limit to $12,000 but later increased the limit to
$18,000 and that was the amount the Conference Committee endorsed. See S.CoNF. REP. No. 92-553, at 42
(1971).
186. S.REP. No. 92-437, supra note 182, at 14 (1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1929.
187. The welfare/domestic work linkage appears to be uninterrupted not only in government policy but
in critiques of that policy. Martha Minow, a law professor who is renowned for her work on women's and
children's rights, persuasively argues in an article, Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, that we have
a responsibility to challenge "public polices [that] seem to work chiefly to express and perpetuate negative
images of a class of people" and suggests a "strict
social, if not legal, scrutiny, for social policies such as the
welfare work requirements applied to mothers of young children, because such policies use and sharpen the
already troubling divisions of class, gender, and race." Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and
Their Children, 26 CONN. L. REv. 817, 839 (1994). She, as I do here in this article, writes about the parallels
between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century concerning the middle-class family and uses
that history to raise concerns about a policy that "is impoverished by... narrow degrees of empathy," resulting
in "a truncated sense of obligation or connection across the society." Id.at 840. Based on this analysis she
urges us to "consider some imaginative changes." It is in her proposed changes that the welfare/domestic
worker linkage appears to be unbroken. She proposes "serious efforts to create jobs" and asks "Why not pay
poor mothers to become childcare providers, parent aides in the schools, and home visitors supporting other
neighborhood families? Why not pay poor mothers, poor fathers, and poor teens to develop community
programs like athletics and gardening?" Id at 841. Nowhere in her analysis or her proposals does she
acknowledge either the "connection across the society" reflected in the waged work of childcare (i.e., the
caring of children of middle-class families by working-class women) or the gender and racial hierarchies
historically embedded in domestic work. Professor Minow's work shows the strength of the linkage and that
the tools needed to break it have yet to be designed. Cf White, supra note 119, at 855 (writing about middleclass white women "[s]peaking in alliance with poor single mothers" and "insist[ing] that the world of work be
made safe for women with children, by paying all women a living wage, giving all women safe, dignified,
fulfilling work settings and work experiences, and restructuring work schedules and expectations so that those
arrangements are consistent with the responsibilities of raising children," but failing to acknowledge that the
lives of middle-class white women and "poor single mothers" are not parallel in our society but interconnected
and that one way they are interconnected is that middle-class white women are some of the employers of some
of the "poor single mothers" and as their employers do not have uncontested common interests).
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workers historically have enjoyed higher status than housecleaners and
laundresses, this tax change shows the fluidity of the stratification and how it is
88
infused with class, gender, and race prejudice.1
3. Contemporary "Solutions" to ProvidingChildcarefor Middle-Class
Families
Although statistics reveal significant progress in removing discriminatory
barriers to employment for women of color, in light of current policymaking, it is
not surprising that domestic work largely retains its gendered and racial cast.
Class, gender, and racial hierarchies that influence our views of motherhood,
childcare, and child-care workers explain how it is possible that the need for
quality, affordable childcare remains high while at the same time many childcare workers work for low pay under bad working conditions. The answer is not
that childcare is impervious to the rules of supply and demand. It is that the
child-care market is largely determined by class, gender, and racial hierarchies,
and those hierarchies determine what types of childcare are demanded and how
it is supplied.
The standard by which all childcare is still measured in the 1990s is the
private care and nurturing provided by the lady-the white, middle-class mother
and homemaker. By this standard, the closer childcare acquired through
marketplace transactions mimics childcare acquired inside the middle-class
home by non-waged labor, the more attractive it is to the consumer.18 9 This
insight suggests that what has been called the ideology of privatized childcare
has two aspects: One is structural in which the government and employers leave
workers to arrange childcare through private market and non-market
transactions, and the other is the nature of the child-care arrangement itself. 190
In the late 1980s, over half of all children under the age of five did not have
waged working mothers and seventy-five percent of all children were in parental
or relative care.' 91 Data available for the early 1990s show an increase in the
188. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the relative status of different classes of
domestic workers). For an extensive description of the evolution of the tax treatment of employment-related
child-care expenditures from 1954 until today, see Nantell, supra note 11, at 910-19.
189. See Abigail B. Bakan & Daiva K. Stasiulis, Making the Match: Domestic PlacementAgencies and

the Racialization of Women s Household Work, 20 SIGNS 303, 308 (1995) ("[I]n recent years an ideological
argument characteristic of a general backlash against feminism and women's ights has tended to discredit
public child care, despite there being no basis in fact to the claim that public child care risks the emotional or
physical development of healthy children.").
190. See Colen, supra note 34, at 81.
191. See Rector, supra note 147, at 526-27; see also JULIA WRIGLEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN 1-2
(1995) (discussing stigmatization of day-care centers). Robert Rector reports on a survey providing data
supporting the domesticity ideal:
[E]ighty percent of mothers state that they would prefer to stay at home with their own children if
they could afford to do so. And by a ratio of two to one, mothers under age forty-four state that they
do not regard the increased enrollment of young children in day care centers in recent years as a
positive development.
Rector, supra 147, at 520 (footnotes omitted).
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number of children cared for in organized child-care facilities,' 92 but the data
also shows that in 1993 forty percent of the children under the age of five with a
waged working mother were cared for by a parent, grandparent, or other relative
in their own home or in the home of a relative. 193 The domesticity ideal appears
to be alive and well.
These statistics also reveal another way by which the domesticity ideal,
combined with the gender stratification of the labor market in general, affects the
demand for and cost of childcare. The decision for parents (overwhelmingly
mothers) not to enter the labor force, but to remain home to care for their
children, is based in part on a comparison of the cost of purchasing childcare and
lost wages. Women's average wages are consistently and significantly below the
average wages earned by white men. 194 This wage stratification itself encourages
women to remain in their homes to do the unwaged childcare. This decision is
also based upon the assumptions about what is the standard of good mothering.
The combination of gender wage discrimination and the domesticity ideal has
the effect of suppressing the demand for waged childcare and thereby
suppressing compensation of workers providing child-care services. The low
wages for child-care services in turn suppress the compensation for other women
in other occupational categories, which reinforces the low wages earned by
child-care workers.
Both the influence of the domesticity ideal of the stay-at-home-mom and its
economic viability have predictable race and class implications. One implication
is that the father's salary is likely to be affected by the racial stratification of
wages in the labor market. Given the higher the salaries of the father the more
feasible the decision of a mother to stay at home without the benefit of money
wages, the racial stratification of the labor market affects which mothers stay
home and which must find waged work. 195 Data show that more married African
American women participate in waged labor than married white women. 196 They
192. See HEIDI I. HARTMANN & DIANA M. PEARCE, HIGH SKILL AND LOW PAY: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD CARE WORK 3 (1989) (reporting the results of a survey conducted in 1984-1985 indicating that of the 8
million children under the age of 5 who had waged working mothers, only about 25% of them were cared for in
organized child-care facilities); Colen, supra note 34, at 81-82 (reporting Census Bureau data for 1987).
Sharon Nantell, relying on Census Bureau data, reports that until 1991, "the primary child care arrangement for
working mothers with children under the age of 5 had consistently been care in the home of another (with such
care provided by a grandparent, another relative or a nonrelative)." Nantell, supra note 11, at 899. The
percentage ranged from 40.7% in 1977 to 36.8% in 1988. See id. In 1991, care provided in the child's home
was more prevalent (35.7%). See id. Between 1991 and 1993, however, statistics show a steady increase in the
use of organized facilities and a steady decline of care in the child's home. See id at 900 (for children less than
1 year old, in 1991,12% were cared for in organized facilities as compared to 19% in 1993; for children 3-4
years of age, the percentage increased from 33% in 1991 to 39% in 1993).
193. See Nantell, supra note 11, at 898.
194. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, tbl. 37, at
204 (1997) (median weekly earnings for men in 1996 was $599 compared with women's of $444).
195. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (referring to data showing the relative incomes of
married men based on race).
196. See Dorothy Brown, The MarriageBonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA, 45,
49 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF
REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION 105 (1990)) (73% of
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also show that married African American women contribute
a higher percentage
97
of income to the household than white women do. 1
Another race and class implication is the role that women who hold
professional and managerial positions play in the child-care labor market.1 9
Armed with economic wherewithal and the domesticity ideal, a significant
number of these mothers hire child-care workers to work in their homes on a
full-time or live-in basis. 199 Reported data indicate that, as of 1993, about three
percent of the children with waged working mothers are cared for by a child-care
worker who lives in the family home. 200 It is estimated that as of 1993, there
were as many as one-million immigrants hired nationwide to perform childcare
and other domestic work.20'
Notwithstanding that live-in care remains atypical among waged working
mothers, it has had a significant effect on the child-care labor market. 20 2 With
married Black women compared to64% of married white women were in waged labor force in 1990).
197. See id, citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 196, at 100, table 8.6 (married Black
women contributed 40% of their total household's income as compared to a 29% rate of contribution by
married white women); see also Brown, supra note 146, at 1491-95 (indicating contribution of African
American wives to household income at different income levels).
198. Although women of color are represented within this occupational category, a disproportionate
number of white women hold these positions. See Herz & Woolton, supra note 137, at 58 (reporting that 30%
of white women as compared to 21% of Black women and 17% of Hispanic women held managerial and
professional jobs in 1994). Although few African American women are performing domestic work in homes,
28% of Hispanic women are, which is "four times their share of total employment." Id.
at 59-60.
199. See Colen, supra note 34, at 82. See also Arat-Koc, supra note 56, at 33, 35 ("[E]mployment of
live-in domestic workers, a long-abandoned practice in North America, is once again being presented as a
solution to the burdens of housework and childcare among high and middle income groups;" because middleclass families in Canada cannot get subsidies for childcare, "parents with two or more pre-school children
[find] employment of a live-in nanny would cost significantly less than sending children to a day care centre or
hiring live-out help.").
200. See Nancy Imperiale, Child Care with Foreign Flair,ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Feb. 23, 1993, at

El.
201. See Lynn Smith & Chris Kraul, Together in the Shadows of the Law: The Link Between Parents
and Nannies who are Illegal Immigrants Creates an Uneasy and DelicateBalance of Power,Love, Need and
Suspicion, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at Al, A24; see also ROMERO, supra note 36, at 86-87 (describing how
migrant women are over-represented among private household workers).
202. The employment of child-care workers who live-in or go to families' homes each day is not limited
to high-income families. Newsweek reported in 1993 that
now more families at all income levels are paying sitters to work in their homes, thanks in part to the
prevalence of illegal immigrants willing to work at low wages. During one recent survey, . . . [a]
copresident of the Families and Work Institute in New York ...says she was stunned to find how
many assembly-line workers in Texas had nannies at home .... [T]hese women had Mexican
women coming across the border ...for in-home care.". . . In Chicago, Christine Thornton Wiener
of Nannies Midwest, Ltd., estimates that undocumented workers account for 60 to 70 percent of the
nanny market in her area.
Melinda Beck et al., The ParentTrap, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1993, at 34-35. See ROMERO, supranote 36, at 9192 (describing a 1983 special report published in an El Paso newspaper that concluded "there may well be
more maids per home in the city than anywhere else in the nation .... At $40 plus room and board a week,
many El Pasoans can afford them, not just the rich"); see generally Vicki L. Ruiz, By the Day or Week:
Mexicana Domestic Workers in El Paso,in To TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY, supra note 55, at 269 (exploring the
demographic, economic, and historical context affecting women living in the border town of Ciudad Juirez,
Mexico and working in El Paso, Texas). But see Leslie Eaton, Show Nanny the Money. As Economy Booms,
Pay Rises for Child-Care Workers, N.Y TIMEs, July 26, 1998, at 27 (reporting that "millionaires" are paying
college educated maternity nurses and nannies up to $1000 a week after taxes and providing health insurance,
a retirement benefit, and in some cases even buying the child-care worker a luxury car).
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live-in care viewed as the best form of care because it comes closest to
reproducing the ideal of middle-class parenting (mothering), the exploitative
working conditions of live-in child-care workers has the further effect of
depressing compensation throughout the child-care labor market. The
expectations of prospective parent-employers regarding market wages, working
conditions, and the general view of the economic worth of the service are greatly
influenced by the market reality that undocumented migrant women of color are
available to mimic unwaged, home childcare for low pay.2 °3
Through live-in childcare, the lady-like worker has found a way to maintain
respectability and thereby mark a boundary between herself and her family and
other waged working mothers and their families. She has done it by modifying,
while at the same time perpetuating, the historical meanings of domestic work,
gender, and race.2° In the nineteenth century, the lady adopted practices that
maintained her hold on respectability by separating herself from the waged
worker with whom she shared her home; in the twentieth century, the lady-like
worker maintains her respectability in the home and in the marketplace by
adopting practices that separate herself from the waged worker she leaves in her
home while she enters the marketplace.20 5
Workers view live-in jobs requiring both housework and childcare to be the
worst type of waged reproductive labor.20 6 Generally only women who cannot
203. See Demetrios G. Papademetriou, The 'Zoe Baird Problem' Is a FlawedLabor Policy, N.J. L.J.,
Feb. 15, 1993, at 17, ROMERO, supra note 36, at 92 ("Native-born domestic workers are unable to raise wages
or improve working conditions as long as employers have access to a virtually inexhaustible reserve army of
undocumented women.").
204.
[T]he very spheres from which the foreign domestic worker is excluded also need her in order to
function in their present form, both materially and ideologically . ... [Tihe dominant society
suppresses awareness of its dependence on foreign domestic workers by rendering domestic
workers socially invisible within the household and legally invisible within immigration and
employment protection legislation.
Audrey Macklin, Foreign Domestic Worker: SurrogateHousewife or Mail OrderServant?, 37 McGLL L.J.
682, 686 (1992); see Colen, supra note 34, at 90, 92-97 (reporting how West Indies migrant child-care
workers in New York City in the late 1980s experienced their employers' "humiliating behavior" that
frequently made them feel invisible and how employers' "profound dependence on caregivers" influenced the
qualities they sought in a caregiver and their stereotypical assumptions about them); Macklin, supra, at 751
("The grim truth is that some Canadian women's access to the high paying, high status professions is facilitated
through the revival of semi-indentured servitude. Put another way, one woman is exercising class and
citizenship privilege to buy her way out of sex oppression.").
205. See Macklin, supra note 204, at 749-50 (comparing current trends in reproductive labor in which
middle- and upper-class women hire household workers with pre-industrial mistress/domestic worker
relationships).
206. See Colen, supra note 34, at 80-81; Doreen Carvajal, For Immigrant Maids, Not a Job but
Servitude, NY. TtMEs, Feb. 25, 1996, § 1, at 1, 38; see also ROMERO, supra note 36, at 12-13, 66-67
(describing results of a study of Chicana domestic workers in Denver in which the women in day work (note
not live-in) found that the flexibility of their employment supported their family and community identities and
provided them a measure of autonomy); Abigail B. Bakan & Daiva Stasiulis, Foreign Domestic Worker Policy
in Canada and the Social Boundaries of Modern Citizenship, 58 Sci. & SOC'Y 7, 16, 16 n.10 (1994)
(referring to a survey of live-in workers in Toronto indicating that 65% of the household workers surveyed
worked more than 44 hours per week and 44% of them reported that they had received no compensation for
performing overtime work and reasoning that "[e]xploitation of live-in domestic workers may arise almost
invisibly, as there is an inherent expectation of the offer of 'sacrifices' associated with 'family ideology').
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otherwise find alternative employment within waged reproductive labor take
these positions.2 °7 That means they are left to those women most desperate for
employment to support themselves and their families.20 8 Through ironic twists of
logic, it is the women's attempt to escape from poverty in their home countries
that becomes a reason for U.S. families to pay exploitative wages and impose
exploitative working conditions. 2 9 The wages paid may compare favorably to
the wages the women would receive in their home country, and that fact becomes
a ready justification by child-care consumers for the employment terms they
impose on child-care workers. 210 It is not difficult to conclude that these
justifications have persuasive power because they are made through a racial
prism.
The child-care employment practices described below provide further support
for the contention that the pay and working conditions are race-based.21 1 Reports
207. See generally Rina Cohen, Women of Color in White Households: Coping Strategies of Live-in
Domestic Workers, 14 QUALITATIVE Soc. 197 (1991) (outlining various strategies the household workers use
to limit the overreaching of employers and make a life for themselves based on interviews of live-in household
workers who migrated predominantly from Third World countries).
208. See Colen, supra note 34, at 82 (describing specifically the waged reproductive labor market in
New York City during the 1980s).
209. See Carvajal, supra note 206, at 37 ("The dirty little secrets behind the closed doors of some upper
middle class houses in the suburbs from New York to Los Angeles are the immigrant women who work up to
15-hour shifts, six day a week, for wages amounting to $2 an hour.").
210. But see Macklin, supra note 204, at 690 (discussing postwar immigration policies in Canada
regarding household workers and indicating that, because the "Caribbean governments ... were anxious to
make a good name for their citizens abroad, their selection process gave priority to educational attainment and
ambition over domestic skills," resulting in "[m]any candidates [who] were actually nurses, teachers or civil
servants in search of better job opportunities in Canada").
211. See Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 189, at 315 ("Migration and paid domestic service are thus
elements of a global set of linkages in which gendered and racialized ideologies play a significant part."); see
also WRIGLEY, supra note 191, at 10-11 (providing examples of how parents rely on national and cultural
prejudices in choosing a household worker, for example preferring Salvadoran women over women from
Guatemala).
Yet, further evidence of the racialized hierarchy related to live-in care in the United States is the
phenomenon of the "secondary arrangement," meaning that a child is provided care through more than one
child-care arrangement. One example of this is supplementing live-in care by enrolling the child in a preschool.
One study shows that when primary care is provided in the child's home, a secondary arrangement is more
likely to be used. See Todd P. Steen, An Analysis of Secondary Child Care Arrangements, AM. ECONOMIST,
Spring 1994, at 82, 88-89. It further shows that whites are more likely to use such arrangements and that
women with higher wages have a higher propensity to use secondary care. See id at 89; see also Colen, supra
note 34, at 94-95 (reporting that the secondary arrangement occurred in a number of the households studied in
New York City when parents hired West Indian women as live-in or full-time caregivers). Anecdotal reports
reinforce the findings of the Steen study and reveal the stratification of reproductive labor and its racial
component. For example, one report described a mother who placed advertisements in newspapers throughout
the country, "including a local Korean newspaper and a Middle Westem daily-that yielded the 50-year-old
Mexican woman who cares for the house and the children. [She] also sends her 3-year-old to a day-care school
so he has a chance to socialize with others his age." Elsa Brenner, Coping with Uncertaintiesin Child Care,
NY. TIMES, April 25, 1993, § 13WC, at 1, 8. Another mother, an attorney in Texas whose husband is also an
attorney, pays "two illegal domestic workers-one lives in, one lives out-S130 a week each in cash to help
with their household and three young children. With their combined six-figure income, that doesn't sound like
much, but [the mother] says it adds up, particularly since they are paying $1,000 a month in preschool tuition."
Beck et al., supra note 202, at 35, These two stories suggest that childcare continues to be stratified along race
lines where the "dirty work" for low pay remains associated with women of color. The enhancement of live-in
childcare through preschool programs has the effect of maintaining the inferior status and working conditions
of the live-in household worker. Rather than using the available resources to increase her wages and benefits
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by immigrant rights advocates that the "miserable workplace conditions are
rampant" have a racial cast.212 One advocate repeats the story told to her of a
twenty-seven-year-old woman who was in the country illegally from Mexico:
Once, she said, she was thrown out of a Malibu home at 5 a.m. for
refusing to get up to see to a crying infant, a duty she never agreed to or
was being paid for. She watched the owners of a Long Beach home let
dogs into the kitchen she had just cleaned, feeding them food scraps on
the floor.
She said she missed countless outings with her friends during off
hours when her Huntington Beach employers called at the last moment to
say they were running late and asked if she could stay over an hour or so
even though [she] had worked her full 12-hour day. She quit after the
couple made her pay for a broken plate.213
In the early 1990s, "[w]ithout English or legal papers, the domestic workers
earned as little as $65 a week in San Diego; with English and papers they earned
as much as $500 in Los Angeles. 2 14 An employee who lives in the household,
but who is without necessary immigration documents, may be paid less than
and improve her working conditions, the family chooses to provide other services to the child.
212. Smith & Kraul, supra note 201, at A24. Julia Wrigley expands upon the relationship of working
conditions to race when she reports that
[p]arents who hire high-status employees are not always confident they can control them. They may
hesitate to issue orders to an educated woman the way they would to a less-educated immigrant. The
head of a Manhattan domestic employment agency said this was a factor in her failure to find a job
for a twenty-seven-year-old American woman.
WRIGLEY, supra note 191, at 5. For a further discussion of the nature of the exploitative working conditions,
see Arat-Koc, supra note 56, at 39-43 (addressing the problem for live-in workers of having no separation
between home and work and how that can lead to employers exploiting their employees; also describing the
inadequacy of laws protecting domestic workers in Canada and the failure of governments to enforce them);
Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 206, at 17 (describing sexual, physical, and emotional abuse and racial
harassment); Diana Vellos, Immigrant Latina Domestic Workers and Sexual Harassment, 5 J. GENDER & L.
407, 418-26 (1997) (describing low wages and hostile working conditions, particularly sexual harassment,
experienced by undocumented Latina domestic workers in the United States).
213. Smith & Kraul, supra note 201, at A25. In contrast to the treatment described in the text, the au
pair program operated through the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) provides substantial protections to the
child-care worker. For example, the USIA finalized new rules effective September 5, 1997, which among other
things, clarifies that au pair participants must receive the federal minimum wage and specifies that an au pair
may not provide more than ten hours of childcare on any given day or more than 45 hours of childcare in any
given week. See Exchange Visitor Program (Au pairs), 62 Fed. Reg. 46,876 (1997) (to be codified at 22
C.F.R. 514.31) (finalizing amendments to existing regulations the interim final rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 34,632
(1997)). Until 1995, when Congress passed the Au Pair Program Extension, Pub. L. No. 104-72, 109 Stat. 776
(1995), the USIA was limited to authorizing agencies to bringing young people, typically women, only from
Western and Northern European countries. See WRIGLEY, supra note 191, at 51-52; Papademetriou, supra
note 203, at 28. This program is structured to reduce, if not eliminate, the domestic service nature of the
employment relationship by requiring that parents provide au pairs their own room, board, and access to
transportation and treat the au pair (which is French meaning as an equal) as a family member. See Imperiale,
supra note 200, atEl; Robert J.Klein, Finding Live-in Help for your Child that is Loving, Loyal and Also
Legal, MONEY, Sept. 1989, at 155, 155. That the workers in this program to date have been nearly exclusively
European means that it has served to reinforce the racial stratification of child-care service rather than disrupt
it,

214. Smith & Kraul, supranote 201, at A24.
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what the family would have to pay a child-care center. In 1993, in Houston, the
current average for a live-in nanny was $125 per week as compared to $200 at a
child-care center.215
A live-in household worker, of course, does not inevitably experience abusive
working conditions. It is the isolation of live-in work and the unstable
immigration status of household workers that increase the potential for abuse.
The structure of the employment arrangement, along with "the racism that
deepens and provides additional legitimation" for exploitative conduct, makes it
difficult for a household worker to protect herself from exploitative employers.2 16
Given the history of waged childcare, what we know is that this potentially
exploitative employment arrangement is built on class, gender, and racial
hierarchies. What we also know is that the structure of the arrangement
maintains the distinction between the lady, the lady-like worker, and the
working-class woman.
What we must not ignore is the complicity of the United States and other
developed countries in having created the economic conditions in the women's
home countries in recent decades that lead them to seek and remain in live-in
household work away from their children, other family members, and native
country.2 17 Their migration is one of the "legac[ies] of imperialism" that
"combine[] with modem conditions of indebtedness. 218 When the women's
home countries adopt structural adjustment policies demanded by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that result in severe reductions
in social services while emphasizing export commodities over local market
expansion, a source of migrant female labor is produced. 2 19 The government of
the home country has reasons to encourage the migration because it is a solution
to the problem of chronic unemployment, and it becomes a source of hard
215. See Jo Ann Zuniga & Pamela Yip, Hiring of Illegal Aliens for Child Care Is Common, Hous.
CHRoN., Jan. 22, 1993, at A13; see also Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 206, at 25 ("[T]he most signsficant
sources for the racial/ethnic variations in the degree of exploitation experienced by foreign domestics reside not
in the allocative and legitimizing role of racial/gender stereotypes, but rather in the different citizenship statuses
and motivations of white/European women and third-world women of color... The threat of deportation to an
advanced capitalist European country does not hold the same implications as it does to a poor third-world
country."); id at 11-19 (analyzing Canadian immigration policies regarding household workers during the
twentieth century and showing their racial character and the relationship of race to issues of citizenship);
Macklin, supra note 204, at 687-92 (same).
216. Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 206, at 17-18, 24 (making these points in reference to Canadian
immigration laws and employment practices).
217. Avoiding this complicity can lead to statements, such as those statements found in M. Isabel
Medina, In Search of Quality Childcare: Closing the Immigration Gate to Childcare Workers, 8 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 161, 199 (1994) that "[p]ersons from overseas are willing and are sometimes more able to
perform childcare work. It is unconscionable that parents in our society are denied access to these willing and
able childcare providers because they are placed at the bottom of the waiting list for immigrant visas." Id.
218. Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 189, at 315.
219. See CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES & BASES: MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS 185 (1989); Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 189, at 315; Colen, supra note 34, at 79-80; Macklin,
supra note 204, at 694-96; see also Dan Gatmaytan, Death and the Maid- Work lfolence, and the Filipinain
the InternationalLabor Market, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 237-38 (1997) (describing the Philippine
govemment's policy of encouraging the export of labor as a means of servicing and repaying the country's
debt).
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currency when the women send back a portion of their pay to support their

children and other family members. 22' The U.S. government also welcomes the
migration because it assists the economies of debtor, underdeveloped nations,
does not impose substantial burdens on state- or federally-funded social services
because the women usually are forced to migrate without their families,
suppresses child-care wages that the federal government pays directly or
indirectly through its welfare and tax programs, and reduces a labor shortage in
child-care workers. Many of these benefits, of course, depend on the women
crossing the U.S. borders without its formal blessing of legal immigration.222
Although much work has been done by various grassroots organizations to
expose these labor issues and the media has reported some of the egregious
working conditions, the basic structures supporting the exploitative employment
remain unchanged.223 Abigail Bakan and Daiva Stasiulis, experts in the field of

domestic work and immigration, argue
[t]he perpetuity of the exploitative conditions associated with in-home
domestic service has meant that a practice

.

.

.

has become

institutionalized in conditions of advanced capitalist liberal democracies.
This unequal assignment of rights that works through constructed
notions of immigrant status, race, gender, and class is now commonplace
in the citizenship practices of most advanced capitalist states.224

220. See Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 206, at 13 (indicating that the governments of Caribbean
countries did not challenge Canada's harsh and unequal treatment of Caribbean household workers who
migrated there because the migration alleviated the chronic unemployment being experienced in those
countries).
221. Cf Arat-Koc, supra note 56, at 45-51. Sedef Arat-Koc describes Canadian immigration policies
during the postwar period designed to assure a supply of household workers without citizenship rights,
concluding:
[t]he state plays an active role in structuring and controlling not only the volume but also the
conditions of these workers. There is a striking contrast between the laissez faire approach the
liberal state has taken, which favours private solutions to problems in the domestic sphere, and its
rigid intervention in the provision, organization and control of 'help' for that sphere.
Id, at 51; see also Medina, supra note 217, at 170-86 (describing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA), which enacted sanctions against employers hiring undocumented migrant workers, and
concluding that this attempt to protect U.S. borders and stem the exploitation of workers has been ineffective;
describing the Immigration Act of 1990, which increased the available number of employment-based visas but
classified child-care workers as unskilled and severely limited the number of visas available for unskilled
workers, and concluding that the 1990 Act "effectively closed the door to childcare visa applicants").
222. See Macklin, supra note 204, at 685 (providing a useful framework for considering the migrant
household worker based on an insider/outsider dichotomy that "encompass[es] a variety of situations where a
person is simultaneously part and not part of a social structure in which she finds herself' and reasoning that
"[in these settings, being an outsider means not only exclusion from participation, but also denial of the
protections normally accorded to insiders").
223. See Beck et al., supra note 202, at 36-37; Carvajal, supra note 206, at 1, 38; Macklin, supra note
204, at 738-39; Smith & Kraul, supra note 201, at A24-25; Zuniga & Yip, supra note 215, at A13. But see
Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 206, at 18-19 (describing successful efforts in the 1970s of grassroots
organizations to change the immigration laws in Canada while acknowledging that the changes had not
"represented an unqualified gain" and that other changes in 1990 in the law, which were widely criticized by
advocacy groups representing household workers, had a particularly racist cast).
224. Bakan & Stasiulis, supra note 189, at 332.
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The use of undocumented migrant women to solve an array of problems for the
home and host countries and for middle-class families is tolerable because it
takes place in the long history of the degradation of domestic work and the
women of color who perform it.22 5 The circumstances of the child-care worker
and the child-care consumer, of course, have changed from the late 1800s to the
late 1900s. Although the meaning of domesticity, motherhood, and respectability
changes from one period to the next and from one locality to another,
contemporary arrangements of waged childcare continue to sustain class, gender,
and racial hierarchies.
4. Summary of the History of Waged Childcare
The U.S. history of domestic work and, in particular, of waged childcare
teaches us two important lessons for applying the antisubordination principle
when evaluating the tax law's treatment of employment-related child-care
expenditures. The first is that systems of subordination do not operate
independently from each other. On the contrary, although each form of
subordination operates in a particularized way in different localities at different
time periods, they each reinforce and support the other. The racial division of
domestic work depends on the gendered nature of reproductive labor and both
operate to support the construction of the working class as inferior. As Sedef
Arat-Koc writes, "[r]ather than solving the problem of gender inequality, ...
[domestic work] adds class and racial dimensions to it[;] ...[r]ather than easing
work] solution polarizes and
the public/private split in society,... [the domestic 226
deepens it, with added class and racial dimensions.,
The second lesson is that wages and working conditions for child-care
workers are not products of a free competitive market establishing an
equilibrium between supply and demand. The labor history, instead, shows how
social prejudices and government intervention greatly influence those wages and
working conditions. For our purposes, what follows from the history of the childcare labor market is that a tax analysis of employment-related child-care
expenditures must include consideration of the structures in the market that
support economic exploitation of child-care workers. Looking at the purchasing
225.

Gatekeepers to citizenship serve to regulate the entry into and exit from nation-states and labor
markets as well as access to citizenship rights. All gatekeepers accomplish this work in part through
the construction, articulation, and reproduction of stereotypes about who is, or is not, an appropriate
candidate for citizenship within a given nation-state....
...[l1t is suggested that differences in citizenship status that reflect the hegemony of advanced
capitalist states also interact with racial/ethnic, gender, and class differences. These socially
constructed differences facilitate structural inequities between predominantly white female citizens
and predominantly noncitizen women of color.
Id at 317, 331; see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY

56-61 (1983) (analyzing the advantages to wealthy European host countries and the costs to their "guest
workers" of being denied citizenship rights).
226. Arat-Koc, supranote 56, at 53.
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of child-care services as an objective fact, unrelated to the political and
economic strongholds of power that influence the nature of that transaction,
becomes a wholly inadequate starting point of analysis.
IRI. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CHILD-CARE EXPENDITURES AND TRADITIONAL
TAX PRINCIPLES: THE MYTH OF OBJECTIVITY

Part I showed how linking reproductive labor to the private sphere and
making the domestic worker invisible served the interests of the middle class and
therefore was necessarily based on class, gender, and race subordination. The
purpose of Part 1I is to identify how traditional tax principles maintain those
subordinating systems. There are two conventional tax concepts that are central
to analyzing child-care expenditures incurred by a wage earner. One is the
business/personal distinction, and the other is imputed income. The preceding
historical analysis is used to show how each, as understood within traditional tax
analysis, tends to reinforce dominant structures and how both, once subjected to
an antisubordination analysis, could be applied to determine the appropriate tax
treatment of child-care expenditures.
A. The Business/PersonalDistinction
The business/personal distinction arises out of the widely accepted
understanding of what should constitute income under an ideal accretion tax
system.227 The ideal tax base was first developed by Robert Haig and then
refined by Henry Simons, and is defined to be the sum of "(1) the market value
of
of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in value of the store 228
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.
Simons recognized that this definition of a comprehensive income tax base
requires "distinguishing between consumption [personal] and expense
[business]." 229 A business expense is to be taken into account as a diminution in
the second part of the calculation when determining the change in value of
accumulations. X dollars expended, for example, for inventory, which is later
sold for Y dollars would result in Y -X income being subject to tax during the
227. Compare,e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (allows deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses .. in
carrying on any trade or business") with I.R.C. § 262 (disallows deduction for "personal, living, or family
expenses"); see DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 16-20 (1986).
228. The definition of income in an ideal accretion tax system was first stated by Robert Haig "as the
money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points in time." Robert M. Haig, The
Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed.,
1921). It was later refined by Henry Simons. SimoNs, supra note 13, at 50.
Jennifer Brooks encourages us to be critical of relying on the Haig-Simons definition of income because,
"[e]ven the most widely approved theory of income may be found faulty in succeeding generations." Jennifer
J.S. Brooks, Taxation in Human Capital,in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 196, at 58, 61. I see the introduction
of the antisubordination principle as consistent with her concern that the dominance of the Haig-Simons
definition has precluded consideration of the social context in which the income tax operates. See id at 64-65.
229. SIMONS, supra note 13, at 54.
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period. In contrast, X dollars spent during the taxable period for comfort or
pleasure, such as for a candy bar or going to a movie, represent an amount to be
taken into account as an increase in the first part of the calculation. 230 The
expenditure for candy or a movie is treated as producing no increase in the
taxpayer's store of property rights. The conclusion that the expenditure does not
produce increases in wealth means that it is treated, under part one of the
calculation, as an amount used for consumption and subject to taxation for the
taxable period. 23 1 The ideal income definition, therefore, requires that every
expenditure be classified as either personal, which means that it should not be
taken into account as a reduction of income either now or later, or 2business,
32
which means that it should be deducted from income either now or later.
One difficulty, of course, is that an inherent problem with Simons's definition
that he himself recognized is that "[a] thoroughly precise and objective
distinction [between personal and business] is inconceivable. '' 233 Simons saw the
problem exclusively as a problem of inadequate information. He believed that
the difficulty with the distinction was that it required determination of subjective
intent. 234 Child-care expenditures provide an excellent example of how difficult
the distinction proves to be for Simons. As he saw the problem with making his
definition operational for an issue like child-care expenditures, it was necessary
to determine whether taxpayers go to work for the purpose of earning sufficient
230. A more complete description of the tax treatment of a personal expenditure would recognize that
the X dollars spent were first earned and treated as an increase in accumulations for the period in accordance
with the second part of the calculation. Once expended for consumption purposes, the amount of
accumulations is reduced by X dollars while the amount of consumption is increased by the same amount. The
net effect of both explanations is that the ideal tax base for any period remains the same regardless of whether
the increase in accumulations is saved or consumed.
231. The description in the text of the treatment of the expenditure for candy or a movie and its
accompanying explanation in terms of the Haig-Simons definition of income reflects conventional tax analysis.
For some tax scholars, however, reconsideration of the meaning of the Haig-Simons ideal tax base, especially
how it has been used to support current tax treatment of human capital, is overdue. See, e.g., Brooks, supra
note 228, at 75-76 (demonstrating how the definition of human capital is over-inclusive with the effect that
"[vialues commonly associated with human capital may in fact be additional, untaxed values attached to
material capital"); Charlotte Crane, Shifting from an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax: Effects on
Expenditures for Education, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 196, at 146, 155 (examining the various
presumptions made to make the income tax operational and concluding that "[tihe presumptions made
regarding the transfer of values concerning the development of human potential are among the least satisfactory
of any of those adopted by the income tax"); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Acknowledging Workers in Definitions
of Consumption and Investment: The Case of Health Care, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 196, at 119, 134
(showing that the Haig-Simons model does not specify the proper tax treatment of expenditures related to
human capital and urging a tax analysis that does not "disregard the lifelong investments for income production
in ourselves and our children").
232. But see Denise D. J. Roy, Consumption in Business/Investment at Home: Environmental Cleanup
Costs Versus DisabilityAccess Costs, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 196, at 170, 182-84, 189 (arguing that,
even if the tax law were to recognize better than it does now that some expenditures classified as personal have
a business element and that some expenditures classified as business have a personal element, there is yet a
type of non-personal business expense that represents consumption that arguably should not be deductible).
The timing of a deduction depends on the timing of the income and that requires consideration of
realization rules. The realization principle is unnecessary to a discussion of employment-related child-care
expenditures. For a summary of the realization principle, see MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 72-74 (8th ed. 1994).
233. SlMONS, supra note 13, at 54.
234. See id. at 54.
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funds to purchase child-care services for their children, or whether they purchase
child-care services for the purpose of earning income in the waged labor market.
For Simons, child-care expenditures were troubling because they raised the
"unwelcome criterion of intention," that he determined to be "inescapable. '235
The difficulty of distinguishing business and personal expenditures is far
more complex than merely a problem of determining taxpayer intent. The
problem with the distinction is that it marks business expenses as productive,
and personal expenses as unproductive in a way that misapprehends productivity
in the home and nonproductivity in the marketplace. Rather than acknowledging
that household cleaning, cooking, and childcare, among other reproductive tasks,
are socially and economically necessary, the intense monitoring of the
business/personal distinction that occurs in the tax law denies the intermediate
value of reproductive tasks-a value based on how the results from reproductive
labor produce further value. 23 6 Reliance on a distinction that is "inescapably"
difficult to apply has resulted in a tax analysis that distorts the reality of the
uncertainty surrounding an expense classified as business or one classified as
personal. The binary classification system requires a willed ignorance of the
unproductive aspects of the public marketplace and the productive aspects of the
private home.
The "inescapable" problems found in the ideal income tax base with the
business/personal distinction are further exacerbated when considered from an
antisubordination perspective. As shown in Part I, the public/private distinction,
which was intensely monitored during the industrialization of the country in the
nineteenth century and has continuing influence today, justifies and supports
class, gender, and racial hierarchies. The public/private distinction is mirrored in
the tax law's business/personal distinction. Within an antisubordination
framework, the business/personal distinction, is no longer seen as an abstract tax
concept disconnected from social and economic relationships. Rather, the
distinction takes on a different meaning once it is understood as being the
functional equivalent, in tax terms, of the public/private distinction, the
production/reproduction distinction, and the cult of respectability. Reconnecting
the business/personal distinction to its social roots removes its seeming
235. Id

236. See Colen & Sanjek, supra note 35, at 3; Richard Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 1, 15 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977). Economists have recognized some

of the problems with the business/personal distinction. See DAVID E BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY
STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 28 (2d ed. Rev. 1984); Goode, supra, at 1, 5-15; see also Crane,

supra note 231, at 155 (reflecting how the tax law presumes all development of human potential, which would,
of course, include child care provided by a parent or a waged worker, is "consumption, rather than investment
leading to taxable income" and, therefore, suggesting that child care is treated as personal not only because it is
not viewed as related to the employment of the parent or parents but because it produces human potential,
which itself is viewed in the tax law as personal); Handelman, supra note 231, at 120 (suggesting that
embedded in the business/personal distinction is the view that productivity is linked to entrepreneurial activity
rather than to the labor of the worker, raising yet another reason why employment-related child-care
expenditures, which are closely associated with workers rather than entrepreneurs, are classified as personal
rather than business).
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objectivity and makes the widespread willingness to tolerate its "inescapable"
problems seem less benign. Even more questions are raised about the
acknowledged indeterminacy of the business/personal distinction, as well as its
being a proxy for the public/private distinction, when the concept of imputed
income is considered.
B. Imputed Income
When taxpayers personally provide services for themselves, they are
producing in-kind income that is referred to in conventional tax analysis as
imputed income.237 When taxpayers use their own personal property for their
own benefit, their property is producing in-kind income that is also referred to as
imputed income. Both types of in-kind income are labeled as income because the
services and the property produce an economic benefit to the taxpayer. Both
types of in-kind income are labeled imputed because the activities take place
outside of the marketplace and because the services and property are used for
personal (consumption) purposes by the person producing them. The hallmark of
imputed income is that the economic benefits are both produced and exhausted
by the taxpayer outside the marketplace.
Non-marketplace activities generally are not the subject matter of an accretion
tax as defined by Haig-Simons for three reasons. 238 The first reason for its
exclusion from the definition of the ideal income is that it is administratively
difficult to value.239 The second reason for its exclusion is that it is viewed as
inconsequential for determining taxpayers' ability to pay. Its trivial importance is
based on the presumption that imputed income, most especially imputed income
from services, varies "with considerable regularity, from one income class to the
next, along the income scale. '240 The third reason for its exclusion is that to
include imputed income in the tax base would be inconsistent with American
values that require limited governmental interference with an individual's private
life. 24 1 Although many policymakers might argue that, without unduly
sacrificing administrative ease or individual privacy, more imputed income,
especially from property, should be included in the tax base to more accurately
measure each taxpayer's ability to pay,242 no one seriously argues that all
imputed income could or should be included in the tax base.
237. The term in-kind income is used to indicate that the income is not received by the taxpayer in the
form of cash but rather in the form of services or property use. For examples of discussions of imputed income,
see WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXAnON 74 (4th ed- 1991); CHIRELSTEN, supra note
232, at 22-25; WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 121 (11th ed. 1997).
238. But see I.R.C. § 7872 (regarding below-market loans of cash); CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 232, at

218-19 (discussing below-market loans of cash).
239. See KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 237, at 121; see also SIMONS, supra note 13, at 51-52

(demonstrating difficulty of line drawing).
240. SIMONS, supra note 13, at 53. See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text (critiquing Simons's

analysis of imputed income).
241. See, e.g.,
KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 237, at 121.
242. See SIMONS, supra note 13, at 110-15.
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The definition of imputed income set forth above is narrower than that found
generally in the tax literature. Frequently, commentators define imputed income
in such a way as to include in-kind income produced by one family member for
another.243 For example, when one parent enables the other parent to enter or
remain in the waged labor force by providing necessary child-care services in the
home, this transaction usually is analyzed under the rubric of imputed income. 2 "
Expansion of imputed income to mean more than the production of in-kind
income for oneself so that it includes the production of in-kind income for other
family members can be challenged within conventional tax analysis, as well as
within a tax analysis that includes the antisubordination principle.
Treating intrafamily transfers of in-kind income as imputed income ignores a
basic tenet of the income tax-that it is an individual income tax. Except for the
provisions related to the joint income tax return for married couples, the Code is
framed to determine the taxable income of each individual taxpayer, making no
exception for intrafamily transactions. On the contrary, the Treasury and
Congress have devoted considerable efforts through litigation and tax reform to
prevent unwarranted assignments of income through intrafamily transfers.245
One significant reason why the exclusion of intrafamily transfers of in-kind
income from imputed income has gone unchallenged is the policymakers'
general reluctance to tax it. Taxation, however, is not the inevitable conclusion if
the intrafamily transfers were not treated as imputed income. Taxation could be
avoided by using conventional tax analysis regarding gifts2 46 or quid pro quo
243.

See, e.g, ANDREWS, supra note 237, at 74; CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 232, at 23-24.

244. In this example, the parent who cares for the children should be understood as in part producing
imputed income and in part income for the other parent and children. The care-giving parent is personally
benefited by providing child care for her or his own children, while simultaneously producing a benefit for the
other parent who also has an obligation to provide the childcare.
I am grateful to Gwen hayer Handelman for her insights on the inadequacies of the definition of imputed
income, which is generally found in the tax literature.
245. E.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949) (reversing the appellate court's decision
holding a family partnership between a father and his four sons to be legitimate and remanding to the tax court
for determination of which, if any, of the sons were legitimate partners, and thus who would be liable for taxes
on the income generated by the business); Lusthouse v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946) (finding that a
partnership between a husband and a wife, which allowed the husband's earnings to be reported as the wife's
income, was not genuine); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) (finding that a relationship similar to
Lusthouse was not genuine); Harrison v Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941) (finding the trust beneficiary
responsible for taxes on the entire amount of income from the trust, regardless of her assignment to her
children of specific amounts of the income); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (finding a husband's entire
income taxable to him regardless of his assignment by contract of half of his income to his wife); I.R.C. § 7872
(treating forgone interest on below-market gift loans as having been transferred to the borrower and
retransferred to the lender as interest).
246. As a gift, the in-kind income would be excluded from taxation in the recipient's tax base under
I.R.C. § 102. The in-kind income would be excluded from the donor's tax base by looking to general tax
principles of administrability. There are many instances in the tax law, for reasons of administrability, that
exclude income. The administrability reasons include issues of privacy, as well as a determination that the high
number of transactions of relative minimal value warrants exclusion. The I.R.S. already takes this position
regarding transfers of in-kind income of services to friends and acquaintances. See I.R.C. § 6045 (requiring
information reporting by any "barter exchange"); Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(4) (as amended in 1996)
(excluding from the term barter exchange "arrangements that provide solely for the informal exchange of
similar services on a non-commercial basis"); see also Rev R. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100 (holding credits earned
by the performance of services in a barter club taxable). It takes a similar position regarding transfers of in-kind
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exchanges along with the principle of administrability2 47 or by relying on
precedent regarding payments to satisfy support obligations.248
Making the antisubordination principle a part of tax analysis leads to the
question of why policymakers have relied on imputed income, rather than other
tax concepts, to conclude that intrafamily transfers of in-kind income should not
be taxed. The effect of treating an intrafamily transfer of in-kind income from
services, mostly reproductive labor, as imputed is to make the person who
produces the work and the productive value of the work itself invisible under the
tax law. The central purpose of the concept of imputed income is to acknowledge
economic benefit produced outside of the marketplace. Within this family
context, submerging the identity of the worker into the identity of the beneficiary
of the work means that the tax law is indifferent as to who is actually doing the
work. Through that indifference, the tax law devalues the reproductive labor
even as it acknowledges the economic value produced by it. The historical role
that class, gender, and racial hierarchies have played within reproductive labor
makes the tax law's submergence of reproductive labor and the reproductive
laborer under the rubric of imputed income particularly pemicious.249
income of property among family members, with the exception of below-market loans. See I.R.C. § 7872. The
gift analysis might apply even if family members exchange in-kind income with each other. Although mutual
gifts might seem like a contradiction in terms, within a family setting that conclusion may accurately reflect the
nature of the economic transactions.
247. Even if we were to conclude that an intrafamily transfer of in-kind income of services is in
exchange for other in-kind income of services or of property or for cash or other property, that does not mean
that taxation is inevitable. For one thing, it is possible that the cost of one family member acquiring in-kind
income of services may be deductible as an expense, such as for employment-related child care. For another,
the exclusion of this income from tax could be based on principles of administrability as was indicated above
regarding the gift approach. See supra note 246.
248. The U.S. Supreme Court held, in Gould v Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), that payments made to
satisfy a support obligation are not income to the recipient for tax purposes. Although the reasoning in this
early case is troubling because it narrowly defined income as including only income arising from a business
transaction or contract contrary to a broader definition of income later adopted by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), it nevertheless supports the proposition that
intrafamily transfers in satisfaction of support obligations are not taxable. Tax provisions subsequently enacted
regarding the treatment of payments made pursuant to separation and divorce agreements can be reconciled
with this view. See I.R.C. § 71.
249. Evaluating the categorization of in-kind services using the antisubordination principle reveals that
even if the in-kind services are conceptualized as a gift, a quid pro quo for other services, property, cash, or
satisfaction of a support obligation, they remain grounded in the public/private distinction and, therefore, risk
perpetuating class, gender, and racial hierarchies. A closer examination of the different tax approaches,
however, shows that they do not all create the same level of risk. Recognizing in-kind services as a gift or as a
satisfaction of a support obligation keeps the intrafamily transfer of in-kind services a private transaction. By
remaining within the private realm, both conceptualizations of the transfer of in-kind services reinforce treating
reproductive labor as not productive. Nevertheless, from an antisubordination perspective, the gift and support
approaches are preferable to one based on imputed income. To analyze the transfer as a gift or as support
acknowledges the worker, the worker's ownership in the economic value produced, and the worker in the
subject position of having transferred economic value. Although no market price is placed on the economic
value of the in-kind income from services, the gift approach has the further advantage of challenging the
recipient of the services to be grateful for them and encouraging the recipient not to assume that, by virtue of
the family relationship, they were rightfully due. The gift and support approaches with their emphasis on the
private side of the public/private distinction, of course, reflect the historical and contemporary views of
reproductive labor. In that regard, the gift and support approaches make little difference in disrupting the class,
gender, and race subordination associated with reproductive labor. The gift and support approaches, however,
hold the potential of not treating the reproductive labor or the laborer as invisible and, under the
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C. The InterrelationshipBetween the Business/PersonalDistinctionand
Imputed Income
Even if we ignore the ideological consequences of treating one family
member's work as the imputed income of another and adopt the broad definition
of imputed income conventionally employed in tax law, traditional analysis,
relying on the business/personal distinction and the concept of imputed income,
remains inadequate to determine the appropriate tax treatment of child-care
expenditures. A typical rationalization of the business/personal distinction is to
link an expenditure to the production of imputed income.25 ° So long as imputed
income is excluded from taxation, the tax logic under the Haig-Simons ideal tax
base requires that any expenditures incurred in the marketplace to produce that
untaxed income must also be excluded from the tax computation.25'
For example, if a taxpayer bought a tomato plant for $3, planted and weeded
it through the early summer, and then ate the tomatoes produced at the end of the
summer, the taxpayer cannot deduct the $3 paid for the plant. The taxpayer is
denied a deduction for the cost of the plant because she used the plant to produce
imputed income in the form of tomatoes that were consumed outside of the
marketplace. If the same taxpayer had taken the harvested tomatoes to a local
farmers' market and sold them, however, she could deduct the $3 paid for the
plant because the tomatoes were sold in the marketplace for others to consume.
The argument that the cost of food that a taxpayer consumed makes it
possible for that taxpayer to be productive in the marketplace has never been
accepted. On the contrary, determining deductibility of the cost of the tomato
plant, depending on what the taxpayer did with the tomato, generally has been
treated as an easy question based on the obvious distinction between business
and personal purposes. Determining whether child-care costs, however, produced
taxed income (business) or untaxed imputed income (personal) has been
recognized as not so easy even under traditional tax analysis. Nothing in the
conventional analysis of imputed income or the business/personal distinction
tells us whether it is more appropriate in an accretion tax system to look solely to
antisubordination principle, that potential justifies preferring either of these approaches to the imputed income
one.
The quid pro quo approach carnes all the advantages of the gift and support approaches. It goes further,
however, in contesting the public/private distinction. It acknowledges that productivity occurs in households
and that the economic value produced can be transferred in a manner that mirrors transactions typically

associated with the marketplace. By using the language of exchange, the approach explicitly recognizes that the
recipient of the in-kind income needed and valued those services. So long as the in-kind income is excluded
from the tax base of the reproductive laborer for administrative reasons having to do with privacy and the
difficulty of valuation and record-keeping, the quid pro quo approach has only limited benefit. Compared to the
imputed income approach, however, it establishes a tax approach that would support and reinforce social and
economic changes under which reproductive labor would no longer be degraded.
250.

See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 232, at 165-68.

251. See SIMONS, supra note 13, at 118-19, in which Simons suggests this result when discussing the
practical insignificance of income from a non-durable good because "the difference between the value of its use
and its original cost is obviously small."
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the fact that the costs of the child-care services benefited the children and their
parents (imputed income) 252 or to look solely to the fact that the costs of the
child-care services permitted the parents to enter the waged labor market.
The inadequacy of the tax concepts of business/personal and imputed income
is demonstrated further when the deduction of child-care expenditures is
analyzed by comparing families with children and families without children. If a
two-waged-worker family with young children is compared to a one-wagedworker family with young children, then a deduction for child-care expenditures
seems appropriate under traditional tax analysis.253 The imputed income
produced by the non-waged worker in providing child-care services is not
subject to tax. The same tax result can be achieved for the two-waged worker
family only by allowing a deduction for child-care expenditures. Both families
have young children in need of childcare and both families have two workers.
The only difference is that one family has a worker who remains out of the
marketplace and personally provides child-care services, permitting the other
parent to earn market wages, while the other family has two workers in the
marketplace and pays someone else to perform those services. The comparison
of these two families leads to a tentative conclusion that child-care expenditures
are a cost incurred to allow workers in both families to earn waged income. A
deduction for child-care expenditures acquired in the marketplace by the twowaged worker family can be understood as achieving tax equity and economic
rationality. 254 By allowing a deduction for child-care expenditures, the law
ensures similar tax liabilities between those families that enjoy imputed income
from child-care services and those who do not.255
252. The dichotomy in the text adopts conventional tax analysis. It fails to acknowledge the possibility
that the costs of producing human capital, through child-care expenditures, is at least partially an investment
that would produce income in the future. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
253. For ease of exposition I will use the term deduction to refer to the tax treatment of child-care
expenditures because, for purposes of this discussion, the distinction between a deduction and an exclusion
from income, such as the one provided in I.R.C. § 129, and the distinction between a deduction and a credit,
such as the one provided in I.R.C. § 21, are not relevant.
254. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 232, at 24; David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital:
Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 793, 841-46 (1992);
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriageandthe Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 372-73 (1994).
255. Although the tax literature frequently pronounces that imputed income from services is not subject
to the income tax, see CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 232, at 22-25, that statement is misleading. The tax law may
not tax imputed income from services directly, but it can tax it indirectly. If the tax law allows a deduction for
an amount paid for the same services in the marketplace, then the imputed income is taken into account in the
tax base indirectly. The effect of allowing a deduction for the expense of acquiring child-care services in the
marketplace is to tax the imputed income produced from child-rearing services performed by a parent.
For example, if a taxpayer, T, prepares her own tax return, she has earned imputed income by performing
those services. The tax law does not tax 7's imputed income directly. The tax law does tax her imputed income
indirectly, however, because, by performing those services for herself, T is denied the right to deduct their
value. T can only enjoy that deduction by hiring someone to prepare the tax return. See I.R.C. § 212(3). Thus,
whether T forgoes earnng taxable income by spending time preparing the tax return or eams money for the
purposes of paying to have the tax retum prepared by someone else, the tax law treats T the same. In both
instances, the effect on 7's taxable income is zero. In the first instance, the tax law excludes the imputed
income from T's gross income and denies any deduction for the value of services she provided for herself In
the second instance, the tax law includes the marketplace earnings in T's gross income, but allows a deduction
for the amount Tpaid to have the tax return prepared.
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If a similar analysis is applied to a two-waged worker family with young
children and a two-waged worker family without young children, however, a
deduction for child-care expenditures is arguably inappropriate. The comparison
of these two families reveals an alternative to the view that child-care
expenditures enable a taxpayer to enter the waged work force. The comparison of
families with and without young children is the basis for an argument that
having children is a consumption choice and that the cost of caring for those
children should not be deductible. The fact that not every worker/taxpayer has
child-care needs allows for an argument to be made that child-care expenditures
are an item of consumption unrelated to income-producing activity for which a
deduction should be available. To make that argument, however, ignores the
economic productivity involved in the rearing of children. That is to say, the
argument itself is based on the business/personal distinction, with child rearing
being treated as personal.
The family situations just described, of course, do not exhaust the kinds of
family situations where child-care needs arise. If a single-parent family with
young children is compared with a single person without young children and if
the view that having children is a consumption choice prevails, it would seem to
have equal force here as in the previous comparison.2 56 By relying exclusively on
An alternative description of the tax consequences of the tax-return preparation example is to say that the
income earned in the marketplace that was then used by T to pay someone else to prepare her tax return is
excluded from gross income. If T prepares the return, the value of the services (imputed income) is excluded
from gross income; if T earns the money for the purpose of buying those tax preparation services, that income
is excluded from gross income. Yet another alternative description of the tax consequences of the tax-return
preparation example is to say that the value of I's tax-preparation services (imputed income) is included in her
gross income and then deducted as an expenditure necessary to determine taxable income. If T prepares the
return, the value of the services (imputed income) is included in gross income and then deducted; if T earns the
money for the purpose of buying those tax preparation services, that income is included in her gross income
and the cost of the services are deducted.
The treatment of taxpayers as the same regardless of whether they prepare their own tax returns or have
them prepared by someone else achieves the tax goals of equity and economic rationality. The deduction for the
cost of tax preparation services assures equity by treating taxpayers who buy tax preparation services the same
as taxpayers who prepare their own returns. The deduction also assures economic rationality by eliminating any
tax benefit to those who prepare their own returns, because whether taxpayers prepare their own returns or pay
someone else to do it, the tax consequences are the same.
Although the foregoing discussion is theoretically accurate, it is in practice misleading. A deduction for
tax preparation is a miscellaneous itemized deduction, which means that it is not deductible to the extent that
the taxpayer's other miscellaneous itemized deductions do not exceed two percent of adjusted gross income.
See I.R.C. § 67(b). This categorization is further limited to the extent the taxpayer elects to take the standard
deduction. See I.R.C. § 63(b). These limitations on the deductibility of the cost of tax return preparation means
that imputed income from preparing one's own tax return enjoys preferential treatment notwithstanding the
deduction provided under I.R.C. § 212(3).
The imputed income/deduction relationship becomes more complicated and more politically charged
when the tax analysis concerns childcare, as opposed to tax preparation, costs. One reason the analysis
becomes more complicated is that, unlike tax preparation services in which all taxpayers have the obligation to
file tax returns, not all taxpayers have children who are young enough to need child-care services. Therefore,
the goal of designing a tax that treats similarly situated persons similarly is not so obviously achievable
because, as the text suggests, it is less clear with whom a taxpayer should be compared.
256. If a single-parent family with young children is compared to a two-parent family with young
children, the argument for a deduction for child-care expenditures might initially seem stronger for the singleparent family and less strong for the two-parent family. Incurring child-care expenditures might seem to be less
of a necessity of wage eaming when it is possible that one parent could stay home to care for the child while
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traditional tax principles and analysis, we see that the various comparisons of
family situations provide some insight as to what is at stake when deciding the
proper tax treatment of employment-related child-care expenditures. Traditional
tax principles, however, provide no clear answer to the question of whether
child-care expenditures should be deductible. They provide no clear answer
because the principles provide no framework for deciding whether child rearing
is personal or predominantly personal and because, even if child rearing is
considered personal, the principles provide no framework for evaluating the
deductibility question, in terms of either tax equity or economic rationality. The
inadequacy of the tax principles becomes even more obvious once we recognize
that the business/personal distinction and the imputed income concept serve to
obscure the role of child-care workers and the impact on them of tax rules that
determine whether their compensation is deductible to their employers (childcare consumers).
D. The Politics of the Invisibility of the Child-Care Worker in
TraditionalTax Analysis
Within the historical context of waged domestic work and the relation of its
invisibility to the nineteenth-century middle-class homes in which that work was
done, the invisibility of the domestic worker found within twentieth-century tax
analysis should be unsettling. It should be made even more unsettling when, in
the development of specific tax proposals, we find political foes defending their
respective positions by appealing to the middle class with arguments that depend
on the invisibility of the child-care worker. The hearings held by the Senate's
Committee on Finance on H.R. 8300, which was the bill that ultimately became
the Tax Code of 1954, starkly show, through a comparison of discussions having
to do with the tax deduction for depreciation of machinery used in business and
with employment-related child-care expenditures, how the invisibility of childcare workers served the interests of the middle class.
In 1954, the Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, testified before
the Committee on Finance. His testimony covered a wide range of tax reforms,
including accelerated depreciation rules for equipment used in business and the
deduction for employment-related child-care expenditures. In support of the
Eisenhower Administration's proposed accelerated depreciation rules, Secretary
Humphrey argued:
To have real prosperity in America, we cannot stimulate consumer
buying alone. Large tax cuts to millions of individuals just to buy
the other parent provides waged earnings. That analysis is flawed, however, because it assumes that a wageearning parent has no child-care responsibilities that need to be met if the other parent remains in the home to
perform those duties. All wage-earning parents have child-care needs; the difference is that some meet these
needs by acquiring child care in the marketplace and others by having those services provided to them within
the household.
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consumer goods is not enough. Millions of people in this country earn
their living making heavy things-big lathes, generators, heavy steel, and
machinery that consumers do not buy. Such things are purchased by
investors. Our tax program not only returns billions of dollars to
consumers but also seeks to stimulate the investment of savings to buy
the products of heavy industry-in the production of which so many
millions of Americans get their livelihood.
257
During an exchange with Senator Russell B. Long from Louisiana, the
Secretary remained focused on the workers making the machines and those
employed by the businesses buying the machines.
Senator Long.
If he [the businessman] makes more profits and
continues to expand his business, where are you going to collect the tax?
Secretary Humphrey. You get it out of the profits and out of the
earnings of all the people working. Every time a man goes to work it
helps the income tax....

Senator Long.
You say you are getting it directly from the
salaries of the laboring men?
Secretary Humphrey. Out of the wages and out of the profits of the
business and out of the people who make these new machines. There are
going to be a lot of people making them and there will be some profits
there. If we can just stimulate the buying of machines and putting in the
258
machines, our income taxes will go up.
Secretary Humphrey's argument in favor of allowing businesses to deduct the
cost of machinery in earlier tax years rather than later tax years was that this tax
rule would increase employment. He de-emphasized the effect of accelerated
depreciation deductions on the profits of both the seller and the buyer of the
machinery; instead, he stressed the effect the tax reform would have on the
workers producing the machinery and those using the machinery in their jobs.
The argument was made in the political environment of a congressional
hearing and was presumably designed to garner public support. The fact that the
argument was political underscores the importance of the form it took. Secretary
Humphrey apparently believed that the senators and the American public would
be more receptive to accelerated depreciation deductions if they understood how
they served the interests of U.S. labor.
For comparison purposes, consider the responses of Secretary Humphrey and
the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Marion B. Folsom, to Senator Long's
questions concerning the proposed deduction for employment-related child-care
257. Act to Revise the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States: Hearing on H.R. 8300 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance,83d Cong. 96 (1954).
258. Id. at 119.
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expenditures.
Senator Long.
Is there any reason why [the deduction for
expenses] should not be more than $600? Is it that this proposal to
recognize the expense of a working mother employing a baby sitter just
the same as a businessman who has to employ a night watchman while
he is away from his business?... You completely exempt the
businessman for the expense of hiring a night watchman, don't you? Is
there any reason why you shouldn't completely exempt a widow who has
no husband and no one in the family to look after the children while she
is gone for the expense of hiring a baby sitter?
Mr. Folsom.
There is no exemption now and we think $500
or $600 would be all right. This will cost us $40 million.
Senator Long.
As between individuals, wouldn't it seem that
she is perhaps even more entitled to that deduction than some of those
people who draw corporation dividends?
Mr.Folsom.
It is very difficult to administer this, anyhow...
Senator Long.
What would the reaction be of the Treasury
Department to a proposal to permit working mothers to deduct that same
expense of hiring a baby sitter, even though their husbands are able to
work, even though they are married and their husbands are able to work?
•.. [Is the only objection] that it would add to the cost?
Secretary Humphrey
No, Senator, we are definitely opposed to that.
The Ways and Means Committee held long hearing on that and many
of the child-care organizations and many of the churches and a great
many people came in and objected to it. The Ways and Means
Committee selected this as the proper way to do it.
SenatorLong.
What is the argument against it? It is not a
question of who objects, but what is the argument against it?
Secretary Humphrey
The child-delinquency cases.
There are great arguments that the mother ought to be at home
looking after children where there is a wage earner in the family... We
are in favor of doing it this way and limiting it in this manner.
SenatorLong.
Actually, though, isn't that every bit as much of
a legitimate expense on the part of a mother who feels that she must
work, even though she is married, as it is on behalf of a businessman
who has to hire that night watchman I was speaking of.
Secretary Humphrey
That is right. [The hearing then moved on to
259
another provision.]
Asked to defend the limitations on the deductibility of child-care expenditures,
Secretary Humphrey and Mr. Folsom spoke about administrability problems,
259. Id. at 116-17.

1998l

Rocking the Tax Code

loss of tax revenue, and child delinquency. Although they conceded the incomeproducing aspect of child-care expenditures, they did not adopt business or
economic arguments to support the limitations in any of the ways they used
business and economic arguments to support accelerated depreciation
deductions.
Further comparison of the two interchanges reveals the inadequacy of the tax
policy arguments made. The taxable transaction that leads to accelerated
depreciation deductions is the purchase of machinery. Secretary Humphrey
preferred, however, to emphasize the related transactions of hiring workers to
make and use the machinery. In contrast, the taxable transaction that leads to the
deduction of employment-related child-care expenditures is, in fact, the hiring of
a worker-a waged worker hired to perform child-care services. Secretary
Humphrey, Mr. Folsom, and Senator Long all preferred, however, to emphasize
the related transaction of the child-care consumer (the mother of the child)
leaving the home and entering the waged workforce. The explanation for the
different emphasis placed on the hiring of a worker who makes or operates a
machine and one who cares for children can be found by looking to the
underlying similarities between the two interchanges.
In both cases, the Eisenhower Administration's position is being constructed
to obtain the support of the middle class. For accelerated depreciation
deductions, the Secretary appealed to the middle class by showing them how
their "livelihood" depended on an expanding economy. For child-care
expenditures, the Secretary and the Under Secretary appealed to the middle class
by emphasizing fiscal responsibility and child welfare. Senator Long's questions
were also constructed to appeal to the middle class. His attack on the accelerated
depreciation deduction was on behalf of middle-class workers/taxpayers, whom
he saw as having conflicting interests with their employers and other investors.
He saw middle-class workers paying higher taxes while the propertied class of
entrepreneurs and investors reaped higher after-tax profits. His attack on the
limitations to the child-care deduction were also on behalf of the middle class.
He was stating the case on behalf of the lady-like worker and her family. Neither
Senator Long, nor Secretary Humphrey, nor Mr. Folsom had any political interest
in making the case for and on behalf of the child-care worker. On the contrary,
her invisibility was required for the interests of the middle class to be served.
That was true in the nineteenth-century home; it remains true in twentieth2 60
century debates about tax reform.

260. But see id. at 1061 (Statement of Mrs. Ranice W. Davis from John Hopkins School of Medicine on
behalf of a number of women interested in the child-care deduction) ("I might add, of course, we feel that
every child-care attendant employed is increasing the employment in the country.").
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IV. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CHILD-CARE EXPENDITURES AND TRADITIONAL TAX
LITERATURE: THE MYTH OF OBJECTIVITY

Part Ill showed how the traditional tax concepts of the business/personal
distinction and imputed income failed to produce either certainty of tax
treatment or objectivity. It showed instead that the concepts, as developed and
applied, are a reflection of social and economic hierarchies traceable to the
nineteenth century that contribute to the invisibility of reproductive labor and the
women who perform it. Part IV continues this discussion by showing how some
of the most influential and respected tax writings of the twentieth century relied
upon social stratification to reach so-called objective conclusions about the
proper tax treatment of employment-related child-care expenditures.
I would identify the writings of three men as having a major influence on the
approaches typically found in the tax literature on employment-related child-care
expenditures. The first is Henry Simons's PersonalIncome Taxation, published
in 1938.261 The importance of this book in modem tax analysis cannot be
overstated. As indicated earlier, Simons's work became the basis for developing
the concept of the ideal accretion tax, 262 and tax scholars frequently use his
writings as the starting point for considering a wide range of tax issues.263
The second is the 1939 opinion of Judge Opper in the case of Smith v.
Commissioner.2 64 This opinion is important because it was the first of a
relatively small number of cases concerning the issue of employment-related
child-care expenditures that were decided before Congress addressed the issue
by statute.265 It also has been made important because it is frequently used in
basic individual income tax courses to teach students the business/personal

261. See SDMONS, supra note 13, at 110-11.
262. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1113, 1113-14 nn. I & 4 (1974); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between
Income Tax anda Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 (1992);
Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to
Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 728 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal
Property Under the InternalRevenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454, 455 (1971); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in
Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value ofMoney", 95 YALE L.J. 506, 508-09 (1986); Paul B. Stephan III, Federal
Income Taxation andHuman Capital,70 VA. L. REv. 1357, 1359 n.2 (1984); Jeff Strnad, Taxation of Income
from Capital:A TheoreticalReappraisal,37 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1024-34 (1985); Deborah M. Weiss, Can
Capital Tax PolicyBe Fair?Stimulating Savings Through DifferentiatedTax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 206,
211-13 (1993).
264. See 40 B.T.A. 1038, aff'dper curiam, 113 F2d 114 (2d Cir. 1939).
265. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (describing Congress's enactment of a tax
deduction for employment-related child-care expenditures). For another case denying employment-related
child-care expenditures, see O'Connor v. Comm'r, 6 TC. 323 (1946). See also Nammack v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.
1379 (1971), aff'd mem., 459 E2d 1045 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972) (unsuccessfully
challenging the constitutionality of the limitations on employment-related child-care expenditures provided
under the now repealed I.R.C. § 214 based on evidence that they imposed a particular burden on working
women); accon Black v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 505 (1977). For other cases involving the deductibility of child-care
expenditures under the provision permitting medical expenses to be deducted, see Ochs v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d
692, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827 (1952); Wendell v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 161 (1949).
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distinction.266 By its inclusion in standard tax teaching materials, its reasoning
has had a far greater impact on tax discourse than it might otherwise have had.
The third is the 1973 publication of Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of
Tax Expenditures written by Stanley Surrey. 267 This book represents the
culmination of Surrey's work developing the concept of tax expenditures that he
first began to consider while Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the Treasury
Department in the late 1960s.268 His influential position in government
combined with his prominence as a teacher and scholar at Harvard Law School
allowed Surrey to showcase the concept of tax expenditures and his agenda for
tax reform. Although academics have debated the usefulness of the tax
expenditure concept, it is widely recognized as having had a substantial
influence on the making of federal tax laws.269 In many respects, the concept of
tax expenditures is derived from the ideal income tax base developed by Simons.
Surrey's contribution was to show how, through identifying tax expenditures,
political pressure could be created for adoption of tax reforms that would make
the Code more nearly reflect the ideal income tax base. Whether policymakers
and scholars agree or disagree with the concept, none of them deny that it
changed the nature of tax discourse. Since the late sixties, conventional analysis
typically includes consideration of the question of whether the tax item (credit,
deduction, or exclusion) is a tax expenditure or an item necessary to a
determination of the ideal income base.27 °
A. Henry Simons: The Definition of Income
Henry Simons's comments about child-care expenditures are quite minimal,
but the context in which those comments arise is significant. According to
Simons,
Measurement of consumption presents insuperable difficulties to
achievement of a rigorous conception of personal income.... [F]rom the
point of view of equity in taxation, the consumption of goods and
services produced within the household or individual economy presents
266. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 237, at 541-42; STEPHEN B. COHEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
128-29 (1989); ICHAEL J. GRAETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES 270-71 (3d ed. 1995); KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 237, at 568-72.
267. See SURREY, supra note 15.
268. See id. at vii-viii.

269. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of PersonalDeductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
313, 349-52 (1989); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 62 (1990); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures:A Reassessment,
1988 DuKE L.J. 1155, 1163-81; Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
ProceduralDefense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Insitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165-71 (1993).
270. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human CapitalAcquisition Costs-Or Why Costs of Higher
Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 968, 970-81 (1993); Jonathan B.

Forman, Reconsidering the Income Tax Treatment of the Elderly: It e 7ime for the Elderly to Pay Their Fair
Share, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 589, 604-12 (1995); Weiss, supra note 263, at 215-17.
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real imponderables. Clearly inequitable results arise whether such items
are consistently included or ignored.
To exclude them is obviously to penalize specialization. If A works
nine hours a day and pays for care of his garden with the proceeds of one
hour's work, he would be overtaxed relative to B, who works eight hours
at the same hourly rate and maintains a similar garden by giving daily
one hour of his own time. Families where wives pay for their housework
from their own earnings outside the home would also be relatively
overtaxed. Similar cases might be multiplied ad nauseam.
On the other hand, if the value of goods and services produced within
the household are to be accounted for, one must face, first of all, the
necessity of stopping somewhere; and no convenient stopping-place is
discernible. Shall one include the value of shaves? of instruction to
children? of a mother s services as a nurse? [emphasis added]
But further problems appear. Even if one be satisfied with the
decision to include only the sort of goods and services commonly
obtained by exchange (and such a rule is certainly not very helpful), the
results will often seem unfair. Mrs. A does her own housework, while
Mrs. B prefers to economize on other things and hires a maid. To impose
additional taxes upon the A family is, so to speak, to penalize industry
and subsidize leisure-and in a not readily defensible manner. If Mrs. A
prefers to do her own work and spend on good entertainment what would
otherwise go as wages to a maid rather than have time for bridge and
modem fiction, it is hard to see why more income tax should be imposed
on that account. The enjoyment of leisure is merely a form of
consumption; and the choice between leisure and goods is of the same
order as that among economic goods generally. Surely there is a strong
presumption against any differentiation, under income taxes, according
to the form which one's consumption may take.
All this, however, may only suggest the impropriety of taxing as
income what may be called "earned income in kind." If it is not equitable
to exclude such items entirely, this may be recognized in the most
flagrant cases by allowing small, additional exemption with respect to the
"earned income" of a wife.... In general, however, it would seem that
considerations of justice, not to mention those of administration, argue
here for [a] rather narrow definition of taxable income.271
Although Simons admitted at the outset that "inequitable results arise whether
such items [of imputed income] are consistently included or ignored, '272 he
ultimately concluded that ignoring imputed income is the preferred solution and,
if anything is done about the "'earned income' of a wife," it should be a "small,
271. SIMONS, supra note 13, at 110-12 (footnotes omitted).
272. Id. at I10.
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additional exemption." 273 How Simons could begin a discussion of imputed
income apparently fully appreciating the imponderability of imputed income and
end it with such clear conviction that imputed income should be ignored is worth
investigating. It is especially worth investigating for our purposes because of the
role childcare plays in the form of argument he adopts.
His discussion about the taxation of imputed income from services takes a
number of turns. The first is when a comparison of a waged worker and a waged
worker/gardener is abandoned for a consideration of families where the wife is a
waged worker purchasing housecleaning services. 274 Although not mentioned,
the assumption seems to be that the husband is also a waged worker. Why was it
important to Simons to shift from the single-waged worker to the two-wagedworker family? In the last line of the paragraph, Simons indicated that he saw
them as raising the same type of issues when he said "[s]imilar cases might be
multiplied ad nauseam."275 That would suggest, at least at the outset, that the tax
law leads frequently to inequitable results if imputed income is ignored.
The reference to family and wives seems to signal the next turn in his analysis
that takes the form of a set of examples. But for the reference to shaving, the
other reproductive labor examples involve the work historically associated with
mothers and wives providing services to other family members, including the
instruction to children and nursing of children.276 Although there is some
ambiguity in this part of his reasoning, one reading is that this list represents
items of imputed income for which the law would encounter significant
difficulties if it tried to tax their value. In the paragraph that immediately follows,
Simons suggested taxing only those items that could be acquired in the
marketplace.2 77 He never told us whether he believed that shaving, instruction to
children, and the nursing of children should be excluded from taxation on that
basis.278 The fact is, however, that all these services (including shaving) could be
"obtained by exchange., 279 Throughout the early part of the twentieth century,
which is the time period of primary concern for him, household workers assisted
with child-care duties as well as housecleaning in middle-class households.28 °
On the other hand, an argument in favor of a reading that he believed these
services are not readily available in the marketplace can be made if we focus on
his examples of childcare: "instruction of children" and "a mother's services as a

273. Id. at 111.

274. See id.at 110. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text (noting that imputed income is
defined to include services provided by one family member for another without any inquiry as to why that is the
appropriate result).
275.

SIMONS, supra note 13, at 110.

276. See id at 110. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text (describing therole reproductive
labor played in establishing
the boundaries between the public marketplace and the private home).
277. See SIMONS, supra note 13, at 111.
278. Seeidatll0-ll.
279. Id.at.11.
280. See supra notes 87-92, 101, 103-04, 107-08, 118-28 and accompanying text(describing the labor

history
of waged domestic workers in the early part of the twentieth century).
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nurse." 281 The grammar of respectability, degeneracy, and stratified reproduction
provides us with the insight that the types of child-care tasks Simons referred to
are most closely associated with middle-class identity and the perpetuation of
that identity.282 Acknowledging that certain child-care duties could not be
delegated to waged household workers avoided a wide range of contradictions
and anxieties within middle-class life. Simons successfully avoided those
troubling identity issues through ambiguity. By so doing, he left his work
susceptible to an interpretation that could be used to strengthen the
public/private distinction along with the hierarchical relationships embedded
within it.
His argument took a more disturbing turn. No longer was he making the
comparison between a taxpayer who produced taxable income in the waged
labor market and one who produced imputed income through unwaged labor.
Instead, he was comparing the choices made by two women, both of whom
apparently were not in the waged labor market.283 One chose to do housecleaning
and spend her money on "good entertainment., 284 The other chose to pay
someone else for housecleaning so that she might entertain herself by playing
"bridge" and reading "modem fiction. ' 285 With this comparison of potential
taxpayers, who could disagree with Simons's conclusion that "[s]urely there is a
strong presumption against any differentiation, under income taxes, according to
the form which one's consumption may take"? 286 What happened to the waged
worker who worked fewer hours at his job to do some gardening or the wagedworking wife who paid for housecleaning services? 287 Once Simons started
comparing different forms of imputed income, his analysis of the issue of
imputed income no longer included waged workers.2 8 From the immediately
preceding comparison of bridge playing and housecleaning, Simons concluded
that "[a]ll this... suggest[s] the impropriety of taxing as income what may be
called earned income in kind. 2 89
What started out as a consideration of difficult questions 290 ended with a
consideration of a quite easy one.29' Simons explicitly used a model of the
gender roles associated with white, middle- or upper-class families to reach that
281.

SIMONS, supra note 13, at 110.

(describing the tensions within the middle-class
282. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text
work and the women who performed it).
led tothe denigration of waged child-care
home that
283. See SIMONS, supra note 13, at I11.
284. Id.

285. Id.
286. Id.

287. Seeid.at 110.
288. Seeid.at 111.
289. Id.
290. See id at 110 (stating that "[m]easurement of consumption presents insuperable difficulties to
achievement of a rigorous conception of personal income").
291. See id. at11l (stating in reference toMrs. A, who cleans her own home, and Mrs. B, who hires a
housecleaner so that she may have more time for bridge and modem fiction that "[s]urely there is a strong
presumption against any differentiation, under income taxes, according to the form which one's consumption
may take").
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easy question and obscure the more difficult ones in his analysis. His shift from
the waged worker/unwaged gardener to the unwaged housecleaner/unwaged
bridge player was only possible because women are associated with the
responsibility of maintaining a clean house, either because they do it themselves
or because they are in charge of hiring someone else to do it.292 His references to
child rearing and mothering without an accompanying comparison to waged
work were also convincing because motherhood is so tightly linked to who
women are. 293 The tax law and society remained in equilibrium as Simons's
analysis proceeded.
The final step in his argument had to do with wives (referred to as Mrs. A and
Mrs. B) and the choices they have in running a comfortable household.294
Running the household entails making choices among cleaning, playing bridge,
reading fiction, or finding some other good entertainment.295 The nature of the
choices are crucial to Simons's argument because, without saying so directly, he
made "the wife" an unsympathetic family member, given the good life she
leads.296 The fact that he was only describing those wives who have sufficient
financial resources to stay at home and hire "a maid" was never defended
because it did not have to be.297 The stereotype of the non-working wife was
powerful enough to let his argument pass as the equivalent of sound analytical
tax policy.
There is obviously a double edge to Simons's analysis and conclusion. One
edge created a tax inequity for women who are engaged in waged work. By
having Mrs. A and Mrs. B stand in for most women, Simons avoided dealing
with women in the waged work force other than as exceptions to the general
rule.298 Within this context, it became reasonable to propose only a "small"
exemption for working wives to be available for only the "most flagrant
cases." 299In other words, he presented an ideal income tax base that depended on
most women remaining in the category of lady.
The other edge is that, by having Mrs. A and Mrs. B stand in for most
women, Simons undermined the nature of women's unwaged labor.300 The
choices for most women are not between housecleaning and bridge. The choices
are among housecleaning, washing clothes, paying bills, mending, child rearing,
etc. To treat maintaining a household and leisure as comparable choices in the
manner that Simons did was to reinforce the notion that unwaged labor is not
productive, but self-indulgent and not economically valuable. 30 1 Treating
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Seeid at 110-11.
Seeid at 110.
See id. at 111.
See id.
See id.
See id
See id
See id

300. See id
301. See id.
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unwaged reproductive labor as having no value means that Simons's analysis
and the tax system he was prescribing had the effect of undermining the
concerns of women, whether or not they are in the waged labor market, by
undermining the unwaged work they do at home. Further, by reinforcing the
view that reproductive labor is not valuable, the tax analysis and the prescribed
system bolstered the view that waged reproductive labor is inferior labor with the
effect of justifying low wages and poor working conditions. Thus, through the
unreflective use of gender stereotypes, Simons simultaneously strengthened the
inferior status of the lady, as well as the hierarchy between the lady and the
waged household worker.
Simons's analysis was made possible by the tenacious remnants of the
nineteenth-century class, gender, and race hierarchies represented in the "cult of
respectability. 30 2 With that historical framework, we can fully appreciate how
and why Simons could have engaged in what is at best a fragmented and
ambiguous analysis. Furthermore, only by reference to the construction of
respectability can we fully appreciate the potential class and racial/ethnic
dimensions of his analysis. As we have seen, the cult of respectability was made
possible by white middle-class women hiring other women to do hard and
distasteful work like floor scrubbing and laundry.30 3 In the last half of the
nineteenth century, domestic work burgeoned as the middle and upper-classes
grew.3 4 The majority of the domestic workers that white women hired were
immigrants and women of color.3 °5 The effect of Simons's analysis was to
reinscribe the nineteenth-century cult of respectability onto the ideal income tax
base and twentieth-century tax law; that reinscription strengthened the class,
gender, and racial divisions that continue to be associated closely in the U.S.
political economy with household work.30 6 In fairness, the problem with the
current tax law's treatment of reproductive labor is not Simons's-the problem
lies with those of us who have carried forward his work into the modem income
tax without interrogating our own assumptions and biases. Those assumptions
and biases make it easy for us to ignore those passages where he expressed
concerns about the tax treatment of a waged-working wife and to emphasize
those passages equating reproductive labor and leisure activities.
B. Smith v. Commissioner: Applying "Accepted Principles"
Simons's analysis of imputed income from services, particularly child-care
services, was echoed in the opinion by Judge Opper in Smith v.
302.

See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text (discussing the cult of respectability as it developed

in the last half of the nineteenth century).
303. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text discussing the need for middle-class women to

distance themselves from what they regarded as menial household work.
304. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 75-86, 93-117 and accompanying text providing data concerning the labor history
of domestic workers in the last half of the nineteenth century.
306. See supra Part II.
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Commissioner.307 The taxpayers, Henry and Lillie Wright Smith, claimed a
deduction on their 1937 tax returns for, as the court described it, "sums spent by
the wife in employing nursemaids to care for petitioners' young child, the wife,
as well as the husband, being employed. 3 °8 One basis for Opper's rejection of
the Smiths' claim for a business deduction was that the child-care expenditures
were indistinguishable from other types of expenditures, such as medical,
clothing, housing, and food. 309 As the court stated, "but for" any of these types of
expenditures, a taxpayer would not be able to earn taxable income. 311 All of the
expenditures that he named represented "the very essence of those 'personal'
expenses the deductibility of which is expressly denied.",3n Once the court
equated child-care expenditures with these other types of expenditures, it found
no difficulty in concluding that the petitioners' argument that child-care
expenditures enabled the wife to engage in waged labor was unpersuasive.
The reasoning was problematic because it failed to address the problem that,
by engaging in waged labor, the petitioners were forgoing the tax benefit of
having untaxed imputed income. 312 As noted earlier, taking into account the
untaxed imputed income would not necessarily mean that a deduction should be
allowed.3 13 It is fair to say, however, that it makes the case against nondeductibility not as strong as Opper suggested it was. By referring to personal
expenditures that did not implicate the issue of imputed income, he obscured
inherent problems with both Simons's ideal income definition and with the
practical operation of the federal tax system he was applying.3 14
Even more problematic was what Opper had to say about imputed income.
Continuing his argument that child-care services were "like similar aspects of
family and household life [and are not] other than a personal concern," Opper
reasoned that the non-taxability of imputed income was evidence that the
expenditure for child-care services was not deductible: 315 "The wife's services as
307. 40 B.T.A. 1038, aff'dper curiam, 113 F2d 114 (2d Cir 1939). For another extensive critique of
Smith, see MCCAFFERY, supra note 30, at 111-14.

308. 40 BTA.at 1038. This case arose before the joint tax return had been introduced yet both husband
and wife were petitioners in the case. The court did not clearly indicate in its opinion whether the deduction
was taken on the wife's or husband's tax return or on both their returns.
309. 40B.TA.at 1039.

310. 40B.TA. at 1038-39.
311.

See4OB.T.A. at 1039.

312. The text adopts the traditional broad definition of imputed income that includes in-kind income
produced by one family member for another. If the opinion were analyzed using a narrow definition of imputed
income, the court's reasoning could be shown also to have failed to address the problem of having untaxed
intrafamily transfers of in-kind service income. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text (noting that
imputed income is defined to include services provided by one family member for another without any inquiry
as to why that is the appropriate result).

313. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (discussing the interrelationship between the
business/personal distinction and imputed income).
314. Had Opper referred to food preparation or dress and shirt making rather than the purchase in the
marketplace of food and clothing items an interesting and valuable discussion about where and how to draw the
line among different kinds of imputed income from services might have occurred. That difficult problem,
however, was obscured completely by Opper's unexamined claim of comparability between expenditures for
child-care services and expenditures for medical care, housing, clothing, and food.
315.

40B.TA.at 1039.
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custodian of the home and protector of its children are ordinarily rendered
without monetary compensation. There results no taxable income from the
performance of this service and the correlative expenditure is personal and not
susceptible of deduction. 3 16 Opper assumed the wife's traditional role of
performing reproductive labor without compensation. Although underlying that
assumption was a recognition that she was performing valuable services, for and
on behalf of, other family members, Opper was unable to break from the
conceptual constraints reflected in the public/private distinction. That constraint
made him unable to recognize that a wife's household services enabled her
husband to enter the waged workforce and produce taxable income. It also
seemed to make him unable to appreciate the taxpayers' purchasing of child-care
services in the marketplace to enable them to enter the waged workforce as
anything other than personal.
Opper understood how the conventional view of imputed income implicated
the business/personal distinction in the same way that expenditures do. 3 17 What
Opper did not appreciate, however, was the potential for tax inequities created by
the exclusion of imputed income from the tax base. Opper, when effectively
comparing two families with young children-one family in which there were
two waged workers and one family in which there was only one waged workershowed no evidence that he recognized the tax inequity.318 Instead, he used the
comparison to argue that the non-taxability of child-care services performed by a
wife for her own children was a reason not to allow a deduction for child-care
expenditures. 319 Had he raised concerns about taxpayers without young children
in need of child-care services, his argument about the personal nature of the
child-care expenditures would have been more understandable. 320 Apparently, he
was not prepared to discuss the decision to have children as a personal (nonbusiness) choice. Instead, he preferred to show the personal nature of the
expenditures by focusing on the wife's choice to enter the waged labor market.
Here the wife has chosen to employ others to discharge her domestic
function and the services she performs are rendered outside the home.
They are a source of actual income and taxable as such. But that does not
deprive the same work performed by others of its personal character nor
furnish a reason why its cost should be treated as an offset in the guise of
a deductible item.3 2
Focusing on the wife's choice to perform child-care services for the family or
316. See id
317. See id
318. See id
319. See id.
320. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text (analyzing the business/personal distinction and
imputed income by comparing various family situations).
321. 40B.T.A. at 1039.
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purchase them from another was both different from and similar to the reasoning
found in Simons.322 Like Simons, Opper recognized that the wife is engaged in
waged work-he analyzed the tax situation of a lady-like worker and not that of
a lady. 323 Unlike Simons, however, he saw the decision to employ others to
perform her household duties as personal and unconnected to the waged labor
she was performing.324 The result of that reasoning was that, under the guise of
objective tax analysis, the cult of respectability and the hierarchical relations on
which it relies were strengthened.
The other basis for the court's holding in Smith that child-care expenditures
are not deductible was tradition. The petitioners had argued that working wives
were "a new phenomenon. '325 Opper's response was that a social and economic
change of this type made it "all the more necessary to apply acceptedprinciples
to the novel facts. 326 The petitioners addressed the "accepted principles"
arguments by echoing a recurrent theme in Simons's writings that "[a]
thoroughly precise and objective distinction [between business and personal] is
inconceivable., 327 They reminded the court that "disbursements normally
personal may become deductible by reason of their intimate connection with an
occupation carried on for profit. '328 Rather than acknowledge the indeterminacy
of the tax code with regard to the business/personal distinction, Opper declared
tradition to be an accepted principle and then went on to assert that tradition
329
required child-care expenditures to be nondeductible:
The line is not always an easy one to draw nor the test simple to apply.
But we think its principle is clear It may for practical purposes be said to
constitute a distinction between those activities which, as a matter of
common acceptance and universal experience, are "ordinary" or usual as
the direct accompaniment of business pursuits, on the one hand; and
those which, though they may in some indirect and tenuous degree relate
to the circumstances of a profitable occupation, are nevertheless personal
in their nature, of a character applicable to human beings generally, and
which exist on that plane regardless of the occupation, though not
necessarily of the station in life, of the individuals concerned. ...
In the latter category, we think, fall payments made to servants or
others occupied in looking to the personal wants of their employers. ...
And we include in this group nursemaids retained to care for infant

322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. Id

326. Id (emphasis added).
327. SIMoNs, supra note 13, at 54. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35 (discussing Simons's
theme of inconceivable preciseness).
328. 40B.T.A. at 1039.
329. See id at 1039.
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children.33 °
Relying on social norms, Opper easily ignored, or at least was easily indifferent,
to the gendered tradition of the public/private distinction upon which he
relied.33 1 Childcare occurred at the hearth and it was beyond reason apparently
from Opper's vantage point to suggest, as the petitioners were doing,332 that it
could shift to the business side of the business/personal distinction.
One also might detect that issues concerning class differences influenced the
court in Smith to deny a deduction for child-care expenditures. Opper's reference
to a person's "station in life" and "servants" meeting the "personal wants of their
employers" suggests that he viewed the hiring of a child-care worker
("nursemaid") as a luxury available only to the upper class. 33 3 With a few
ambiguous references, we can only speculate that Opper viewed the deduction
for child-care expenditures as operating to the unfair advantage of the wealthy.
Perhaps he believed that well-to-do taxpayers would be the most likely to hire a
"nursemaid" to meet child-care needs. Perhaps he believed that the less wealthy
working class would meet those needs by relying on non-market arrangements
(in-kind service income) of extended family members, such as grandmothers and
aunts, or even older children. Although both would have enjoyed the advantage
of lower tax liabilities (the wealthy through a deduction from income; the less
wealthy through income exclusion if they had to pay any tax at all), achieving
tax equity by increasing the deductions available to the wealthy may have
nevertheless seemed untenable. This might have seemed especially true within
the social and economic environment of the Great Depression in which Opper
was writing.334
Whatever the extent of Opper's liberal instinct to preserve the progressive tax
by finding child-care expenditures nondeductible, the idea that childcare and
other reproductive labor were women's private responsibility even if women
could avoid that responsibility by hiring other women to do it, was left intact.

330. Id at 1039-40 (emphasis added).

331. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the public/private distinction).
332. See 40 B.T.A. at 1039.
333. 40 B.TA. at 1040. A related point of interest is that Henry Smith was an attorney who himself
argued the case before Opper.
334. The approach that has been taken in the child-care tax provisions since it was first enacted in
1954-favoring parents in the lower-tax brackets over those in the higher-tax brackets-reflects a similar type
of class analysis of employment-related child-care expenditures that is only hinted at by Opper. In fact, the
debate over the 1954 enactment, that occurred in the vastly different postwar period and over fifteen years after
the Smith decision, reflected concerns similar to those that may have been troubling Opper. One of the most
notable concerns was that middle-class women entering the waged labor market were doing so for personal
reasons and that the child-care expenditures might be of a quality and cost beyond that necessary to engage in
waged labor. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history accompanying
the 1954 legislation). The Smith case and the debates surrounding the 1954 enactment allowing the deduction
for child-care expenditures provide a good example of how the government defers to the judgment of the
taxpayer when the expenditures are presumed to be business-related while the government subjects
expenditures presumed to be personal to substantial regulation and skepticism. See Roy, supra note 232, at
188-89.
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The marketplace transactions of hiring the child-care worker and entering the
waged workforce are ignored. What might first appear to be a hint of genuine
class sympathy, therefore, becomes on closer examination a reinforcement of
class, gender, and racial hierarchies. For Opper, the mother and wife remain the
ideal, and history tells us that the ideal of the lady can only be achieved through
class, gender, and race subordination.
Although Opper's opinion is more a series of unsupported conclusions than it
is reasoned analysis, it is not surprising given its historical underpinnings that it
has continuing influence in maintaining the view that sound tax principles do not
support the deductibility of child-care expenditures. Not even the fact that
Congress ultimately overrode the Smith decision by enacting a child-care
provision seems to have mattered. One significant reason why Smith has had
such a long-lasting influence is that its conclusions were reinforced nearly thirty
years later within the analytical framework of the tax expenditure budget, which
Stanley Surrey successfully promoted.
C. Stanley Surrey: The Tax ExpenditureBudget
In 1967, Stanley Surrey made a speech in his capacity as Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy in which he developed the concept of "tax
expenditures" and a "tax expenditure budget. '335 Surrey understood the federal
income tax system as consisting of two types of provisions. One type are those
"structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax on individual and
corporate net income. 3 36 The other type are those provisions that "comprise[ ] a
system of tax expenditures under which the Governmental financial assistance
programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than through
direct Government expenditures. 337 The term tax expenditures was chosen to
indicate that these provisions are the equivalent of direct government outlays, the
only difference being that they are accomplished through the federal income tax
system.33 8 Surrey's purpose for classifying tax provisions as either structural or
tax expenditures was to expose the relationship between tax reform and
Government expenditures and to suggest "new pathways to tax reform. ' 339 For
him, tax reform meant grappling with questions, such as, "[I]s tax assistance the
preferred route, or should the assistance be given directly? Which method comes
closest to the targeted goal of the assistance and does so with fairness and
340
efficiency?
The business/personal distinction and imputed income issues are incorporated
into the structural/tax expenditure distinction. As Surrey acknowledged, the tax
335. SURREY, supra note 15, at 3.

336
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.at 6.
Id.
See id. at 3.
Id.at viii-ix.
Id. at viii.
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expenditure budget raises "difficulties in the application of agreed income tax
structural concepts, such as the proper line between allowable expenses incurred
in trade or business or in the acquisition of income and nondeductible personal
consumption expenses (e.g., moving expenses or child care expenses)....341
That acknowledgment, however, did not lead him to modify his approach to
account for the difficulties.34 2
Surrey was more concerned about items being omitted from the list of tax
expenditures than he was about those that were included.343 That made logical
sense within his proposal because being listed as a tax expenditure purportedly
meant that the item would be subject to political scrutiny. At that point, any
arguments about difficulties of classification between business and personal
could be made. What Surrey failed to acknowledge, however, were the practical
difficulties of successfully challenging the classification of any one item. Once
the tax treatment (a deduction initially and subsequently a credit or exclusion)
for employment-related child-care costs was classified as a tax expenditure,
especially given the historical construction of reproductive labor within our
social and economic institutions, including the tax law, it is no surprise that no
serious consideration has been given to reclassifying the tax treatment.
Even Surrey, who had listed childcare as an example of the type of
expenditure that raised definition problems, 3 " ignored those difficulties when
addressing the question of whether child-care expenditures should continue to be
deductible under the federal income tax system.345 Surrey put the deduction for
child-care expenditures among a group of tax expenditure items that should be
eliminated and replaced by direct financial assistance from the government.346
He reasoned that the provision was introduced into the tax system at a time when
there were few governmental child-care programs. 347 With the increased
availability of programs for childcare in the 1970s, he believed it was
appropriate to have the tax provision eliminated and the tax savings channeled to
those existing programs. 348 The primary advantage he saw to using direct
assistance was that it would allow the funds to be used for those families who
341. Id at 19 (emphasis added).
342. The Tax Expenditure Budget continues to classify the tax provisions for dependent care expenses
as tax expenditures. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 11, at table 1.
343.

See SURREY, supra note 15, at 19.

344. See id.
345. See id.
at 198-202.
346. See id
347.

Its presence in the tax system reflects the earlier absence of direct child care programs available to a
family where both spouses were employed ....
Tax expenditure items of this character evidence the
sensitivity of the tax system to concern over the lack of federal assistance in social areas. Relief
through the tax system is thus the point where social advance wedges into the federal budget and is
often the forerunner of larger and more adequate direct programs in later years. Unfortunately, the
tax expenditure item usually remains as an inequitable and vestigial program.
Id at 201.

348. See id.; see also supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text (discussing child-care legislation in the
1960s and 1970s).

Rocking the Tax Code

1998l

were "poor" and who could not take advantage of the tax provision, thus
reducing the benefits going to families with higher incomes. 349 This argument is
a variation on the "upside-down" subsidy theme that Surrey emphasized
throughout his discussion of the tax expenditure model. 350 After making the
observation that a tax deduction provided under a progressive tax system leads to
greater tax benefits for the wealthy because a deduction is worth more to those
351
persons who have greater incomes and, therefore, are taxed at higher rates,
Surrey contended that "almost any of these tax expenditures is seen as woefully
unfair or inefficient when cast as a direct expenditure program. 352
Surrey bolstered his redistribution argument by focusing on the greater
effectiveness of child-development programs stressed in the direct assistance
programs as compared to the simple custodial care required under the tax
provision.353 He saw this issue as directly related to his redistribution argument
when he cited the Senate Finance Committee's decision in 1971 to allow a
deduction for household expenditures unrelated to childcare once the taxpayer
otherwise qualified for a deduction under the tax provision.354 He indicated that
the Committee saw this "reform" as part of the government's larger efforts "to
take people off welfare. 355 It cannot be doubted that Surrey found subsidies to
employers of persons who perform domestic work for them misguided and
contrary to what should be the redistributive policies of the federal government.
He wrote:
But there is a strange irony in giving tax benefits to upper middle class
families to aid them in employing servants to help solve welfare
problems. It is clear that no direct program of this characterGovernment grants to better-off families to subsidize their obtaining
domestic help-could stand the light of public scrutiny. But here it is,
buried in the child care tax expenditure. This is another illustration of
how one tax expenditure program, itself dubious, expands to encompass
additional programs that are even more ill-advised.356
Surrey's line of argument concerning welfare, direct subsidies for childcare, and
persons who are poor357 was made in the context of the civil rights movement,
349. See SURREY, supra note 15, at 201-02.

350. See id. at 37.
351.

Seeid. at36.

352. Id. at 37. But see Griffith, supra note 269, at 352-63 (providing alternative analyses of the
distributive implications of tax expenditures); Handelman, supra note 231, at 123 ("[T]ax expenditure analysis
reflects unacknowledged, and surely unintentional, class bias. Higher-income taxpayers are the principal
beneficiaries of ... prudential adjustments to the definition of income. The experiences and perceptions of
working people are not taken similarly into account.").
353. See SURREY, supra note 15, at 202.

354. See id; see also supranotes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing this tax change).
355. SURREY, supra note 15, at 202.
356. Id.
357. See id.
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Operation Headstart, and the War on Poverty.358 As noted earlier, in the late
1960s and early 1970s, childcare became inextricably linked to race as well as
class.359 Therefore, his critique based on the progressivity principle also should
be understood as a critique of the racial bias that motivated proposals to expand
the availability of tax benefits for child-care expenditures as well as limit direct
funding programs.
Although Surrey came close to embracing the antisubordination principle I
am advancing, his analysis fell short. He assumed that, if the tax law eliminates a
deduction for childcare, it is no longer complicit in facilitating economic
exploitation and racism. He neither saw how tax neutrality could constitute
complicity in exploitative and subordinating practices nor imagined how the tax
law might take a more active role in disrupting those practices.
Surrey's redistribution arguments are also problematic because they implicitly
assumed that child-care expenditures are personal rather than business and
ignored the imputed income implications raised by child-care expenditures.
Surrey took up both these aspects of child-care expenditures in a footnote.36 °
Again referring to the debates in 1971 surrounding the child-care tax provision,
he noted that "there was an unsuccessful effort to convert it into a deduction that
determined adjusted gross income rather than an itemized deduction in the
deduction group alternative to the standard deduction., 361 He went on to say that
the proposal was based on the argument that child-care expenditures were like
other business expenses.362 Surrey viewed this argument as gendered, and
believed that once he removed gender from the argument the personal nature of
the expense would become clear:
Much of the force behind the position that childcare is a real business
expense derives from the view of women's groups that the expense of
child care is generally offset against the working wife's probable earnings
to see how much net income she would add to the family by working.
Under these mores, the child care deduction assists her in obtaining a
freedom of decision on a parity with the husband ....

In this view, it

would seem that if decisions as to who works outside the home were
made regardless of sex, there would be no basis for the child care
deduction. If so, as a matter of tax structure it is hard to see why the
expense is really a business expense and not a personal expense. What
steps Congress should take to assist in altering current mores regarding
women and career occupations is a matter for direct expenditure
358. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (discussing the federal domestic legislative agenda
during the middle and late 1960s).
359. See supranotes 175-77 and accompanying text (discussing Operation Headstart and how it came
to be socially and politically understood).
360. See SURREY, supra note 15, at 357 n.66.
361. Id.
362. See id.
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programs, such as363those for child care and development assistance, and
not tax programs.
Surrey's reasoning with regard to the business/personal nature of child-care
expenditures is perplexing. He did not explain why it was important to resolving
the business/personal issue that the proposal was made by women's groups. 364
Even more problematic is how he used the fact that the limitations on
deductibility of child-care expenditures had their greatest practical effect on
women entering the work force as a basis for reasoning that child-care
expenditures were personal. 36' He seemed to understand this argument as an
argument about sex discrimination rather than as an argument showing that
child-care expenditures enabled the earning of income by both parents when he
stated that "it would seem that if decisions as to who works outside the home
were made regardless of sex, there would be no basis for the child-care
deduction., 366 However one might interpret his response to the proposal, it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that Surrey believed that any effort to address sex
discrimination in employment was beyond the appropriate goals of the tax
system.
In this same footnote, Surrey addressed issues related to imputed income.36 7
Apparently, he felt that more needed to be said once the comparison between
one-waged-worker and two-waged-worker families was raised.368 His reasoning
about imputed income is most intriguing, especially in view of Simons's position
on imputed income from services.369 Surrey wrote:
Of course, if the imputed income of a family member staying home and
providing child care and household services were taxed, then tax
differences in this respect between that member working or staying at
home would not exist; also there should be no deduction for amounts
paid to others for child care and household services. This view then shifts
the argument to whether a child care deduction is appropriate to offset
the non-taxation of such imputed income. But tax measures having this
function would seem to be properly classed as tax expenditures, and to be
370
judged accordingly.
363. Id.See supra note 265 for cases challenging constitutionality of child-care provisions based on
gender.
364. See SURREY, supra note 15, at 357 n.66.
365. See id
366. Id
367. See id.
368. See id
369. For a discussion of Simons's position on imputed income from services, see supra notes 271-73
and accompanying text.
370. SURREY, supra note 15, at 357 n.66. This passage makes clear that Surrey embraced the
conventional broad definition of imputed income, which means that he ignored the tax implications of
intrafamily transfers of in-kind income for services. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text noting that
imputed income is defined to include services provided by one family member for another without any inquiry
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One's first reaction to Surrey's response to the inequity created by the nontaxability of imputed income from services may be dismay.371 If assuring
horizontal equity-treating similarly situated families similarly under the tax
system-is not a tax structural provision, it becomes harder to understand what
would be. His response only makes sense within the context of the ideal
accretion tax and the Haig-Simons definition of income, which underlies the Tax
Expenditure Budget.372 Simons ignored imputed income from services.
Therefore, Surrey apparently reasoned that any provision designed to address
that issue becomes a tax expenditure. 373 Although technically sound, Surrey's
conclusion ultimately raises serious questions about how useful the Tax
Expenditure Budget can be as a basis for tax reform.374
Surrey clearly drew on his liberal instincts to inform his tax analysis. His
conclusions, however, coincided with the gendered tradition that reproductive
labor, and childcare in particular, were the primary responsibility of women to be
accomplished by the upper and middle classes within the private domain without
direct or indirect governmental assistance. In what appears to be an unintended
effect of Surrey's analysis, concerns about subordination based on class, gender,
and race become the basis for arguing that a tax response is inappropriate rather
than a reason to explore how tax reform might disrupt it.
D. Summary
An analysis of the approaches used by Simons, Opper, and Surrey addressing
the question of the deductibility of child-care expenditures shows that they are
all quite similar. All three acknowledged the difficulty of developing objective
guidelines to distinguish between business and personal expenses, and all three
failed to confront this difficulty when reaching the conclusion that child-care
expenditures should not be deductible. Although Surrey was more explicit and
Simons was less direct on this question, all three understood this deduction as
disproportionately benefiting higher-income families. All three relied on
traditional gender roles as they each strove to achieve the appearance of applying
tax principles objectively for the purpose of approximating an ideal income tax
base. Within that tradition, all three failed to consider the effect of nondeductibility of child-care expenditures on child-care workers.
The approaches of Simons, Opper, and Surrey differ most with regard to
issues of race. Simons reinforced racial stereotypes with his implicit reference to
as to why that is the appropriate result.
371.

See SURREY, supra note 15, at 357 n.66.

372. See id. at 12-13.
373. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text (discussing Simons's position on imputed income
from services).
374. See Griffith, supra note 269, at 346-47 (critiquing the modifications to Haig-Simons that the tax
expenditure model makes, such as ignoring the non-taxation of unrealized appreciation in property and the
exclusion from income of imputed income from owner-occupied homes and other property).
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the cult of respectability. Opper treated race as invisible; based exclusively on the
historical treatment of reproductive labor and waged household workers, his
reasoning left racial and ethnic hierarchies in place. Although Surrey implicitly
acknowledged race discrimination in his analysis of Congressional treatment of
childcare in the early 1970s, it is clear that all three, including Surrey, saw racial
hierarchies beyond the purview of an ideal income tax base.
Scrutiny of their respective approaches demonstrates that each failed to
provide a convincing rationale either for or against deductibility of child-care
expenditures. Each refused to consider the implications of having a tax system in
which reliance on so-called objective principles could not produce predictable
results. Instead, each arranged their arguments in such a way as to perpetuate the
myth that an income tax system consists of predetermined objective principles.
The perpetuation of that myth has had considerable influence on tax
commentators addressing the question of the proper tax treatment of child-care
expenditures. Some commentators remain tied to the business/personal
distinction and marshal a variety of arguments in favor of treating child-care
costs as a business expense in the tax law.375 In contrast, others assume that the
deduction for child-care costs is a tax expenditure and argue that this deduction
should be retained or expanded under the tax law.376 The nature of the child-care
debate can be transformed, however, by introducing the antisubordination
principle into tax policy discourse. The proper measurement of the income tax
base of taxpayers who employ child-care workers is no longer the only issue. As
we have seen, an examination of the historical context of childcare changes the
discourse by expanding the range of relevant tax issues to include questioning
the effects of tax law on child-care workers. That analysis is undertaken in Part
V.
V. EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CHILD-CARE EXPENDITURES UNDER THE TAX LAW:

APPLYING THE ANTISUBORDINATION PRINCIPLE

Supplementing a discussion of the business/personal distinction and the
concept of imputed income with a historical analysis of class, gender, and race in
the child-care labor market leads to a reevaluation of current tax law provisions.
On the one hand, the tax rules for employment-related child-care expenditures
provided under sections 21 and 129 suggest an acknowledgment of the business
375. For examples of commentators showing child-care costs to be an appropriate business deduction,
see ABA Section on Taxation, supra note 7, at 341; Marjorie Komhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The
PartnershipModel of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV.1413, 1447-48 (1996);

Zelenak, supra note 6, at 409-11; Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes,
Consumption Taxes andHuman Capital,51 TAx L. REV. 1, 14 n.60 (1995); Ellen R. Zieve, To Work or Not to
Work, and What about the Kids?, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 163, 167-76, 181 (1993).
376. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of Highrisk

Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 184 n.74 (1993) (explaining provisions as reflecting cultural values); John F.
Witte, Congress and Tax Policy: Problems and Reforms in a HistoricalContext, 10 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 107,

113 (1992) (explaining child-care provisions along with others as part of a dynamic of"tax politics").
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nature of these expenditures. On the other hand, the segregation of child-care
expenditures from other employee-related or self-employed expenditures
suggests their personal nature. This view is reinforced by the structure of the
credit calculation under section 21. By circumventing the progressive rate
structure to allow for greater reductions in tax liability for lower-income
taxpayers than for higher-income taxpayers, the credit appears more related to
redistribution of wealth concerns than determining the appropriate tax base
under an ideal accretion tax. Arguably, the conflicting interpretations of the tax
provisions appropriately reflect the ambiguity inherent in the business/personal
distinction. Even though the reasoning found in Simons's Personal Income
Taxation, the Smith case, and Surrey's Pathways to Tax Reform resisted the
implications of the "inescapable" problems of the business/personal distinction,
in the political arena, where ambiguity and compromise are coins of the realm,
the idea of an expense having both a business and personal nature appears to
have found support.
The historical devaluation of reproductive labor adds another dimension to
the business/personal controversy surrounding employment-related child-care
expenditures. For expenditures where the distinction between business and
personal is otherwise difficult to make, arguably the tax law should err on the
side of classifying an expenditure as business related. Treating an expenditure,
such as childcare, the same as other business deductions would disrupt the
hierarchical distinction between productive and reproductive labor. By treating
child-care expenditures as personal, the tax law perpetuates the economic
exploitation, sexism, and racism that is rationalized by distinguishing between
public production and private reproduction. Reconnecting the business/personal
distinction to its social, cultural, and economic roots makes the limited tax relief
provided under sections 21 and 129 seem inadequate.
Another reason for favoring a deduction that is not limited either by the
income level of the taxpayer or the amount spent for employment-related
childcare concerns the tax inequity created by the exclusion of child-care
services, performed in the home by parents, from the tax base, and the class,
gender, and race implications of that exclusion. Recent statistics show that the
percentage of married couples with children in which both parents work exceeds
seventy percent for couples with children over age six and is nearly sixty percent
for couples with children under age six. 3 77 Considering the increasing number of
single mothers, we can conclude that the great majority of taxpayers do not enjoy
378
the tax benefit of excluding child-care services performed by a parent.
Arguably, these statistics suggest that the exclusion creates only minor issues of
tax equity because of the ever-increasing rates of two-income couples and single
377. See supra note 145.
378. In 1995, 65% of all "never married" women with children were in the waged labor force and 57%
of all women with children who had been widowed, divorced, or separated were in the waged labor force. See
Nantell, supra note 11, at 883-84.
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mothers.
The antisubordination principle, however, encourages us to look in more
detail at who is most likely to accrue the benefits of tax-free imputed income.379
Data on earnings suggest that the substantially higher salaries and wages paid to
white married men places them in a better financial position to forgo their wives'
waged earnings and enjoy the tax-free benefits of her child-care services.3 °
These statistics suggest that excluding child-care services from income has
significant class and race implications. By allowing a deduction for child-care
expenditures, the tax law indirectly taxes the child-care services enjoyed by oneearner couples. 381 An unlimited deduction would indirectly ameliorate some of
the effects of wage and salary discrimination experienced by women and men of
color in all sectors of the labor market. Yet another consequence of providing an
unlimited deduction for child-care expenditures would be the removal of one
potential economic barrier for women entering the waged labor market. The
income exclusion encourages women to remain in the household, giving
continuing vitality to the cult of respectability.
The arguments just presented for an unlimited child-care deduction
demonstrate how the integration of antisubordination principle into an analysis
of the business/personal distinction and conventional notions of imputed income
can change the character of those common staples of tax analysis. The
antisubordination principle transforms seemingly objective criteria by
reconnecting them with various social and economic institutions. The veil of
objectivity surrounding traditional tax principles is lifted once the historical
context from which they were derived and operate is revealed.
The foregoing analysis remains woefully incomplete because it only indirectly
addresses the issue of economic exploitation of child-care workers. Over time,
and in combination with the successes of other social movements, the
sociopolitical devaluation of reproductive labor and related discriminatory wage
patterns could be countered by an unlimited child-care deduction. In the context
of the social, political, and economic trends today, however, this proposal seems
like nothing more than the substitution of one set of abstractions (the
business/personal distinction, imputed income, and the ideal accretion tax) with
another set (productive/reproductive labor distinction, the public/private
distinction, and stratified reproduction).
The primary problem with the proposal is that it ignores what we know about
379. The text reference to imputed income is based on the traditional definition of imputed income,
which includes in-kind income produced by one family member for another. If a more narrow definition of
imputed income is adopted, the tax equity issue raised in the text would include not only the exclusion of inkind income from child-care services individuals produce for themselves, but also the exclusion of intrafamily
transfers of child-care services. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text (noting that imputed income is
defined to include services provided by one family member for another without any inquiry as to why that is the
appropriate result).
380. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (referring to data showing the relative incomes of
married men based on race).
381. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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today's child-care labor market. Wages for child-care workers are depressed and,
in view of the elasticity of the labor supply, are not likely to increase, even with
increased tax benefits for child-care consumers. 382 Any increase in tax benefits
are far more likely to accrue to the consumers of childcare than they are to trickle
down to child-care workers through increased wages and benefits or improved
working conditions.
One response to this problem might be that an unlimited child-care deduction
be accompanied with increased enforcement of federal and state labor laws and
federal immigration laws to address directly problems in the child-care labor
market through governmental intervention. The current subsidy to the middle
class through the "seepage of unauthorized workers '383 into childcare is
indefensible. 384 Linking an expansion of the child-care deduction that is likely to
benefit the child-care consumer to other labor and immigration policies,
however, without first changing the underlying structures supporting those
policies would seem to betray any commitment to take seriously the economic
exploitation and racism experienced by migrant household workers.
Another response might be the elimination of any tax relief for employmentrelated child-care expenditures. The tax savings from such a measure, projected
in 1997 to have been approximately $3.6 billion,385 could be used to design
child-care programs that could simultaneously increase the availability of
affordable care to lower-income taxpayers and upgrade the working conditions
and wages for child-care workers. One problem with this response is that the loss
of tax relief may increase the incentives for middle-class families to obtain childcare services through the underground economy Although there is no evidence
that increased tax relief will lead to higher wages or better working conditions
for child-care workers, neither is there assurance that the removal of tax benefits
will not detrimentally affect the workers.
The 1996 welfare reform legislation mandates work participation rates by
recipients of benefits.3 86 As part of this legislation, the federal government
382. This analysis relies on the work of A.C. Pigou, who supported the use of tax to correct market
failures. See generally A.C. PiGou, A STUDY INPUBLIC FNANCE (3d ed. 1947). For further discussion of the
relation of Pigou's work to the treatment of child-care expenditures, see Mary L. Heen, Welfare Reform, Child
Care Costs, and Taxes: DeliveringIncreased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 173, 208-09 (1995) (viewing the market failures as having to do with parents' and

society's failure "to invest adequately in children's human capital" and the "constellation of...
economic factors discouraging women from full labor force participation.").

social and

383. Papademetriou, supra note 203, at 28.

384. Some might argue that stricter enforcement of immigration laws might be detrimental to the childcare workers because it would create further barrers to their ability to earn a living. This response is
problematic because it fails to take into account the history of migrant labor in this country and becomes an
excuse for exploitation. See supra notes 68-117, 204-25 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
migrant workers providing domestic services, and specifically child-care services, during the late nineteenth
century and throughout the twentieth century).
385. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supranote 11, at table 1.
386. See Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Center for Law & Social Policy, The
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, 4 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 311, 311-13 (1997);

Mark Greenberg, HHS Policy Guidance on Maintenance of Effort, Assistance, and Penalties: Summary and
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provides block grants to the states for childcare.387 A portion of the child-care
grant money is available only if the state meets certain matching requirements.38 8
Predictions are that the new dollars for childcare fall far short of what would be
needed to implement the new work requirements. 389 Not only does this new
legislation undermine the availability, affordability, and quality of childcare for
low-income families, it also casts doubt on the federal and state governments'
commitment to assuring fair working conditions for child-care workers. Rather
than seeing the recent changes in welfare laws as invigorating a commitment of
federal and state governments to provide quality childcare, state and federal
governments, under the cover of fiscal responsibility, may ultimately place
considerable pressure on child-care workers to keep their compensation low.
Appeals to fiscal responsibility may also be a reason why an unlimited
deduction for employment-related child-care expenditures may be unlikely to
prevail. Nevertheless, the experience over the last four decades suggests that tax
reform related to childcare is more likely to gain legislative support than direct
funding programs. Its appeal to the politically powerful middle class may be
enough at some point in the future to lead policymakers to reorder their fiscal
priorities.390
The question then arises as to what kind of tax reform could avoid the
reinforcement of class, gender, and race hierarchies identified with the current
approach and simultaneously disrupt the economic exploitation of child-care
workers. Two reforms warrant serious consideration in any discussion of the tax
treatment of employment-related child-care expenditures. One would entail a
direct response to the issue of economic exploitation of child-care workers by
abandoning the idea of an unlimited deduction and allowing instead
employment-related child-care expenditures to be deducted only for those childcare expenditures that exceed some percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. For example, assuming a percentage limitation of five percent, if T had
adjusted gross income of $75,000 and employment-related child-care
expenditures of $5,000, Twould be allowed to deduct $1,250 ($5,000 - ($75,000
x .05)). The amount the taxpayer spends on childcare becomes the tool by which
the tax law intervenes into a sector of the labor market that is economically
Discussion, 4 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 315, 319 (1997); Nichola L. Marshall, The Welfare Reform Act of
1996: Political Compromise or Panaceafor Welfare Dependency, 4 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 333, 335
(1997).

387. See Center for Law & Social Policy, supra note 386, at 312.
388. See id
389. See Congressional Budget Office, CBO Memorandum: Federal Budgetary Implications of the
PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, at 13 (Dec. 1996) (estimating a
$1.4 billion shortfall for 1997-2002); see also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S

CHIDREN: YEARBOOK 1997, at 35-38 (1997) (describing unmet need of child-care assistance for low-income
working families and the inadequate funding of child-care assistance for parents forced into the work force
under the 1996 law). But see Jason DeParle, The Welfare Evolution: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1997, at Al (reporting that states are doing more than was expected regarding expanding eligibility for childcare programs and allocating resources to child care).
390. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text discussing changes to the tax treatment of
employment-related child-care expenditures during the 1970s that favored middle-class families.
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exploitative due to class, gender, and race subordination.39' T's expenditures on
child-care services in excess of a minimum amount would be fully deductible.
Keying the amount deductible to the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
ameliorates, to some extent, the problem that an unlimited deduction would
disproportionately benefit higher-income taxpayers.392 If the reform were to
achieve its dual goal of addressing the needs of consumers and providers in the
child-care market, the revenue loss could be as high as would result from the
adoption of an unlimited child-care deduction. Any revenue savings produced by
the limitations should be offset by increased costs of childcare resulting from
improved working conditions and higher wages for child-care workers.
One criticism of denying a deduction for some portion of child-care
expenditures incurred is that it undermines the benefits otherwise achieved by
having the tax law unambiguously treat employment-related child-care
expenditures as a business expense. Although the motivation for the limitations
are quite different, the limitations for child-care expenditures would resemble the
limitations placed on other controversial deductions, such as medical expenses
and casualty losses.393 Perhaps one way to counteract this perception is to allow
the deduction to be taken to reach adjusted gross income so as to distinguish it
from other deductible expenses viewed as personal in nature.394
Another criticism is that consumer expectations and the general view of the
economic worth of child-care services will combine to make the availability of
the tax deduction irrelevant. Instead of encouraging consumers to increase the
wages and improve the working conditions of child-care workers, it may lead to
increased reliance on the underground economy. The history of the child-care
labor market certainly suggests that consumer resistance will be strong. Whether
it is possible to overcome that tradition by setting a standard of fair wages
through the tax law is unknown. To design a tax provision that ignores the reality
of economic exploitation in this labor market, however, seems wholly
unacceptable.
Some of the concern about consumer resistance could be addressed through
an additional reform that would work in conjunction with the first. This reform
391. To avoid the possibility that child-care consumers might further exploit child-care workers and
intensify the racial divisions within child-care services by entering into secondary child-care arrangements,
some type of constraint under either type of reform needs to be placed on the deduction based on the number of
child-care workers hired. See supra note 211 (discussing secondary child-care arrangements).
392. To meet further the needs of low-income taxpayers who incur employment-related child-care
expenditures consistent with encouraging fair wages and working conditions for child-care workers, the
proposal could include a refundable tax feature. That would mean that taxpayers who would otherwise not owe
any taxes would nevertheless receive a tax refund based on the amount of child-care expenditures they had
incurred. For further discussion of refundability, see Nantell, supra note 11, at 937-38, 949.
393. See I.R.C. §§ 165(h) (casualty losses); 213 (medical expenses); William D. Andrews, Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 331-43 (1972) (medical expenditures); Epstein,
supra note 263, at 463-67 (casualty losses); see generally Stanley A. Koppelman, PersonalDeductions Under
an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679 (1988) (analyzing the relationship of income definition to personal
deductions that includes consideration of casualty losses and medical expenses).
394. This would, of course, require the amount to be determined on the basis of a tentatively computed
adjusted gross income amount.
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entails two substantial amendments to section 129. The first change would be to
eliminate the limitation on the amount of child-care assistance employers are
allowed to provide for their employees. The other change would be to allow the
employee to exclude the in-kind or reimbursed amounts from income only if the
employer assures that the child-care workers' working conditions meet certain
criteria, such as a fair salary, reasonable working hours, and provision for family
health care. The exclusion provided under section 129, as amended, would be
more valuable to an employee than the limited deduction proposed above
because the amount of the exclusion would not depend on an employee's
adjusted gross income.395 This difference would encourage employers to
establish child-care assistance programs. One major advantage of employerprovided child-care assistance is that high standards of care by, and working
conditions for, child-care workers are more likely to be achieved. The
government can assure proper working conditions for child-care workers far
more easily through IRS audits of employers of child-care consumers than it can
by trying to regulate the child-care market by investigating individual child-care
workers and consumers. By creating tax incentives for employers to provide
quality child-care assistance programs, current conditions in the child-care
market can be changed dramatically, benefiting both child-care consumers and
child-care workers.396
A second major advantage of employer-provided child-care assistance is that
it would acknowledge employers' partial responsibility for the well-being of their
workers' families. 397 The historical tradition of viewing childcare as private has
not only supported the production/reproduction hierarchy, but has also obscured
the relationship of childcare to production itself. Tax incentives for employerprovided childcare will encourage the marketplace to recognize its coresponsibility for the care and nurturing of young generations who represent the
395. A complete evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages to employees of the proposed
amendments to section 129 requires consideration of state and local income tax rates as well as federal income
tax rates. It also requires consideration of the immediate savings of Social Security taxes compared to potential
reductions in Social Security benefits in the future, which are based on the employee's taxable earnings record.
See supra notes 23, 25 considering the tax treatment of employment-related child-care expenditures and social
security.

396. Recent proposals for lowering corporate taxes for those businesses that provide their workers
attractive compensation packages, including pensions, education and training, health insurance, and profitsharing or stock purchase, parallel the tax reform approach to child-care expenditures that I am suggesting. See
SENATE DEMOCRATIC TASK FORCE ON HIGH-WAGE JOBS, SCRAMBLING TO PAY THE BILLS: BUILDING ALLIES
FOR AMERICA'S WORKING FAMILmES, PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS WAGE AND INCOME STAGNATION AND BOOST

ECONOMIC GROWTH 12-14 (Feb. 28, 1996) (modifying the Boren-Danforth Business Activities Tax proposal,
which is a form of consumption tax); see also Margaret 0. Kirk, Parents, the Ultimate Experts, Critique the
Clinton Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, at 4 (describing President Clinton's child-care proposals, which

include tax credits for companies that offer child-care services for employees); Nantell, supra note 11,at 92737 (describing state tax incentives to employers who provide child-care assistance to their employers); id at
950-51 (describing proposals to provide federal tax incentives to employers who furnish child-care assistance
to employees).
397. See generally Handelman, supra note 231, at 135-36 (through analysis of health care costs,
showing how U.S. tax policy has failed to recognize working people's lives and productive contributions with
the effect that it has failed to account for the human costs of business enterprises through analysis of health care
costs).
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workers of the future. The basis for this tax reform proposal is respect for the
investment in human potential. Promotion of that respect is itself a necessary
component to structural changes that will make the economic
exploitation of
398
economy.
political
our
within
intolerable
child-care workers
This proposal is likely to raise concerns on the part of the Internal Revenue
Service and employers that they have neither the expertise nor the administrative
systems necessary to evaluate the working conditions of child-care workers.
Claims of complexity and unmanageability essentially reflect a general
reluctance in the tax law to scrutinize business arrangements. Deference to the
child-care labor market should be an unacceptable alternative, given its history
and current operation. Before this proposal is rejected as unfeasible, the I.R.S.
should at least have to show, after consulting with the business community,
including small and large businesses, child-care experts, and labor relation
experts, why it is unable to develop workable criteria for administering this tax
provision.
The concern about the feasibility of the proposed employer-provided childcare assistance program raises a broader issue. The obvious criticism of the
limited deduction/exclusion scheme that I am proposing is that it is explicitly
designed to interfere with the marketplace and that such interference is
inconsistent with the widely accepted goals of the federal income tax system. 399
Standard tax analysis evaluates tax reform proposals based on their ability to
avoid distorting economic decisions. If nothing else has been shown in this
article, it is clear that there is no tax response that will not affect the child-care
labor market. Regardless of the existence and/or extent of a deduction for
employment-related child-care expenditures, the issue of economic exploitation
of child-care workers cannot be avoided. A decision not to intervene in that
economic exploitation is as significant as a decision to intervene. The goal of
minimizing distorting economic decisions is based on an assumption that prices
and wages are determined through competitive forces. Introducing the
antisubordination principle into the discussion about the child-care labor market
shows that this assumption was misplaced regarding this market sector. An
argument to preserve the child-care labor market in the name of economic
neutrality ignores the equally important goal that the tax law should not be used
to facilitate class, gender, and race subordination.
The solution I am proposing to the complex set of problems concerning
childcare is imperfect because it is produced out of a set of constrained
circumstances that presents only bad choices. What is more important than the
particulars of the proposal is that the discussion helps us to appreciate how the
tax law is implicated in the social and economic relationships of the parties to an
398. 1 am encouraged to make this proposal by reports of the growing number of employers who are
providing on-site child care for their employees. See Nantell, supra note 11,at 886, 946-48 (reporting that as of
1996 approximately 1400 businesses provided on-site child care). This development suggests a growing
recognition by employees of their responsibility to this generation and future generations of employees.
399. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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economic arrangement. What the discussion of current tax law and possible
reforms shows is that no tax debate about employment-related child-care
expenditures should exclude consideration of how childcare has been
constructed through our social and economic institutions. What the discussion
further accomplishes is the removal of the artificial boundary between tax
concepts designed to implement an ideal accretion tax and the social and
economic environment in which those concepts operate. The point is not to
diminish the importance of the distinction between business and personal or the
concept of imputed income. Rather the point is that those concepts can gain
more analytical power when they are analyzed within a framework that includes
the antisubordination principle.
CONCLUSION

Through a historical examination of domestic work, specifically childcare,
this article uncovers the class, gender, and race implications of the tax law's
child-care provisions. In the process, this article shows how seemingly objective
tax reasoning using seemingly objective principles of tax analysis implicates
issues involving exploitative and subordinating practices. It further shows that
when the principles prove inescapably problematic, stereotypical roles based on
class, gender, and race are relied upon to obscure the inadequacy of the
principles. Finally, it shows how those tax principles might be used in a much
more dynamic fashion to further the dual goals of developing a comprehensive
tax base and disrupting economic arrangements that lead to class, gender, and
race subordination.
The analysis depends on the exploration of the meaning of domestic work and
childcare over time and in various geographical contexts in the United States.
Social and economic beliefs and practices frequently naturalize subordination.
That is, beliefs and practices make subordination seem as though it is based on
objective truth, leading to conclusions that the consequences of the
subordination are fair, inevitable, unchangeable, or unrelated to the acquisition
of wealth and status by others. 400 The problem of identifying subordinating
practices demands a methodology designed to contest theories, ideas, acts, or
facts that are seemingly incontestable. The work of critical race theorists and
legal feminists makes the difficult task of uncovering discrimination in the
marketplace and in the tax law easier. This critical jurisprudence shows how
important history is in providing a context for understanding current practices
and beliefs.4 0 ' It also stresses the importance of examining relevant legal texts for
rhetorical ploys that achieve the appearance of objectivity by relying on

400

See John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory Archie Schepp, and Free Music: Securing an

Authentic IntellectualLife in a MulticulturalWorld, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2142-44, 2206-10 (1992).
401. See id. at 2143-44; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1713-24,

1734-45 (1993).

Yale Joumal of Law and Feminism

[Vol. 10: 307

subordinating beliefs and practices.4 2 I am not suggesting that implementing the
antisubordination principle is easy, but I am suggesting that the difficulties
would be reduced if we expand traditional tax analysis by relying on a welldeveloped critical methodology, which historically contextualizes an issue and
critically examines classic legal texts that have addressed that issue.
At first glance, attributing economic exploitation, sexism, and racism to the
tax code may seem surprising. Admittedly, my linking of the income tax law and
economic and social practices that lead to subordination of persons based on
their class, gender, and race is not the standard fare of tax analysis. When
policymakers address class issues, they typically do so in the context of
evaluating tax reforms in terms of their distributional effects among income
classes.40 3 Seldom are tax rules evaluated by how they may maintain and perhaps
encourage economic exploitation.4° In recent years, some academics have
explored the ways in which the income tax law discriminates against women, in
particular married women.40 5 A few have discussed the ways in which income
tax law treats same-sex couples.4 °6 Far too little analysis has been published
exploring the implications of race in tax law. 40 7 This growing collection of work,
402. See, e.g., Lucinda M_ Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature ofLegal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 887-95 (1989); Harris, supra note 401, at 1750-57.
403. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 16-18; STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., supra note 2, at 34-40; Anne L. Alstott, The EarnedIncome Tax Credit and the Limitations of TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533, 557-58 (1995); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the
Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REv. 961, 1011-12 (1992); Heen, supra note 382, at 189-90; Weiss, supra
note 263, at 239-40, Zelenak, supra note 6, at 369-70.
404. But see generally, e.g., Handelman, supra note 231 (showing how tax analysis fails to recognize
the productive role of workers); Roy, supra note 232 (interrogating the soundness of the personal/business
distinction and revealing how the distinction privileges the business realm while devaluing the contributions of
workers and their families).
405. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 30, at 11-28; Alstott, supra note 9, at 2006-50; Amy C.
Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identiffing and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law,
23 J. L. & POL. 241, 279-354 (1997); Alice Kessler-Harris, "A Principle of Law But Not of Justice": Men,
Women andIncome Taxes in the United States 1913-1948, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 331, 349-60
(1997); Marjorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income
Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 92-111 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality Gender
Discrimination,Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 600-34 (1993); McCaffery, supra
note 18, at 988-96, 1001-29; Zelenak, supra note 254, at 344-81, 401-04.
406. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cam, Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 471, 475-81
(1997) (demonstrating how for unmarried couples the tax law is in many cases unclear and in other cases is
generally disadvantageous); Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, I LAW &
SEXUALITY 97, 111-23 (1991) (analyzing the tax treatment of same-sex couples); Adam Chase, Tax Planning
for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 359, 360-68 (1995) (comparing tax treatment of same-sex
couples and married couples); William V Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of UnmarriedDomestic
Partners,5 B.U. PUB_ INT. L.J. 1, 5-12 (1995) (analyzing tax ramifications of domestic partnerships).
407. But see Brown, supra note 146, at 1488-1507 (compiling income data for married couples based
on race showing that the marriage penalty produced by the joint return in disproportionately paid by low- and
middle-income white wives and African American wives and that the marriage bonus is disproportionately
enjoyed by upper-income white wives); Brown, supra note 196, at 52-54 (evaluating the joint tax return and
providing data showing that white couples are more likely to enjoy the marriage bonus and Black couples are
more likely to suffer the marriage penalty); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 759-803 (studying the differential enjoyment of various tax
benefits by Blacks and whites); john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policy Have Racially
SegregatedAmerica, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 196, at 80, 92-95 (analyzing how the role of the federal
government, including its tax policies, has contributed to racial separation of African American and white
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however, is not viewed as central to an understanding of the basic concepts of
tax law.408 This article attacks the myth that considerations of class, gender, and
race raise tangential tax issues, and shows that tax analysis cannot be done in the
absence of an antisubordination principle.
Policymakers widely accept that the federal tax law should be designed to
meet the goals of equity, administrability, and economic rationality.4°9 They have
pursued these goals predominantly through a technical lens, seeking neutral and
objective solutions.4 1 ° Their attempts to disengage normative questions from
technical ones have led to a cramped view of what constitutes equity,
administrability, and economic neutrality as well as to policies that hinder
redistributive justice.
Under traditional tax analysis, it is easy to forget that the three goals of the
federal tax law are embedded in American political values, which include respect
for individual autonomy, privacy, and free enterprise. For example, a tax rule that
requires a taxpayer to reveal or allow government inspection of information
generally viewed as personal is considered unadministrable because it would
lack public support. Freedom from governmental intervention in an individual's
private life is a strong American political value that carries considerable weight
in debates about current tax law and proposed reforms, even if not consistently
reflected in existing tax laws.
Another strongly held American value reflected in these goals is a
commitment against discrimination on the basis of class, gender, and race. 411 No
one advocates, for example, tax rules that explicitly tax members of the working
class more than capitalists, women more than men, or persons of color more than
whites.412 Although some argue that legal remedies aimed at reducing
discrimination are ineffective and lead to economic inefficiencies,4 13 no one
communities).
408. See Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introductionto TAXING AMERICA, supra note 196, at
2 (discussing the current debate on tax reform and how it fails to take into account issues of class, gender, and
race).
409. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 2, at 6-11; STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., supra note 2, at 30-42.

410. See Lisa Philipps, Discursive Deficits. A Feminist Perspective on the Power of Technical
Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy, 11 CAN. J.L. & SoC'Y 141, 145, 149-51 (1996).

411. The same cannot be said with as much conviction about discrimination based on disabilities or
sexual orientation.
412. Progressive taxation might be described as reflecting class animus against the wealthy. This is not,
however, a rebuttal to the argument in the text because the animus is directed at a group-the wealthy-that
historically and contextually wield considerable economic and social power. Animus toward the wealthy does
not perpetuate domination but disrupts it and should not be equated with animus toward members of the
working class.
413. See, e.g., RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROuNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 28-87 (1992); Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and
Discriminationin Labor Markets, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 891, 901-15 (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Sex DiscriminationLaws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1325-34 (1989). For examples of legal

scholars favoring legal intervention, see Mary E. Becker, BarriersFacing Women in the Wage-Labor Market
and the Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. C-I. L. REV. 934, 940-47
(1986); John J. Donohue m, ProhibitingSex Discriminationin the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56

U. Cm. L. REV. 1337, 1358-68 (1989).
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advocates that the law should be designed to exacerbate marketplace
discrimination.4 14 Policymakers should oppose vigorously any such proposal as
inconsistent with all three goals of the federal tax system that follow from the
American belief in assuring individual dignity and equal opportunity.
They should view the antisubordination principle as merely an extension of
the current tradition of evaluating tax law in terms of its redistributive effects.
Although progressivity frequently is contested,415 tax proposals are typically
debated in terms of their distributional effects among income classes.416
Agreement with the antisubordination principle is not a prerequisite to its
inclusion in tax policy discussions. What is necessary is consensus that a
comprehensive tax analysis includes an evaluation of whether a tax provision
perpetuates or disrupts class, gender, and race subordination.
An analytical framework that combines traditional tax principles with the
antisubordination principle proved fruitful when applied to childcare. Its ultimate
potential is still undetermined. Other specific topics in the tax law need to be
examined to uncover the various ways that tax literature reinforces differential
treatment based on class, gender, and race. The topics should also be analyzed to
determine how our understanding of tax provisions might change through an
examination of the historical context in which the relevant economic
arrangements occur. In addition, a similar analysis needs to be undertaken for the
more general tax structural rules, such as the realization principle, accrual and
cash accounting, and the non-taxation of imputed income from services and
property. Once some of this work is accomplished, we may begin to imagine the
general outlines of a tax system that embraces the goal of a comprehensive tax
base while furthering this country's aspirations and policies to prevent economic
exploitation and promote equality.

414

For a similar analysis of the tax law, see McCaffery, supra note 405, at 597-98.

415. See CHARLES 0. GALVIN & BORIS I. BrrTKER, THE INcoME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT
BE? 14-21, 31-58 (1969); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at ProgressiveTaxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1910-45 (1987); Donna M. Byme, Progressive Taxation

Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 742-71 (1995); Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Rhetoric of the AntiProgressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 470-517 (1987);

Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policyfor Post-LiberalSociety: A Flat-Tax-InspiredRedefinition of the Purpose
and Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 728-35 (1985).

416. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, White House and the G.O.P Announce Deal to Balance Budget and to
Trim Taxes, N.Y TIMES, July 29, 1997, at Al; Jason DeParle, Democrats Invisible Man Specializes in
Making Inequity to Poor Easy to See, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991, at A12; E. J. Dionne, Jr., For Richer,for
Poorer,In Taxes and Ideology, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 22, 1986, at Al 0; Peter G. Gosselin, Soaking the Rich? Or
Just a Return to Pre-Reagan Days?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1990, § National/Foreign, at 1; Steven
Greenhouse, Clinton s Economic Plan: Impact on Individuals; Middle Class and Wealthy to Bear Brunt of

New Taxes, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993, at AI8; Sylvia Nasar, Who Paid the Most Taxes in the 80's? The
Superrich, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, § 3, at 4; Peter Passell, Level Field or Uneven Results? Tallying Up the
What Ifs in the Flat-Tax Proposals, N.Y TINES, Feb. 16, 1996, at D2; Robert Pear, Focus on the Tax

Package: Who Will Pay How Much?, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at D22; Tom Redbum, Tax Hikes to Hit the
Poor,Middle Class, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al; Robert J. Shapiro, Flat Wrong: New Tax Schemes Cank

Top Old Progressive Truths, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1996, § Outlook, at C03; Robin Toner, Major Help
Foundin Tax Billfor Low-Income Households,N.Y TIMES, Aug. 22, 1986, at Al.

